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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates the implications of EU climate change policy for energy intensive 
industries. Specifically, it calculates, for a range of energy-intensive processes and products, 
the product price increases that would be required to maintain unit profits at present levels, 
based on likely values of allowance prices in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
up to 2020. For most of the energy- and carbon-intensive products considered here, an 
allowance price of €20 per tonne of carbon dioxide would require price increases of between 
0.1 to 5% to maintain profits, assuming full pass-through of the allowance price along the 
value chain. Doubling the allowance price to €40/tonne would double the required increase. 
The activities that risk being most challenged by the carbon constraint appear to be container 
glass production using virgin inputs, primary aluminium production, primary steel production 
based on the basic oxygen furnace process, and some basic chemicals production. However, 
the analysis has also shown that for many of these cases alternative production processes 
exist, based on recycled inputs, for example. The cement sector, although very energy- and 
carbon-intensive, is relatively little exposed to international competition. 
Indeed, the paper also investigates in how far it would be possible for the affected activities to 
pass through cost increases to their clients, by analysing their exposure to domestic and 
international competition. It concludes that the sectors analysed are typically relatively highly 
concentrated (sometimes even at the world level) and form parts of vertically integrated and 
locally-clustered value chains. This tends to increase market entry and exit barriers and, thus, 
to reduce the risk of large output losses and delocalisation. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Global climate policies agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) aim to stabilise “greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (UN, 1992). Based on the scientific evidence, the European Union (EU) 
has interpreted this goal as requiring the increase in global temperatures to be kept to at 
most 2° Celsius above pre-industrialisation levels. In order to achieve this with some 
likelihood, scientists estimate that the concentration in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) - the most important greenhouse gas – should be stabilised at no more than 450 to 
500 parts per million volume (ppmv). Historically, the CO2 concentration hovered 
around 200 to 250 ppmv, until industrialisation raised it to its current level of about 370 
ppmv.  
Figure 1: The climate challenge: long-run trends in CO2-concentration in the atmosphere 
and global temperature change 
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Source: Historical CO2 concentrations and temperature variation from Vostok ice core analysis: Barnola 
et al. (2003); temperature measurements since 1856-2000: Parker et al. (2001). 
Limiting the rise in concentrations to 450 to 500 ppmv would require massive changes in 
underlying trends, given the dynamic release of man-made greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere and the stock-flow problem. Indeed, instead of continuing to grow, emissions 
would have to be reduced dramatically in absolute terms, as business as usual scenarios 
predict CO2 concentrations of 800 ppmv or more by the end of this century. 
This is why in 1997, under the umbrella of the UNFCCC, the international community 
agreed an approach to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The approach was based on 
accepting common but differentiated responsibilities between industrialised and 
developing countries. This agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, requires that industrialised 
countries, being mainly responsible for the prevailing level of greenhouse gas 
concentrations, should deliver first by reducing their emissions and by transferring 
technical know how to developing economies.  
So far, it is mainly the EU that has taken the lead in unilaterally committing itself to 
ambitious emission reduction objectives. However, efforts to achieve these come at a 
price, as they impose additional costs on European industries and consumers. Moreover, 
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they run the risk of undermining these industries' economic performance when other 
major emitters and competitors do not join this effort. In the worst case, European 
producers would lose out to their competitors without the environmental objective being 
achieved due to “carbon leakage”1. This is a particular concern as regards energy and 
emission intensive industries exposed to intense international competition. 
This study tries to shed some light on these claims and fears. However, it does not draw 
policy conclusions. This is left to the reader. Chapter 2 tries to identify energy intensive 
industries and measures their weight in the total economy. It tries to analyse how they 
differ and what they have in common, and where they are located. 
Chapter 3 tries to measure and quantify the potential cost increases these industries 
would incur due to the imposition of a carbon constraint. This is done by first calculating 
the emission intensities of different production processes, as well as the imputed 
emissions from upstream industries. In applying a carbon price of €20/tCO2 to these 
emissions, which is typically assumed to be the cost of the carbon constraint imposed on 
the European economy by the Kyoto protocol, valid until 2012, the cost increases can be 
calculated for each product and sector. The study takes into account the direct and 
indirect effects of such a carbon constraint along the value chain, by assuming that 
electricity producers fully pass through higher (opportunity) costs due to the carbon 
constraint to energy (and electricity) intensive industries. 
Chapter 4 analyses the exposure of these industries to international competition and the 
potential impacts of cost increases on their production and export performance. Evidence 
of market dynamics, including price developments, output changes and changes in the 
trade balance are analysed. However, data available do not allow robust price elasticities 
of demand to be estimated at the level of disaggregation necessary for this study. 
Chapter 5 reviews different studies that aim to estimate the potential branch-level and 
wider economic impacts of such cost increases, including the risk of carbon leakage. In 
particular, the potential knock-on effects on output prices and their impact on the 
competitiveness and profitability of the different branches are analysed. The analysis is 
completed by an effort to quantify the potential economy-wide implications and a first 
effort is made to analyse ex-post the branch-specific effects of the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) in place since 2005. Chapter 6 offers some conclusions. 
This study could be used as an input to develop EU-wide emission benchmarks for 
energy and carbon-intensive industries, if these were to be based on the information 
gathered by the European Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau (IPPC). 
Annex I provides a statistical overview of energy and carbon intensities of about 100 
products and production processes, the cost and price implications of imposing on them a 
carbon constraint of either €20/tonne of CO2 or €40/tonne of CO2, as well as an 
indication of their exposure to international trade. This annex is based on a homogenous 
database (Prodcom from Eurostat), and uses energy and market prices of 2006 to better 
compare different sectors, products and production processes. 
Nevertheless, this study does not aim to provide a complete picture of the impact of 
imposing a carbon constraint on all energy-intensive industrial activities in the EU. 
 
1 Carbon leakage refers to a phenomenon in which carbon-intensive activities are moved, either through 
foreign trade or relocation of production plants, from the countries implementing climate policies to 
non-abating countries. 
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Instead, it tries to illustrate the design of a method that aims to quantify the issues at 
stake in the policy context of the EU embarking on an active and ambitious climate 
policy. To this end, it therefore tries to rely exclusively on publicly available, 
comparable, well-defined and verifiable data. Thus, information provided confidentially 
by stakeholders, data not based on market transactions or that could not be verified, did 
not enter this analysis. 
2. IDENTIFYING ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES AND THEIR ECONOMIC WEIGHT  
According to the “Energy Products Tax” directive (Directive 2003/96 EC, OJ L283 of 
31.10.2003), “an "energy-intensive business" shall mean a business entity … where 
either the purchases of energy products and electricity amount to at least 3.0% of the 
production value or the national energy tax payable amounts to at least 0.5% of the added 
value.” Businesses meeting one of these criteria are eligible for preferential tax 
treatment, the features of which are largely left at the discretion of Member States. 
For the purposes of this study and as a starting point2, an energy-intensive industry has 
been defined as a NACE (the statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Communities) 3-digit heading (or 2-digit, if there is no 3-digit breakdown) in 
which annual purchases of energy products, including electricity, amount to at least 3.0% 
of annual turnover, both values calculated at EU-level3. Using this criterion, some 17 
manufacturing industry branches (out of 103) were energy-intensive in 2004. The 
energy-intensive industries are in the sectors of building materials, ferrous and non-
ferrous metals, chemicals, textiles and pulp and paper. Figure 2 ranks these sectors 
according to the importance of energy costs in their turnover, while Figure 3 ranks them 
in terms of their share in total manufacturing industry value added. 
Figure 2: Energy costs of energy-intensive industries in EU 21, 2004 
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Source: Eurostat: Structural business statistics 
                                                 
2  Later on, this level of aggregation will prove to be inappropriately high, as it pools together very 
energy intensive businesses with others that hardly consume more energy than the rest of the 
economy. 
3  All data used in this section come from Eurostat’s structural business statistics for 2004, the most 
recent year for which data were available. It is unclear whether energy produced “on site” and used in 
production is included in the data. Bulgaria, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovenia have 
not reported data on industrial energy purchases, so they have not been included in the analysis. 
References in this section and the next one to “EU” should therefore be understood as referring to the 
remaining 21 Member States.  
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From Figure 2, it can be seen that in 2004, energy purchases amounted to 1.7% of 
turnover in manufacturing industry as a whole, but to almost 6% in the energy-intensive 
industries. Among the latter, cement and brick manufacture is almost twice as energy-
intensive again as the next most energy-dependent sector (measured by the share of 
energy purchases in turnover), pulp and paper. 
These energy-intensive branches accounted for about 2.1% of GDP and employed about 
3.7 million people, 1.9% of the total EU labour force. Also, while they account for only 
11.4% of manufacturing employment they account for 13.7% of manufacturing industry 
value-added, as these industries are typically rather capital intensive. Within the energy-
intensive branches, the relative economic importance of basic chemicals manufacture can 
be seen from Figure 3. The “basic chemicals” branch accounted for almost one-third of 
value-added in all energy-intensive industries. Seven of the seventeen energy-intensive 
branches (basic chemicals, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, metals casting, pulp and 
paper, glass and cement) account for over three-quarters of value-added generated by the 
energy-intensive industries. The other energy-intensive branches each contribute less 
than 0.5% to total manufacturing industry value-added. 
Figure 3: Value added of energy-intensive industries in EU 21, 2004 
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Source: Eurostat: Structural business statistics 
Although the above is based on a quite disaggregated analysis of manufacturing industry 
– some 103 branches were distinguished – identifying the potential impact of climate 
change policies on particular energy-intensive activities and products and the economic 
significance of these impacts requires still more detailed data. For example, the “non-
ferrous metals” sector includes activities (such as aluminium production) that are highly 
energy-intensive alongside others that are less so. And within these more disaggregated 
sectors, such as aluminium production, there exist once again rather big differences in 
energy intensity: producing primary aluminium (based on virgin alumina) requires about 
20 times as much energy input as producing secondary aluminium (based on aluminium 
scrap). Indeed, with rising product prices some of these less energy-intensive important 
 5
activities (often representing half of the overall EU production) may fall out of the 
definition of an "energy intensive business" used in the "Energy Products Tax" directive. 
Chapter 3 thus looks at a number of energy-intensive products in more depth and at a 
more disaggregated level and tries to arrive at more precise estimates of their economic 
importance and the impact of imposing a carbon constraint with a CO2 price of €20/tonne 
of CO2 on their costs. 
As can be seen from Figure 4 below, there are considerable differences between Member 
States in the energy-intensiveness of manufacturing industry. In particular, and as might 
be expected from data on economy-wide energy intensity, manufacturing industry in the 
“new” Member States is in general considerably more energy-intensive than in the “old” 
Member States. The five Member States in which energy forms the largest share of 
turnover all joined the EU in 2004 or later, while only in one of the “new” Member 
States (Hungary) is manufacturing industry less energy-intensive than the (weighted) EU 
average. Romanian manufacturing industry spends proportionately almost 5 times more 
of its turnover on energy purchases than the EU average. 
Figure 4: Energy costs of manufacturing industry by country, 2004 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
EU
Ro
ma
nia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
La
tvi
a
Cy
pr
us
Es
to
nia
Po
rtu
ga
l
Be
lgi
um
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bli
c
Lit
hu
an
ia
Au
str
ia
Ita
ly
Sw
ed
en
Fi
nla
nd
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
Ge
rm
an
y
Sp
ain
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
De
nm
ar
k
Hu
ng
ar
y
Fr
an
ce
Ire
lan
d
in % of 
manufacturing 
industry 
turnover
 
Source: Eurostat: Structural business statistics 
These differences in energy intensity for manufacturing industry as a whole mean that 
the share of energy-intensive industries in manufacturing value added is also much more 
important in the “new” than in the “old” Member States. In Romania, 61 of the 103 
NACE branches report energy purchases greater than or equal to 3% of turnover, 
compared to 16 in Germany, for example. Consequently, more than 80% of value added 
in Romanian manufacturing industry is generated in energy-intensive branches (Figure 
5). 
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Figure 5: Value added of energy-intensive industries by country, 2004 
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Source: Eurostat: Structural business statistics 
It seems reasonable to expect that as the “new” Member States advance further in their 
restructuring process, they will become less energy-intensive. In the short- and medium-
term, however, the economic impacts of higher energy prices, whether caused by policy 
or markets, will be more severe than in the rest of the EU. 
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3. ESTIMATING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS OF AN EU CARBON CONSTRAINT 
FOR PRODUCTS OF SELECTED ENERGY-INTENSIVE BRANCHES 
The previous chapter aimed to identify the energy-intensive industries and indicate their 
contribution to manufacturing industry and the economy as a whole. Based on the 
branches identified as being energy-intensive, this chapter looks at a number of energy-
intensive products within these branches, with a view to providing more refined 
indicators of their role in the economy and to try to arrive at more precise estimates of 
the impact of a carbon constraint and CO2 prices on their costs.  
3.1. Procedure for calculating key energy- and emissions-related data for energy 
intensive industries 
The European Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau studied about 30 
different industries with a considerable environmental impact and published for each 
industry a comprehensive reference document on "Best Available Techniques" (BAT). 
Under Directive 1996/61/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control 
(IPPC) (OJ L257, 10 October 1996), the Commission organises an exchange of 
information on “Best Available Techniques” (BAT). The “Best Available Techniques” 
represent the techniques that are the most effective in achieving a high level of protection 
of the environment as a whole and that are developed on a scale which allows 
implementation in the relevant industrial sector under economically and technically 
viable conditions, taking into account the costs and advantages of applying them. The 
results of the information exchange take the form of BAT “Reference Documents” (the 
so-called BREFs). The information exchange is inclusive and organized with the 
Member States and other stakeholders representing the industrial sectors concerned and 
the environmental NGOs. Thirty-one BREFs have been adopted by the Commission 
covering all the IPPC industrial sectors. A process has also started to review and update 
the existing documents. The BREFs have to be taken into account by competent 
authorities to set BAT-based permit conditions.  
The BREF reports contain for each industry a detailed description of the main product 
groups, their production technologies and their associated input mass flows and 
emissions. Based on this comprehensive survey, and on data on energy prices, the energy 
intensity, CO2-intensity as well as energy cost and incremental cost for ETS allowances 
can be calculated for most energy-intensive products. The energy and consumption levels 
used in this study represent typical or average levels of the currently installed capacities, 
which were taken from the status quo description in the BREF reports. Hence, it is 
important to note that the energy and CO2-intensities calculated in this study do not refer 
to advanced low energy or low carbon technologies. 
The BREF report for each industry gives a comprehensive overview of data on energy 
input for the main products. For each product group the specific energy input data in 
energy units per tonne of final product are specified for several technologies. In the 
summary tables, the figures of the specific energy input in the form of fuel and electricity 
refer to typical values of existing European plants. The energy intensity of the product 
group is then given as the sum of the specific heat and electricity consumed. 
The CO2-intensity of each product group is calculated based on the input energies and 
CO2 emission factors for the energy sources used. Values for CO2 emission factors are 
given in tonnes of CO2 emitted per GJ and are listed for various energy sources in Table 
1. The CO2 emission factors are the default emission factors of the Intergovernmental 
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Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and are also used by Eurostat. To calculate the CO2-
intensity of one product group, several energy sources (natural gas, fuel oil, electricity, 
etc) and their corresponding CO2 emission factors have been taken into account. In this 
way, the CO2-intensity per tonne of final product is obtained. 
Subsequently for each product group the incremental cost of imposing a carbon 
constraint is calculated based on 
• the total CO2-intensity including – where applicable – the imputed CO2-intensity 
originating from purchasing of electricity and other feed materials. An overall carbon 
intensity along the value chain is also calculated. In this sense, the term “integrated” 
CO2- and energy intensity refers to summing-up the CO2- and energy intensities in the 
last production step and in the preceding production processes of feed materials. Thus, 
integrated CO2- and energy intensities cover both the “direct” (process) emissions and 
the “indirect” (upstream) emissions. They have been calculated for steel from 
integrated steelworks, primary aluminium production, primary copper production and 
diverse chemicals and polymers. 
• an assumed allowance price of €20/tCO2 (the forward price of allowances for 2008-
2012 in the EU ETS in mid-July 2007) 
• full cost pass-through by upstream suppliers (such as electricity suppliers) of CO2 
prices.  
The resulting cost increases were then, for information and illustration purposes, also 
expressed as (i) a percentage of energy costs (before additional allowance costs) and - 
where possible, that is, where reliable price information could be found - (ii) as a 
percentage of the output price.4  
Table 1: CO2-emission factors 
Fuel kgCO2/kWh tCO2/GJ 
Coal 0.3388 0.0941 
Coke 0.3816 0.1060 
Natural gas 0.2008 0.0558 
Gasoline/diesel/heavy fuel oil 0.2639 0.0733 
Electricity (EU average) (2) 0.43 0.12 
Electricity (coal, 35% efficiency)  0.968 0.268 
Electricity (natural gas, 45% efficiency)  0.446 0.124 
Sources and footnotes: (1) Source of the CO2 emission factors: IPCC (2007).  
 (2) CO2 emissions from public electricity and heat production in the EU-15 in 2005 amounted to 1,003.9 
million tonnes (EEA (2007); the electricity consumption in the EU-15 amounted in 2005 to 8.798 
Exajoules (1 EJ = 1018 J). Thus, a CO2-intensity of electricity of 0.114 tCO2/GJ for the EU-15 results. The 
0.12 tCO2/GJ given in the table should be regarded as an approximation.  
                                                 
4  Others, such as McKinsey/Ecofys (2006), express this additional cost as a percent of production costs. 
As these are typically somewhat lower than the output price the percentage increase looks more 
important. However, as no reliable production-cost data (except energy costs) were available at the 
level of disaggregation analysed here, only references to output prices could be given.  This, however, 
seems to be defensible as after all the potential impact on output prices would determine the impact on 
competitiveness. 
Table 2: Energy prices per unit of energy 
 Price Energy content Specific energy price 
per energy unit (€/GJ) 
Coal €63/t (7000kcal/kg) (1) 29.3 GJ/t 2.2  
Coke €156/t (1) 27 GJ/t 5.8  
Gas oil €440/t (2) 42 GJ/t 10.5 
Natural gas €222/1000m³ (3) 39 MJ/m³ 5.7  
Electricity €51/MWh (4) 3.6 GJ/MWh 14.2  
Sources and footnotes: (1) EURACOAL Market Report 1/2007. (2) Price from gas oil futures, May 2007, 
EcoWin. (3) Natural gas: "Russian border price" taken from EcoWin, May 2007. (4) Baseload at 
European Energy Exchange in May 2007. 
Throughout this study, for electricity the average CO2-intensities based on the average 
fuel mix for producing electricity in the EU of 0.12 tCO2/GJ have been used. In some 
cases, CO2-intensities of alternative fuel mixes were also taken into account for 
illustrative purposes. For instance, for the electricity-intensive primary aluminium 
industry, carbon intensities were also calculated based on electricity generated from coal 
only.  
Coal-based electricity (35% efficiency) is with 0.268 tCO2/GJ more than twice as carbon 
intensive as the average EU electricity mix. Electricity from coal accounts for 30% of the 
electricity generation in the EU-27. At EU level, the carbon-intensive electricity 
generation from coal is somewhat counterbalanced by significant shares of CO2-neutral 
nuclear (31%) and renewable (14%) electricity generation as well as a 20% share of 
electricity generated from natural gas. The carbon intensity of electricity based on natural 
gas (45% efficiency) of about 0.124 tCO2/GJ approximately matches the average EU 
electricity carbon intensity (0.12 tCO2/GJ). This differs very much from the carbon 
intensity of the fuel mix used for electricity production back in the early 1970s, when it 
was approximately 0.19tCO2/GJ . 
Figure 6: Distribution of energy sources of electricity production in the EU-19, 1971 and 
2003  
2003
Coal 33%
Oil 5%Hydro 9%
Nuclear 31%
Gas 18%
Renew ables 
4%
3,031 TWh1971
Coal 47%
Oil 24%
Hydro 18%
Nuclear 4%
Gas 6%
Renew ables 
1%
1,296 TWh
CO2 free 
 
Source: IEA 
EU-19 refers to EU-15 plus Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
The scope of this study comprises more than only the CO2 emissions of the industrial 
sectors currently included in the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). The 
industry sectors currently covered by the ETS directive comprise CO2 emissions in the 
production and processing of ferrous metals, the mineral industry (that is, cement, glass, 
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ceramics), mineral oil refineries, coke ovens and the paper & pulp industry. In addition, 
this study covers the non-ferrous metals industries (aluminium and copper refining) and 
parts of the chemical industry. The subsectors in the chemical industry cover large 
volume production of inorganic chemicals, fertilisers, chlor-alkali, organic chemicals and 
polymers.  
The definition of greenhouse gases in the ETS directive (Annex II) includes, in addition 
to CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). However, the ETS to date 
covers only CO2 emissions. As it is potentially feasible that the current trading scheme 
will be extended to non-CO2 greenhouse gases, this study also addresses additional 
emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in the aluminium industry (PFCs) as well as in 
the chemical industry (mainly N2O). 
The tables below contain three columns with information on the final energy intensity: 
The first column refers to fuel-related energy sources where the specific type actually 
used (natural gas, fuel oil, coal, . . .) is not mentioned explicitly, but accounted for in the 
calculation of the CO2-intensity. The second column shows the electricity intensity. 
Finally, in the third column the values of both columns are summed up to give the total 
final energy intensity of the product. 
The prices for energy products given in Table 2 refer to prices observable in early/mid 
2007. Specific energy prices per energy unit (€/GJ) are calculated from the listed energy 
contents and prices for energy products.  
The energy costs per tonne of product, which are calculated in the following tables of 
this chapter, are based on the specific energy prices given in Table 2. 
As regards electricity prices, imposing a CO2 price of €20/tonne and assuming a full pass 
through of these higher (opportunity) costs to downstream industries triggers a price 
increase from €51/MWh to almost €60/MWh, or 17%, for electricity consumers. This 
increase is based on the assumption that all electricity producers (including nuclear and 
hydro) pass through a cost increase that mirrors the carbon content of the average fuel 
mix in the EU (see Figure 6). 
No distinction is made with respect to the initial allocation method in the European 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), as differentiating between opportunity costs (in 
case of a free allocation) and financial costs (in case of selling allowances at the market 
price) does not make a difference as regards (cost) competitiveness but only as regards 
profitability. For easier understanding, however, it should be assumed that all allowances 
would have to be purchased by energy-intensive industries.5  
3.2. Iron and Steel Industry (DJ271) 
Steel is one of the most common materials in the economy and is a major component in 
buildings, tools, automobiles, and appliances. It is used extensively in both the 
investment goods industry (construction, machinery, heavy transport) and in the 
consumer goods industry (automotive, household appliances, packaging). There exists a 
huge variety of different steel grades distinguished by composition and application.  
 
5  See chapter 5 for a more sophisticated discussion of this issue. 
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The globalisation of the world economy has had a profound effect on the steel industry, 
which is undergoing intensive structural changes. This is characterised by the 
development of new concepts in steel working (for example, mini-electric steel mills, 
new concepts for electric arc furnaces, new casting techniques and direct or smelting 
reduction techniques). Highly competitive market conditions may accelerate this 
structural change, encouraging consolidation in the steel industry. This is evident from 
the growing number of alliances, co-operative ventures and takeovers (BREF-steel). 
In the EU-25, the iron and steel sector accounts for about 19 percent of total 
manufacturing energy consumption. The value added of the sector amounted to about 
€30 billion in 2004, which is approximately two percent of the value added of the total 
manufacturing sector in the EU-25. The turnover of the steel industry in the EU-25 
reached about €138 billion in 2004, up from about €93 billion in 2002. The steel sector in 
the EU employs about 370,000 people.  
In 2005, the EU-25 steel industry produced 187 million tonnes of steel products, which 
corresponds to about 17% of world production. Over the past decade, the level of EU-25 
output has been increasing at an average annual rate of about one-half percent. 
Production is rather highly concentrated: the top five steel producers in the EU hold 
more than 50% of the market, and the market share of the top ten approaches 70%. The 
high capital intensity together with substantial minimum size requirements for integrated 
steelworks (see below) and the vertically integrated value chain make both entry and exit 
very difficult in this market segment. 
Over the past century, the EU and the US dominated the world market both as producers 
and consumers. That, however, has changed in the past five years with a single country, 
China, emerging as a main market player on both the supply and the demand side. China 
has become the world’s largest steel producer, surpassing the EU. In 2005, China 
generated about one-third of both world supply and demand. 
From 2002 to 2006 world steel production and consumption increased by about 37% to 
about 1.2 billion tonnes of steel. The main reason for the extensive overall increase had 
been the booming Chinese manufacturing and construction sector. In China steel 
production more than doubled (+136 %) and steel consumption almost doubled (+ 94 %) 
from 2001 to 2006, and China turned from a net importer to a net exporter of steel 
products.  
The opposite is true for the EU. While from 2001 total EU exports have increased from 
24 million tonnes to 31.5 million tonnes in 2006, total imports to the EU have increased 
even faster from 21.7 million tonnes in 2001 to about 37.5 million tonnes. As a result, the 
EU’s trade balance in steel quantity shifted and the EU became in 2006 a net importer of 
steel after having been a net exporter for the last years. The main reason for this 
development is rapid growth in imports from China, which is now the second largest 
exporter of steel to the EU, after Russia. In the past few years, driven by high demand 
from China, prices boomed both for steel, for its raw materials (coke, iron ore and scrap) 
and for its transport.  
Two main process routes for steel making can be distinguished, the classic “blast 
furnace/basic oxygen furnace” route, and direct melting of scrap (that is, electric arc 
furnace). In the EU, about two thirds of crude steel are produced via the blast furnace 
route (primary steel), about one third is produced in electric arc furnaces (secondary 
steel) by melting of scrap. 
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A blast furnace uses coke and sinter or pellets (sometimes in combination) as input 
materials. The output of the blast furnace is ‘pig iron’ which is further refined in the 
basic oxygen furnace (BOF). In an integrated steelworks the preparation of the input 
materials (coke, sinter, pellets) as well as the actual steel-making process (blast furnace 
and basic oxygen furnace) form an integrated value chain (recovery of process gases and 
energy). However, steel can also be produced in a stand-alone blast furnace/basic oxygen 
furnace route. Coke, sinter and pellets have then to be delivered and produced elsewhere.  
The main reducing agents in a blast furnace are coke and powdered coal forming carbon 
monoxide and hydrogen, which reduce the iron oxides. Coke and powdered coal also 
partly act as a fuel. Coke is the primary reducing agent in blast furnaces and cannot be 
wholly replaced by other fuels such as coal.  
The objective in oxygen steelmaking is to oxidise the undesirable impurities (mainly 
carbon) contained in the metallic feedstock produced in the blast furnace (reducing 
carbon content from about 4% to less than 1%). In modern basic oxygen plants heat and 
gas is recovered, so that the process becomes a net producer of energy. 
Due to heat recovery during the BOF-process, the BOF-process is a net energy producer 
(negative energy intensities in Table 3). The CO2-intensity of the BOF-process is almost 
negligible in comparison to the blast furnace process.  
The overall balance of energy and CO2 of primary steelmaking along the value chain is 
referred to in Table 3 as “Integrated Steelworks”, and summarises the overall CO2- and 
energy intensity of the pelletisation & sintering process, the blast furnace and the basic 
oxygen furnace.  
The integrated steelworks process has an energy intensity of about 19.8 GJ/tst, a CO2-
intensity of about 2.1 tCO2/tst, and energy costs of about €114/tst. The total cost for the 
CO2 allowances needed amounts to €42.5/tst and is in the range of 6.5% (e.g. ingots, flat 
semi-finished products) to 12.1% (hardened steel plates, railway material) of current steel 
product prices. The CO2 allowance cost corresponds to about 37% of the energy cost. 
The calculated allowance costs of €42.5/tst are in good accordance with total allowance 
costs of the integrated steel route €41.2/tst mentioned in a recent IEA report (IEA 
(2005))6. 
In an integrated steelworks using the “Blast furnace/basic oxygen furnace” route mainly 
flat products are produced. In mini-mills using the electric arc furnace (EAF) route 
mainly long products from scrap steel are produced. 
The direct smelting of iron-containing materials (secondary steel) such as scrap is usually 
performed in electric arc furnaces (EAF) which play an important and increasing role in 
modern steel works concepts. The major feedstock for the EAF is ferrous scrap, which 
may comprise scrap from inside the steelworks, cut-offs from steel product 
manufacturers and capital or post-consumer scrap (for example, end of life products). 
 
6  The €41.2/tst refer to an allowance price of €20/tCO2. However, the actual figure mentioned in the IEA 
report is based on an allowance price of €10/tCO2 and consequently amounts to €21.6/tst. 
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Table 3: Energy and CO2-related data for the iron and steel industry (DJ271) 
Cost for CO2 allowance  Fuel 
(1) 
 
(GJ/tst) 
Electricit
y  
 
 
 
(GJ/tst) 
Energy 
intensity 
 
 
(GJ/tst) 
CO2 
intensity 
 
(tCO2/tst) 
Energy 
cost 
 
 
(€/tst) 
Prices 
 
 
 
(€/tst) 
Euro 
 
(€/tst)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentage 
of product 
price (%) 
Coke Oven 
Plant 
3.3 n/a 3.3 0.35 19.1 160 (8) 7 36.6 4.4 
Pelletisatio
n 
1.3 0.1 1.4 0.1 8.5 n/a 2.6 30.6 n/a 
Sintering 1.5 0.2 1.7 0.2 11.4 n/a 3.6 31.6 n/a 
Blast 
Furnace 
18.6 0.1 18.7 1.95 102 450 (2) 39 38.2 8.7 
Basic 
Oxygen 
Furnace 
(BOF) 
-0.65(11) 0.08 -0.57(11) 0.01 -2.6(11) 450 (2) 0.25 n.a. <0.1 
Integrated 
Steelworks 
(5)(7) 
SP(6): 61% 
19.4 (7) 0.35 (7) 19.8 (7) 2.1 (7)(9) 109 (7) 450 (2) 
350 to 
650 (3)
42.5 
(5)
38.9 9.4 (4) 
6.5 to 12.1 
(3)  
Electric Arc 
Furnace 
(EAF) (5) 
SP(6): 39% 
1 1.5 2.5 0.41 (10) 30 450 (2) 
350 to 
650 (3)
8.2 
(5)
27.3 1.8 (4) 
1.3 to 2.3 
(3)
Source: Energy consumption of current installations of the European iron and steel industry reported in 
BREF-steel. 
(1) "Fuels" refers here to several fuels: coke, coal, coke oven gas, natural gas, oil, etc. Each of these fuels has been 
accounted according to the input parameters given in the BREFs. 
(2) An average steel price of $600/t is assumed; this results in €444/t (exchange rate: €1 = $1.35).  
(3) A price range (350-650 €/t) is given as the actual price depends on the steel product. Prices for diverse steel 
products are derived from the PRODCOM database of EUROSTAT. The lower end of the price range corresponds to 
products like ingots or flat semi-finished products whereas the upper range corresponds to hardened steel plates, rolled 
bars in bearing steel or railway material. 
(4) based on a steel price of €450/t. 
(5) Further processing (rolling, finishing, etc) is not taken into account. 
(6) SP: share of production. 
(7) The energy and CO2 intensities for the integrated steelworks are based on the sum of gross consumption of the 
processes along the value chain: sintering and pelletising (average of both processes used), blast furnace, basic oxygen 
furnace.  
(8) Coke price: 175 $/t (fob-China) + 35 $/t (freight) (EURACOAL (2007)); exchange rate: 1€ = 1.35$; resulting in a 
coke price of: €156/t  
(9) Total CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne of steel in the integrated BOF process are: 2.074 tCO2 and 
1.975 tCO2 (for two Western plants) (IEA (2005)), 2.0 tCO2 (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)) and 1.8 tCO2 (Lund (2007)). 
(10) Total CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne of steel in the EAF process are: 0.4 tCO2 (IEA (2005)) and 
0.4 tCO2 (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)) and 0.5 tCO2 (Lund (2007)). 
(11) Negative figures refer to energy gain (BOF process is net energy producer). 
The direct melting of steel using electric arc melting has an energy intensity of about 2.5 
GJ/tst, which corresponds to energy costs of about €30/tst. The total CO2-intensity of the 
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EAF route amounts to 0.41 tCO2/tst. This figure includes CO2 emissions of the carbon 
electrodes and CO2 degassing of the oxidised carbon in melted steel, which together 
amount to a CO2-intensity of about 0.15tCO2 per tonne of steel. Assuming an allowance 
price of €20/tCO2 the total CO2 emissions of the EAF route amount to €8.2 per tonne of 
steel. This corresponds to €6.8/tst of total carbon allowance cost calculated in a recent 
IEA report for the EAF process (IEA (2005))7.  
The calculated cost increase of €8.2/tst due to the CO2 allowance is in the range of 1.3% 
to 2.3% (depending on the product) of current steel prices. The CO2 allowance cost 
would add about 27% to the energy cost for the direct melting of steel. 
 
3.3. Aluminium (DJ2742) 
Aluminium is characterised by several desired material properties (ductile, good thermal 
conductivity) and is easy to process (casting, extruding, machining). Due to its desirable 
properties, aluminium is widely used in transportation, packaging and construction 
industries. Aluminium alloys combine light weight with high strength and are therefore 
vital to the transportation industry (aerospace, automotive, rail), construction sector and 
the packaging industry. Carbon fibres and other composite materials are increasingly 
used to substitute for aluminium in certain applications. 
Total EU production of refined aluminium in 2005 was about 8 million tonnes. About 4.6 
million tonnes of this output (58% of total production) is made up of much less energy-
intensive secondary aluminium, which has been constantly increasing. The primary 
production accounts for about 3.3 million tonnes (42% of total production). The turnover 
of the aluminium industry in the EU-25 was €38.5 billion in 2004 and value added was 
about €8 billion. In 2006 the exports of the EU-25 amounted to about €8 billion; imports 
at €15.5 billion were almost twice as high as exports. The EU aluminium industry 
directly employs about 200,000 people, mainly in small-scale secondary aluminium 
smelters.  
From 1990 to 2005 aluminium prices have oscillated in a range from $1200/t to $2000/t. 
However, as of 2005 prices increased substantially from about $1,800/t to reach a peak in 
May 2007 with about $2,800/t and subsequently decreased to about $2400/t in November 
2007. Due to the dollar devaluation the price in euro decreased from its peak value of 
about €2080/t in May 2007 to values in the range of €1800/t to €1900/t. In the overview 
Table 4 the aluminium price of May (€2080/t) was used as the energy prices (such as for 
electricity) were also based on May values (see Table 2). 
In 2005, 24 primary aluminium smelters were operating in the EU, and a further 13 in the 
EEA. Primary aluminium is a global market that is highly concentrated: the top three 
producers account for more than 32% of the global market. In Europe, the number of 
companies involved in secondary aluminium production is much larger (265). There are 
about 200 companies whose annual production of secondary aluminium is more than 
1,000 tonnes per year (BREF-nonferro). 
                                                 
7 The €6.8/tst mentioned refers to an allowance price of €20/tCO2. However, the actual figure mentioned 
in the IEA report is based on an allowance price of €10/tCO2 and consequently amounts to €3.4/tst. 
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Actually, for primary aluminium production, energy prices determine the location of 
smelters, and EU or US locations can hardly compete any longer with newly emerging 
locations in developing countries or countries (such as Iceland) with abundant energy 
resources as compared to genuine domestic needs. There, the first clients of new large-
scale hydro power plants often are aluminium smelters and they do not compete with 
other energy consumers as is the case in densely populated and industrialised countries. 
Thus, it is expected that most primary aluminium smelting capacity in Europe and in the 
United States is likely to shut down over the next 20 years (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)). 
However, in Europe primary aluminium production is often part of a vertically-integrated 
value chain of production and further processing, as integrating and locally clustering 
these activities allows for exploiting important economies of scope. Thus, relocating 
primary aluminium production would also imply forgoing these cost savings. 
Since 1990 world aluminium consumption almost doubled, passing from 19 million 
tonnes in 1990 to 37 million tonnes in 2007, mainly due to booming demand from Asia. 
The dominant trend in aluminium production over the last two decades has been the 
relative decline in market strength of the traditional suppliers, EU-25 and the USA. By 
2004 the number of newly emerged producers had risen significantly. China in particular 
accounted in 2004 for 23% of the world production and had overtaken the position of the 
EU and USA. The EU's share of refined aluminium production fell by 8% percentage 
points from 1982 to 2004 and the USA's share fell by 15% percentage points. 
Contrary to the decrease in production, both EU and the USA maintained their share of 
consumption of refined aluminium. With about 12 million tonnes, the EU is with the US 
still the largest aluminium market. This resulted in a declining ratio of production to 
consumption, which in the case of EU-25 primary aluminium, dropped from 71% to 45% 
over the past two decades, a factor related to the fact that there has been no investment in 
new capacities for 20 years. 
The production of primary aluminium is one of the most energy intensive production 
processes, whereas the production of secondary aluminium from aluminium scrap 
consumes only about 5% to 10% of the energy needed for primary production. 
Primary aluminium is produced from bauxite that is converted into alumina (Al2O3). 
Alumina is made from bauxite ore in the Bayer process. The production of alumina is 
normally carried out close to the mine site but there are sites in Europe where bauxite is 
converted to alumina at the same site as an aluminium smelter or at stand-alone alumina 
refineries. Most of the bauxite is mined outside Europe but there are still several alumina 
production facilities within Europe (BREF-nonferro). 
The energy input for the production of 1 tonne of alumina is about 11 GJ of fossil fuels 
and about 0.8 GJ electricity. As for the production of 1 tonne of primary aluminium 
about 1.9 tonnes of alumina are needed, this results in an effective energy consumption 
for alumina of 22.4 GJ per produced tonne of aluminium metal. The energy cost for 
alumina needed for the production of 1 tonne of primary aluminium amounts to about 
€218 assuming prices for fuel oil as in Table 2. The cost of alumina needed to produce 
one tonne of primary aluminium is about €500 (May 2007). Thus, the energy cost for the 
production of alumina represents about two-fifths of the price of alumina. 
Primary aluminium is then produced in a melting-electrolysis process (Hall-Héroult 
process). As energy input electricity is mainly needed (55 GJ/tAl). During the electrolysis 
the carbon anodes are consumed. Approximately 0.425 tonnes of carbon are consumed in 
the production of 1 tonne of aluminium metal. The consumption of the anodes delivers a 
major part of the energy needed for melting the aluminium (13.8 GJ/tAl) and results in the 
release of a substantial amount of CO2 during the production of primary aluminium (1.56 
tCO2/tAl). 
The primary aluminium electrolysis accounts for a total energy intensity of 16 GJ/tAl. 
Due to the large electricity consumption, the CO2-intensity of the primary aluminium 
electrolysis depends strongly on the carbon intensity of the electricity mix used. For 
clearer differentiation, the effects of three electricity mixes with different CO2-intensities 
have been calculated: (i) average energy mix of the European aluminium electrolysis 
industry (see Figure 7) (ii) average EU electricity mix (see Table 1) (iii) electricity 
generated from coal (see Table 1).  
For primary aluminium electrolysis the European aluminium energy mix results in a 
CO2-intensity of 6.2 tCO2//tAl, the EU average electricity mix results in a CO2-intensity of 
8.3 tCO2//tAl and coal based electricity results in a CO2-intensity of 16.5 tCO2//tAl. 
Figure 7: Energy supply for the electrolysis process 
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Moreover, at the anode significant amounts of the perfluorocarbons (PFCs) tetra-fluoro 
methane (CF4) and hexa-fluoro ethane (C2F6) are formed (reaction of molten cryolite, 
Na3AlF6, with carbon). Both PFC gases have high global warming potentials of about 
6500 in the case of CF4 and 9200 in the case of C2F6 (IPCC(2007)). 
The PFCs cannot be removed from the gas stream with existing technology once they are 
formed. However, the PFC emission of modern plants can be minimised by using 
improved process control (control of cell voltage, alumina feed). Calculations for 
European primary aluminium smelters shows that the total quantity of PFC gases 
emitted, calculated as CO2-equivalent emission were about 15 million tonnes in 1990 
(BREF-nonferro). Assuming a production of roughly 1.5 to 2 million tonnes of primary 
aluminium, this results in CO2-equivalent emissions of PFCs in the range of 7.5 tCO2eq to 
10 tCO2eq per tonne of aluminium. Modern plants can reach CO2-equivalent emissions of 
PFCs in the range of 0.1 tCO2eq to 0.7 tCO2eq per tonne of aluminium. This corresponds to 
actual PFC emissions of about 0.02 kg to 0.1 kg CF4 and C2F6 per tonne of aluminium 
(BREF-nonferro). 
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The overall calculation of energy and CO2 intensities along the value chain is in this 
analysis referred to as “integrated” primary aluminium production, which accounts for 
the sum of the refining processes of alumina, the aluminium electrolysis and the cast 
house (compare Table 4).  
The energy intensity of the “integrated” primary aluminium production amounts to 
about 93.3 GJ per tonne of refined aluminium.  
For the calculation of the CO2-intensity of the “integrated” primary aluminium 
production the three electricity mixes mentioned above have been distinguished. For the 
low carbon case (average energy mix of European aluminium industry) a CO2-intensity 
of 7.8 tCO2//tAl is calculated, for the medium carbon case (EU electricity average) a CO2-
intensity of 10 tCO2//tAl is obtained and for the high carbon case (coal power plants) a 
CO2-intensity of 18.4 tCO2//tAl results.  
The overall energy cost for the "integrated" primary aluminium production of 1 tonne of 
primary aluminium is calculated to be about €1040 (assuming baseload price, compare 
Error! Reference source not found.) which represents roughly half of the current 
aluminium price (€2080/tAl, May 2007). The cost for CO2-allowances is about €156/tAl in 
the low carbon case (average CO2-intensity of European aluminium industry); about 
€200/tAl in the medium carbon case (EU electricity average) and about €368/tAl in the 
high carbon case (coal power plants). This corresponds to about 7.5% of the final product 
price in the low carbon case, 9.6% in the medium carbon case and 17.7% in the high 
carbon case. Compared to the energy cost, the CO2-allowance cost amounts in the low 
carbon case to 15%, in the medium carbon case to 19.2% and in the high carbon case to 
35.4%.  
The main cost of producing primary aluminium is electricity and production tends to 
concentrate where low cost electricity is available. About a third of European primary 
aluminium is produced in Norway and Iceland as those countries have inexpensive and 
carbon-free hydropower available in ample quantities. The shares of the energy sources 
used in the aluminium electrolysis are shown in Figure 7. On a global scale, nearly 60% 
of the energy used in the electrolysis process is generated from hydropower; the share in 
Europe is 46%. 
The secondary aluminium industry basically produces recycled aluminium from 
aluminium scrap. The production and refining of secondary aluminium is much less 
energy demanding and consumes about 5% to 10% of the energy needed to produce 
primary aluminium. The energy intensity of secondary aluminium is about 7.1 GJ/tAl and 
the CO2-intensity is about 0.5 tCO2//tAl. Moreover energy cost are comparably low with 
about €74/tAl and the cost for CO2-allowance corresponds to about 0.5% of the 
aluminium price, and to 13.8% of the energy cost. 
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Table 4: Energy and CO2 related data for the aluminium industry (DJ2742) 
Cost for CO2 allowance   Fuel 
 
(GJ/tAl) 
Elect-
ricity 
 
(GJ/tAl) 
Energy 
intensity 
 
(GJ/tAl) 
CO2 
intensity (8)
 
(tCO2/tAl) 
Energ
y cost 
(8) 
 
(€/tAl) 
Price
s  
 
 
(€/tAl) 
Euro 
 
 
(€/tAl)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost 
 (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price 
 (%) 
Alumina  20.8 (1) 1.6(1) (3) 22.4 (1) 1.7 (1) 240 (1) 500 
(1)((2)  
33.8 
(1)
14.1 (1) 6.8 (1)
Primary 
Aluminium 
Electrolysis: 
aluminium 
electrolysis + 
cast house 
total: 16 
 
 
of which  
2.2 (fuel) 
+ 
13.8 
(anode)(6)
55 71 6.2 / 
8.3 / 
16.5 (5) (6)
 
of which 
anode 
consumption: 
1.56 
803 (4) 2080  123 /  
166 /  
330 
6)
15.3 / 
20.7 / 
41.1 (5)
5.9 / 
8 / 
15.9 (5)
"integrated" 
Primary 
Aluminium(12) 
as sum of 
primary 
refining 
processes  
SP(7): 42% 
36.8 56.5 93.3 7.8 / 
10 / 
18.4 (5)(10)
1040 
(4)
2080 
 
156 /  
200 /  
368(5
)
15 / 
19.2 / 
35.4 (5)
7.5 / 
9.6 / 
17.7 (5)
Secondary  
Aluminium 
SP(7): 58% 
7.1 n/a 7.1 0.5 (11) 74 2080
 
10.2 13.8 0.5 
Source: Energy consumption of current installations of the European aluminium reported in BREF-
nonferro.  
(1) Referring to "per tonne of aluminium metal" produced. About 1.9 tonnes of alumina are needed for the primary 
production of one tonne of aluminium.  
(2) The alumina price shown corresponds to the price of alumina needed for the production of 1 tonne of primary 
aluminium. The price of 1 t of alumina was in May 2007 in the range of $340 to $370 (fob) (CRUAlu2007). Based on 
an exchange rate of $1.35/€ an average price of €263 per tonne of alumina results. This corresponds to a price of about 
€500 for alumina per tonne of aluminium.  
(3) Provided by Eurometaux. 
(4) Assuming baseload price (EEX, May 2007), compare Table 2. Price for the consumption of carbon anode 
(Soderberg/ prebake electrode) not included.  
(5) The first value corresponds to the energy mix used in the European aluminium electrolysis industry (Figure 7), the 
second value corresponds to the average CO2-intensity of electricity in the EU; the third value corresponds to the CO2-
intensity of electricity generated in coal power plants.  
(6) CO2 emissions of 1.56 tCO2/tAl and heat of 13.8 GJ/tAl due to the carbon anode consumption (carbon anode 
consumption of 0.425 tC/tAl). 
(7) SP: share of production. 
(8) Assuming energy cost and CO2-emission-factors for the consumed fuel correspond to the respective values of gas 
oil. 
(9) Prices of refined aluminium metal in May 2007 was $2800/t. Based on an exchange rate of $1.35/€ a price of 
€2074 per tonne of aluminium metal results. 
(10) IEA (2005) reports total emissions of 9.4 tCO2 per tonne of aluminium (emissions from aluminium production 
including alumina process plus indirect CO2 emissions from electricity). 
(10)McKinsey/Ecofys (2006) report total CO2 intensities per tonne of primary aluminium of 8.6 tCO2 
(11) McKinsey/Ecofys (2006) report total CO2 intensities per tonne of secondary aluminium of 0.3 tCO2
(12) The "integrated" primary aluminium production accounts for the sum of the refining processes of alumina, the 
aluminium electrolysis and the cast house. 
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3.4. Copper Industry (DJ2744) 
The copper industry manufactures tailored semi-products for the building, 
electrical/electronic, machinery, communications, transport and household appliances 
industries. Up to 65% of annual European copper demand is used in the generation, 
distribution and the use of electricity. About 8% of the EU’s annual copper demand is 
used to distribute drinking water.  
The turnover of the copper industry in the EU-25 was €19.7 billion in 2004. The value 
added of the copper industry was €2.9 billion, or about 15% of the turnover and much 
less than in all other energy intensive industries. The European copper refining industry 
employs roughly 4,000 persons. The workforce in the semi-finished industry accounts for 
about 40,000 persons (European Copper Institute (2007)). 
Like other metals, the price of copper has sharply increased since 2003: in 2003 copper 
traded at about $1340 per tonne ($0.6/pound), then increased up to a level of $7,700 
($3.5/pound) by mid-2006 and traded in January 2007 at $5,500 ($2.5/pound8). 
World production of primary refined copper is about 15 million tonnes (2006); the world 
production of secondary refined copper is about 2.5 million tonnes (2006). The EU-15 
used in 2006 about 3.8 million tonnes of refined copper. In 2006 the EU-25 imported 
about 1.9 million tonnes and exported about 100 thousand tonnes of refined copper 
(International Copper Study Group (2007)). 
The production of refined copper in the EU-25 amounted to approximately 2.3 million 
tonnes in 2004. The share of secondary production of the total refined production in the 
EU-25 was 32% in 2003. 
Primary copper may be produced from primary concentrates and other materials by 
pyrometallurgical or hydrometallurgical routes. Concentrates contain various amounts of 
other metals besides copper and the processing stages are used to separate these and 
recover them as far as possible.  
The main sources for copper concentrates of the EU are Chile, Indonesia, and Argentina. 
Since the late 1990s China in particular saw increasing demand on the concentrate 
market and has now secured a 20% share of the world supplies, ranking on a par with the 
EU as second largest concentrate importer in the world behind Japan.  
In 2004 the largest primary copper producers on a global scale were Chile (14.1%), 
China (12.3) and Japan (11.3%) followed by the EU-27 with about 10% of the global 
copper production (Poland 5.1%, Germany 2.6% and Bulgaria 2.1%) (IEA (2007)). 
Other major primary copper producers are Russia (6.1%), the US (5%) as well as 
Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia producing each about 4% of the global primary 
copper. 
Secondary copper production is based on the recycling of copper scrap. Products with 
reasonable amounts of metal copper include wires, pipes, electronic and household 
appliances, automobile radiators, and so on. In 2000, the EU-25 became a net exporter of 
copper scrap, imports accounted for about 350 thousand tonnes, while exports rose to 
about 470 thousand tonnes. Since then, the gap between imports and exports of copper 
 
8 1 pound = 0.4536 kg 
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scrap has constantly increased (exports 2004: 720 thousand tonnes, imports 2004: 280 
thousand tonnes), in particular due to strong demand from China, which now accounts 
for about 63% (68% including Hong Kong) of the total EU exports. 
Exports of copper products amounted to €9.3 billion, while imports amount to almost 
€17 billion in 2006. Both exports and imports have steadily increased since 1999. 
In contrast to other industries documented in the BREFs, with rather detailed 
documentation of energy consumption and shares of energy sources, comparable detailed 
data on the copper industry are not given (BREF-nonferro).  
Hence, the calculation of the energy and carbon intensities (Table 5) is based on a recent 
report of the IEA on industrial energy efficiency and CO2 emissions (IEA (2007)) with 
references to energy statistics of the copper industry in Chile (Alvarado et al. (2002)).  
Actually, the BREFs give a range of 14-20 GJ/t energy consumption from concentration 
to the refined product. Based on the IEA study, an overall energy intensity of 42.1 GJ/t is 
given in Table 5 for “integrated” primary copper production (mining plus refining). 
However, a study undertaken in 1992 for the UN quotes even a much higher energy 
intensity of 130 GJ/t (CopperUN1992).  
Table 5: Energy and CO2 related data for the copper industry (DJ2744) 
Cost for CO2 -allowance (5)   
Primary 
copper 
production 
Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tCu) 
Electricity  
 
 
(GJ/tCu) 
Energy 
intensity 
 
(GJ/tCu) 
CO2 
intensity 
(3) 
 
(tCO2/tCu) 
Energy 
cost (3)
 
(€/tCu) 
Prices  
 
 
(€/tCu) Euro 
 
(€/tCu 
) 
Percentage 
of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentage 
of product 
price (%) 
Mining 
 
6.1 n.a. 6.1 0.4 50 n.a. 8 n.a. n.a. 
Refining (2) 
 
14.4 21.6 36.0 3.5 423 4075 (4) 
(01/2007) 
70 16.5 1.7 
"integrated"  
Primary 
Copper 
Production (5)
 
 
20.5  21.6 42.1  3.9  473 4075 (4)
(01/2007)
 
 
78 16.5 1.9 
Source: Energy consumption for primary copper production (IEA (2007)).  
 (1) Mining refers to energy uses in the open pit and underground. 
(2) Refining refers to the processes from concentrating, over smelting and electro-refining to the final product "copper 
cathode" (99.99% Cu). 
(3) Assuming energy cost and CO2-emission-factors for the consumed fuel correspond to the arithmetic average of gas 
oil and natural gas. 
(4) Copper traded in January 2007 with $5500 per tonne, assuming an exchange rate of €1 = $1.35 results in €4075 per 
tonne. 
(5) The "integrated" primary copper production accounts for the sum of the Mining and Refining process.  
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The total CO2-intensity for “integrated” primary copper production has been calculated 
to be about 3.9 tCO2/tCu (see Table 5). This value corresponds well with a CO2-intensity of 
3.29 tCO2/tCu given in a recent study by Kuckshinrichs et al. (2007). The calculated CO2-
intensity corresponds to an incremental cost for CO2 allowances of about 1.9% of the 
copper price in January 2007. 
3.5. Other non-ferrous metals 
This section refers to the non-ferrous metals zinc, lead, nickel and magnesium.  
Zinc is commonly used in batteries, in alloys (mainly brass), for corrosion protection and 
as roof cover. The world production of zinc amounted to almost 8 million tonnes in 2004. 
The zinc production in the EU-25 (2004) amounted to 2.26 million tonnes, whereas 2.5 
million tonnes of zinc were consumed.  
Depending on the production process for zinc refinement significant differences in 
energy and CO2 intensity result. The energy intensities for primary zinc production are 
about 14 GJ/tmet (electricity) with the electrolysis process and 42 GJ/tmet using the 
imperial smelting furnace in combination with New Jersey distillation. The respective 
CO2-intensites are about 1.8 tCO2/tmet in the case of the electrolysis and 4.1 tCO2/tmet 
(including 0.43 tCO2/tmet process emissions) in the case of the imperial smelting furnace 
with New Jersey distillation (BREF-nonferro), (IPCC (2006a)). 
Secondary zinc refining using the Waelz kiln process accounts for an energy intensity of 
approximately 50 GJ/tmet and an estimated CO2-intensity of about 5 tCO2/tmet of which 3.7 
tCO2/tmet are due to process emissions (BREF-nonferro), (IPCC (2006a)). The secondary 
refined zinc accounts for 12% of the zinc production in the EU-25.  
Lead is used in secondary batteries (lead-acid battery), in projectiles, as shielding from 
radiation and as ballast in marine uses. The global lead production was about 5.8 million 
tonnes in 2004. Lead production and consumption in 2004 for the EU-25 amounted to 
about 1.4 million tonnes and 1.8 million tonnes, respectively.  
For primary lead production two basic methods are used: sintering/smelting or direct 
smelting. The sintering/smelting method is the dominant method and accounts for about 
80% of worldwide primary lead production. Typically, sintering/smelting processes 
account for an energy intensity of roughly 9 GJ/tmet and total CO2-intensities in the range 
of 0.7 tCO2/tmet to 1.0 tCO2/tmet (including 0.6 tCO2/tmet of process emissions). Direct 
smelting processes have energy intensities and total CO2-intensities of approximately 5 
GJ/tmet and 0.5 tCO2/tmet (including 0.25 tCO2/tmet of process emissions), respectively 
(BREF-nonferro), (IPCC (2006a)). 
Secondary lead refining processes have energy intensities and CO2-intensities similar to 
the direct smelting process. Secondary lead production amounts to about 64% of the 
entire lead production in the EU-25.  
Nickel is mainly used in various alloys (such as stainless steel) as well as for catalysts 
and as corrosion protection. Worldwide production of refined nickel metal amounted to 
about 1.15 million tonnes in 2004. In the EU-25 in 2004 consumption of refined nickel 
metal was almost 500 thousand tonnes, whereas production was only 130 thousand 
tonnes.  
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The energy used for the primary production of refined nickel is typically in the range of 
40 to 85 GJ/tmet (BREF-nonferro). 
Magnesium metal is mainly used as a light construction material (for example, in the 
automotive and aerospace industries), for die-casting and as a component of aluminium 
alloys. Other important applications are steel desulphurisation and as a reducing agent 
(metallurgy, corrosion protection, pyrotechnics). The consumption of refined magnesium 
worldwide in 2005 was about 560 thousand tonnes of which about 65 thousand tonnes in 
the EU.  
Primary magnesium is produced by an electrolytic process or a thermal reduction 
process. Secondary magnesium production from magnesium containing scrap is 
increasingly important. In 2002 the last primary magnesium producer in the EU closed, 
whereas secondary magnesium is still produced at a couple of sites in the EU.  
In primary and secondary magnesium production, sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) is often 
used in foundries as an inert blanketing gas to prevent oxidation and the formation of 
nitrides. Sulphur hexafluoride has a very high global warming potential of 23900 times 
that of CO2.  
Greenhouse gas emissions from primary magnesium production are roughly 0.5 to 1 kg 
SF6 (corresponds to 12 to 24 tonnes equivalent CO2) and 4 to 6 tonnes of CO2 per tonne 
of magnesium metal for the thermal reduction process as well as for the chlorination-
electrolytic process (BREF-nonferro). The IPCC guidelines assume for primary and 
secondary magnesium casting a default emission factor of 1 kg SF6 per tonne of 
magnesium metal (IPCC (2006a)). 
Alternatives to SF6 are sulphur dioxide (SO2) which has been used for some years in 
magnesium production as well as hydrofluoro compounds (HFC) and fluoroketones. 
The emissions of SF6 in the entire metal industry of the EU-25 amounted to 30.4 tonnes 
(corresponding to 726 thousand tonnes CO2-equivalent) in 2004. From the beginning of 
2008 the use of SF6 in magnesium die-casting for consumptions higher than 850 kg per 
year are prohibited by EU regulation. 
3.6. Cement & Lime Industry (DI265) 
The cement industry and the lime industry have in common that their product contains a 
large amount of lime (CaO) and that production processes are rather similar. The 
difference between both industries lies in the applications of their products. Almost the 
entire production of cement is used in the construction sector, whereas lime is used only 
to a minor part in the construction sector. The most important lime-consuming sectors 
are the steel industry (40%), agriculture & environmental sector (20%), construction 
sector (20%), sugar industry (5%) and the pulp & paper industry (2%) (BREF-cem). 
The turnover of the EU-25 cement, lime and plaster industry was almost €22 billion in 
2004 and the value added was €9 billion. The workforce of the cement industry in the 
EU-15 amounts almost to 60,000. 
Market concentration in the cement industry is rather high. The share of output of the 
largest three manufacturers is about 50% in major European countries (Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Poland) and even more than 80% in the UK and France. This makes the 
cement industry - as other similarly concentrated industries - prone to collusion and the 
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formation of cartels. In 1994 and again in 2000, the Commission imposed significant 
fines on several European cement manufacturers for having formed an illegal cartel.  In 
Germany, another antitrust suit was opened in 2003 by the Bundeskartellamt and a fine 
of €661 million in total was imposed against six companies. Subsequently, the cement 
price decreased from about €70/t to about €45/t. Altogether, 16 cartel and anti-trust cases 
have been reported between 1995 and 2005 in EU 25 ((London Economics (2007)). This 
compares to, for example, 7 cases in the steel industry or 10 in the automotive industry. 
Cement is a relatively homogeneous product, the trade in which is little affected by trade 
policies. However, cement is a heavy product having a low value in relation to its weight. 
Hence, cement is very costly to transport. In general, the product does not travel more 
than 200 km on land between the plant and the consumer. 
Imports as well as exports each amount to about €2 billion, which in total is about 10% 
of the turnover of the sector. Thus, the cement & lime industry is by far the sector with 
the lowest exposure to trade compared to the other energy intensive industries. The 
intensity of international trade dropped between 2002 and 2004 from 7% to 4% of world 
production, mostly because of the significant increase in sea transportation costs, 
although cement transport is much cheaper by sea than by road or rail. Shipping cement 
over the Atlantic is cheaper than transporting it by road for distances of over about 400 
km. However, since 2005 significant indications of increased imports by sea have been 
observed. In particular, cement imports from China almost tripled in 2006 reaching a 
share of almost 3% of the cement consumption in the EU.  
 The first step in the manufacturing process of cement, limestone (CaCO3) is converted 
with the use of heat to calcium oxide (CaO). During this calcination process CO2 is 
released. The calcination is followed by burning the resulting calcium oxide together 
with silica, alumina, and ferrous oxide at high temperatures to form clinker. The clinker 
is then ground or milled together with gypsum and other constituents to produce cement. 
Portland cement is produced by intergrinding cement clinker and sulphates (typically 
about 5%) such as gypsum and anhydrite. In blended cements (composite cements) there 
are other constituents (in the range of 25%-65%), such as granulated blast furnace slag, 
natural or artificial pozzolanas, limestone, or inert fillers. Portland cement accounts for 
about 43% of the consumed cement. The market shares of blended cements are about 
44% for Portland-composite cement and around 5% for blast furnace cement and 
pozzolanic cement (BREF-cem). 
The term lime includes quicklime and slaked lime and is synonymous with the term lime 
products. Quicklime, or burnt lime, is calcium oxide (CaO). Slaked lime consists mainly 
of calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2) and includes hydrated lime (dry calcium hydroxide 
powder), milk of lime and lime putty (dispersions of calcium hydroxide particles in 
water). 
The process emissions in lime and cement fabrication are the dominating fraction of the 
overall CO2 emissions. For instance, the CO2 emissions originating from energy 
consumption (in the “dry process”) account for only about 0.3 tCO2/t in the fabrication of 
clinker, whereas about 0.54 tonnes of CO2 process emissions are released per tonne of 
clinker. As lime is only one component of cement, CO2 process emissions for cement 
production are smaller than for lime. Process emissions of CO2 in lime fabrication are 
about 0.75 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of lime. 
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The CO2 emissions shown in Tables 6 and 7 include energy-related as well as process-
related CO2 emissions. 
The clinker burning takes place in a rotary kiln which can be part of a wet or dry long 
kiln system, a semi-wet or semi-dry grate preheater (Lepol) kiln system, a dry suspension 
preheater kiln system or a preheater/precalciner kiln system. The best available technique 
(BAT) for the production of cement clinker is considered to be a dry process kiln with 
multi-stage suspension preheating and precalcination. The associated BAT heat balance 
value is 3000 MJ/tonne clinker (BREF-cem). 
For both products, the share of energy in costs is rather high. In the case of cement, 
energy costs are in the range of a quarter to a third of the product price. For lime, the 
share of energy cost is about a third of the product price. The incremental cost for CO2 
allowances are in the range of €15 to €20 per tonne of Portland cement and about €22 per 
tonne of lime. The mentioned CO2 allowance cost for cement are in good agreement with 
total CO2 allowance cost of €17.4 per tonne of cement calculated in a recent IEA report 
(IEA (2005))9. Expressed as a share of the price the incremental cost for CO2 allowances 
is about a quarter in the case of cement and about a third in the case of lime. 
There is a range of partial substitutes and alternatives for cement and concrete products 
with significantly lower CO2-intensities. Coal fly ash, blast furnace slag and other 
products can substitute for cement in concrete mixes. These cement substitutes have the 
dual benefit of replacing energy-intensive Portland cement, and of using material that 
would otherwise be landfilled. The use of these substitutes is an instrument to reduce 
cost. Moreover, in many cases the substitute product improves the quality of the 
concrete. In recent years, the introduction of the emission trading system has already 
motivated firms to introduce new products substituting the use of cement and concrete. 
 
 
9 The mentioned €17.4/t refers to an allowance price of €20/tCO2. However, the actual figure mentioned 
in the IEA report is based on an allowance price of €10/tCO2 and consequently amounts to €8.7/t. 
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Table 6: Energy and CO2 related data for the cement industry (DI2651) 
Incremental cost for CO2 -
allowance (3)  
 
 
 
Fuel 
 
(GJ/t) 
Electricit
y 
 
(GJ/t) 
Energy 
intensity 
 
(GJ/t) 
CO2 
intensity(3)
 
(tCO2/t) 
Energy 
cost (3)
 
(€/t) 
Prices 
 
 
(€/t) Euro  
 
(€/tl)  
Percentag
e of energy
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
Clinker        
"Dry process" 
with multi-stage 
cyclone preheater 
and precalciner 
kilns, 
3 0.4 3.5 0.86/  
0.9/ 
0.75 (4)(8)
13/ 
10/ 
22.2 
50 (7) 17.2/ 
18.0/ 
15.0 
132/ 
180/ 
68 
34.4/ 
36/ 
30 
"Dry Process" 
equipped with 
rotary kilns with 
cyclone preheaters 
3.7 0.4 4.1 0.92/ 
0.97/ 
0.8 (4) (8)
14.7/ 
11.1/ 
25.9 
50 (7) 18.4/ 
19.4/ 
15.7 
125/ 
174/ 
61 
36.8/ 
38.8/ 
31.4 
"semi-dry/semi-
wet processes" 
 (Lepol-kiln), 
3.9 0.4 4.3 0.94/ 
1.0/ 
0.8 (4) (8)
15.4/ 
11.6/ 
27.3 
50 (7) 18.8/ 
19.9/ 
16.0 
122/ 
172/ 
59 
37.6/ 
39.8/ 
32 
"Wet Process" or 
"Dry Process with 
long kilns" 
5.0 0.4 5.4 1.04/ 
1.1/ 
0.86 (4) (8)
18.3/ 
13.4/ 
33.6 
50 (7) 20.8/ 
22.2/ 
17.2 
114/ 
166/ 
51 
41.6/ 
44.4/ 
34.4 
Portland cement (1)        
"Dry process" 
with multi-stage 
cyclone preheater 
and precalciner 
kilns, 
2.85 0.5 3.4 0.84/ 
0.88/ 
0.73 (5) (9)
14.9/ 
12.1/ 
23.7 
70 16.7/ 
17.5/ 
14.7 
112/ 
145/ 
62 
23.8/ 
25/ 
21 
"Dry Process" 
equipped with 
rotary kilns with 
cyclone preheaters 
3.5 0.5 4.0 0.9/ 
0.94/ 
0.77 (5) (9)
16.6/ 
13.1/ 
27.2 
70 17.8/ 
18.9/ 
15.4 
107/ 
144/ 
56.6 
25.4/ 
27/ 
22 
"Semi-dry/semi-
wet processes" 
 (Lepol-kiln), 
3.7 0.5 4.2 0.9/ 
0.95/ 
0.78 (5) (9)
17.2/ 
11.2/ 
28.5 
70 18.3/ 
19.0/ 
15.6 
106/ 
169/ 
55 
26.1/ 
27.1/ 
22.3 
"Wet Process" or 
"Dry Process with 
long kilns" 
4.8 0.5 5.3 1.0/ 
1.08/ 
0.84 (5) (9)
19.9/ 
15.3/ 
34.5 
70 20.2/ 
21.6/ 
16.8 
101/ 
141/ 
49 
28.9/ 
30.9/ 
24 
Blended cement (2) 
(30% other constituents) 
       
"Dry process" 
with multi-stage 
cyclone preheater 
and precalciner 
kilns, 
2.1 0.4 2.5 0.62/ 
0.65/ 
0.55 (6)
11.7/ 
9.6/ 
18.1 
70 12.4/ 
13.0/ 
10.9 
106/ 
135/ 
60 
17.7/ 
18.6/ 
15.6 
"Dry Process" 
equipped with 
rotary kilns with 
cyclone preheaters 
2.6 0.4 3.0 0.66/ 
0.7/ 
0.57 (6)
12.9/ 
10.4/ 
20.7 
70 13.3/ 
14.0/ 
11.4 
103/ 
135/ 
55 
19/ 
20/ 
16.3 
"Semi-dry/semi-
wet processes" 
 (Lepol-kiln), 
2.7 0.4 3.1 0.68/ 
0.72/ 
0.58 (6)
13.3/ 
10.6/ 
21.7 
70 13.6/ 
14.4/ 
11.6 
102/ 
136/ 
53 
19.4/ 
20.6/ 
16.6 
"Wet Process" or 
"Dry Process with 
3.5 0.4 3.9 0.75/ 
0.8/ 
15.4/ 
11.9/ 
70 15.0/ 
16.0/ 
97/ 
135/ 
21.4/ 
22.9/ 
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long kilns" 0.62 (6) 26.1 12.5 48 17.9 
Source: Energy consumption and process emissions of current installations of the European cement 
industry (BREF-cem).  
(1) Portland cement is assumed to comprise of 95% clinker and 5% gypsum and anhydrite. For the calculation 95% of 
the energy consumed in the clinker process is assumed and additionally 50 kWh electricity per tonne of cement for 
grinding. 
(2) The blended cement is assumed to comprise of 70% clinker and 30% other constituents. For the calculation 70% of 
the energy consumed in the clinker process is assumed and additionally 50 kWh electricity per tonne of cement for 
grinding. 
(3) The first value corresponds to the fuel mix used in the European cement industry (39% petcoke, 36% coal, 7% fuel 
oil, 6% lignite, 2% gas, 10% different types of waste; values from 1995 (BREF-cem); the second value corresponds to 
the case of using entirely coke as fuel; the third value corresponds to the case of using entirely natural gas as fuel. 
(4) Process emissions of CO2 are assumed 0.54 tCO2 per tonne of clinker. In general process related CO2 emissions 
depend on composition of raw material.  
(5) Process emissions of CO2 are assumed 0.51 tCO2 per tonne of Portland cement. 
(6) Process emissions of CO2 are assumed 0.38 tCO2 per tonne of blended cement. 
(7) Cement price about €50-70/tcem
(8) Total CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne of clinker are 1.05 tCO2 (IEA (2005)). 
(9) Total CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne of cement are: 0.84 tCO2 (IEA (2005)); 0.83 tCO2 (weighted 
average of 11 countries including US, China, India, Japan, Germany) (IEA (2007))); 0.7 tCO2 (McKinsey/Ecofys 
(2006)) and 0.75-0.8 tCO2 (Lund (2007)). 
 
Table 7: Energy and CO2 related data for the lime industry (DI2652) 
Cost for CO2 -allowance   
Quicklime 
Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tlime) 
Electricit
y  
 
 
(GJ/tlime) 
Energy 
intensity 
 
(GJ/tlime) 
CO2 
intensity(2) 
 
(tCO2/tlime) 
Energy 
cost 
 
(€/tlime) 
Prices 
 
 
(€/tlime) Euro 
 
(€/tlime)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost 
(%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price 
(%)  
Lime 
in 
Shaft 
Kilns 
4.2 0.16 4.36 total: 1.1
 
of which 
process 
related: 0.75 
23.8 70 (1)
 
21.5 90.4 30.7 
Lime 
in 
Rotary 
Kilns 
5.5 0.16 5.7 total: 1.2
 
of which 
process 
related: 0.75 
30.5 70 (1)
 
23.4 76.7 33.4 
Source: Energy consumption and process emissions of current installations of the European lime industry 
(BREF-cem).  
(1) Prices for quicklime (2005) according to PRODCOM database of EUROSTAT was €68/t. 
(2) Total CO2 emissions (energy and process related). Process related CO2 emissions depend on composition of raw 
material.  
 
3.7. Glass Industry (DI261) 
Glass is extensively used in the packaging industry (container glass), for windows and 
glazings (float glass) and to a lesser extent as tableware and fibres (mineral wool, optical 
fibres). For most packaging purposes glass could be substituted to a large extent by 
alternative products (polymers, composite materials, aluminium), whereas for the other 
applications glass is more difficult or very unlikely to be substituted by alternative 
products. 
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The total volume of glass produced in the EU-25 in 2005 was 34.8 million tonnes, 
mainly made up of container glass (20 million tonnes) and float glass (9 million tonnes). 
The 34.8 million tonnes of glass produced in the EU represent about 30% of total world 
output, making the EU the world’s largest glass producer. In 2004, the turnover of the 
glass industry in the EU-25 amounted to €43 billion and value added of the sector was 
€16 billion. The glass industry employs about 200,000 people. Prices of glass products 
were rather stable over the last decade. The price of glass varies from about €100 for a 
tonne of container glass to several thousands of euros per tonne for special glass (for 
example, technical glass).  
Glass exports (extra-EU) were about €6 billion in 2006; imports of glass reached about 
€3 billion in 2006. These figures are equivalent to about 14% and 7% of turnover, 
respectively. In 2006, the EU-25 trade balance was still positive, although the difference 
between exports and imports has been slowly eroded over the years. Almost 70% of all 
exports were in the form of container glass or untransformed float glass, and these have 
always been said to be products that are not traded over long distances. As with many 
other industrial products, imports from China have been growing fast and now account 
for almost 20 % of total imports of glass products. 
Primary glass making is a very energy intensive process. In general, the energy 
necessary for melting glass accounts for over 75% of the total energy requirements of 
glass manufacture. The cost of energy for melting is one of the largest operational costs 
for glass installations and there is a significant incentive for operators to reduce energy 
use. Major reductions in energy consumption have been achieved in the last decades. In 
1995 average energy consumption per tonne of glass melted was more than 30% lower 
than in 1975, and around 60% lower than in 1960. Energy consumption levels for 
melting are nowadays approaching the theoretical minima (BREF-glass).  
Adding recycled glass to the glass making process results in lower energy consumption. 
As a general rule each 10% of cullet results in a 2.5-3.0 % reduction in furnace energy 
consumption (BREF-glass). Thus, the savings from using recycled glass are significant, 
but do not decrease the energy consumption to a fraction of the primary production as in 
the case of iron, aluminium and other metals. 
The three main energy sources are fuel oil, natural gas and electricity. The actual energy 
requirements in the various sectors vary widely from about 3.5 to over 40 GJ/tonne. This 
figure depends very heavily on the furnace design, scale and method of operation. 
However, the majority of glass is produced in large furnaces and the energy requirement 
for melting is generally below 8 GJ/t.  
In the glass production process a major part of the CO2 is released by carbonates at high 
temperatures. Carbonates10 are essential ingredients for the production of glass. The 
release of CO2 during the glass fabrication process is analogous to the reaction of 
limestone (CaCO3) at high temperatures to lime (CaO). 
The process-related CO2 emissions for various glasses and production processes are in 
the range of 0.03 tCO2/tgl to 0.25 tCO2/tgl depending on the amount of carbonates used 
 
10 Carbonates used in the glass fabrication are: soda (Na2CO3), dolomite (CaMg(CO3)2 ) and limestone 
(CaCO3).   
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(IPCC (2006)). For the calculation of CO2-intensities in Table 8 process emissions of 0.2 
tCO2 per tonne of glass have been assumed.  
To calculate the carbon intensity of 1 tonne of glass, the CO2 emissions from carbonates 
(process-related CO2 emissions), heat (average CO2 emission factor for natural gas and 
fuel oil) as well as electricity (EU average CO2 emission factor for electricity) were taken 
into account. For the production of container glass this results in 0.7 tCO2 per tonne of 
glass produced. According to the BREFs it takes on average 6.5 GJ of heat per tonne and 
0.8 GJ of electricity per tonne of primary container glass produced. This gives an average 
energy intensity of 7.3 GJ per tonne of container glass produced. The used heat is mainly 
generated from natural gas and fuel oil. However, in the BREF document the shares of 
the fractions of the fuels used for heating are not reported. Thus, in order to calculate the 
carbon intensity and energy cost of the used heat, the average of the CO2 emission 
factors and cost factors for natural gas and electricity were used as an approximation. 
Table 8: Energy and CO2 related data for the glass industry (DI261) 
Cost for CO2 -allowance   Fuel 
 
(GJ/tgl) 
Electricit
y  
 
 
(GJ/tgl) 
Energy 
intensity 
 
(GJ/tgl) 
CO2 
intensity
 
(tCO2/tgl) 
Energy 
cost 
 
(€/tgl) 
Prices  
 
 
(€/tgl) Euro 
 
(€/tgl)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
Container 
Glass 
SP(4): 60% 
6.5 0.8 7.3 0.7 
of which 
process 
related: 
0.2 
64 200(3) 14.3 22.3 7.1 
Float Glass 
SP(4): 22% 
7 1 8 0.75 
of which 
process 
related: 
0.2 
70 975 (3) 15 21.4 1.5 
Special 
Glass 
SP(4): 5.8% 
12 0.9 12.9 0.9 
of which 
process 
related: 
0.2 
78 5,000 to 
20,000 
(3)
2,000 (2)
18.5 23.7 < 1 
Mineral 
Wool 
SP(4): 6.8% 
17 n.a. 17 1.3 
of which 
process 
related: 
0.2 
138 800 (3) 26 18.8 3.3 
Source: Energy consumption and process emissions of current installations of the European glass industry 
reported in (BREF-glass).  
(1) Based on the overall sales of container glass in the EU-25.  
(2) Based on the overall sales of special glass in the UK.  
(3) Prices for glass products (2006) are derived from the COMEXT database of EUROSTAT. 
(4) SP: share of production. The mentioned shares refer to production volumes in tons. Not mentioned in the table is a 
production share of 3.6% for tableware & crystal (domestic glass) and of 1.8% for other products. 
(5) Total CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne of glass are: 0.45 tCO2 energy related (estimated from 
overall energy consumption of world glass production assuming a fuel mix of 50% natural gas and 50% fuel oil) and 
up to 0.2 tCO2 process related due to decarbonisation of soda ash and limestone (IEA (2007)). 
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Based on an allowance price of €20 per tonne of CO2 the incremental costs of the CO2 
allowance is about €14 per tonne of container glass. The incremental CO2 allowance cost 
for glasses ranges from about 1% in the case of special glass up to about 7% for 
container glass. 
The fabrication of primary glass is a very energy intensive process. However, float glass 
products in particular play an important role in other sectors to increase energy efficiency 
substantially (for example, insulation glass, intelligent glazings in the construction 
sector) and are an important component of renewable energy technologies (thermal solar 
collectors, PV modules). 
3.8. Ceramic Industry (DI262,263,264) 
Ceramic materials are used in high volumes in the construction sector as bricks and tiles. 
Other important ceramic products are refractory materials, sanitary ware, household 
ceramics and a vast variety of technical ceramics.  
The turnover of the European ceramic industry (EU-25) amounted to about €37.8 billion 
in 2004, of which €9.5 billion in the manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction 
products (DI264), €12.8 billion in the manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags (DI263), 
and €15.6 billion in the manufacture of other ceramic products including refractory 
products (DI262). Value added in the ceramic sector was about €14.8 billion. The 
workforce employed in the ceramic sector is about 225,000 people. 
The most important export sector of the ceramic industry is the tiles and flags industry 
(DI263) with sales of about €4 billion in 2005 (extra-EU). Extra-EU imports in this 
sector amount to about €0.6 billion. 
All sectors of the ceramic industry are energy intensive, as a key part of the process 
involves drying followed by kiln firing to temperatures of between 800°C to 2000°C. 
Today natural gas, fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas (propane and butane) are mainly 
used for firing. 
From a competition point of view, the ceramics sector is a sector of “potential concern” 
and the sub-sector “manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products in bricked 
clay” is a sub-sector of “serious concern” (London Economics (2007)), due to its market 
structure, low import penetration and high barriers to market entry. 
In the past 20 years the energy efficiency of the ceramic sector increased significantly 
(Table 9). Remarkable differences in the energy-efficiency improvement – even for 
similar product groups – are seen. For instance, the energy efficiency for the production 
of “wall and floor tiles” improved by 52%, whereas for the production of “brick and roof 
tiles” energy efficiency improved only by about 13%.  
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Table 9: Development of energy used for the production of ceramics 
Sector Unit 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Brick and roof tiles GJ/t 2.65 2.45 2.19 2.06 2.38 2.31 
Wall and floor tiles GJ/t 11.78 9.16 6.76 5.45 5.74 5.60 
Refractory products GJ/t 4.88 4.96 6.51 4.91 5.41 5.57 
Sanitary Ware GJ/t 25.56 24.21 22.27 22.76 20.88 21.87 
Vitrified clay pipes GJ/t   5.75 5.77 6.1 5.23 
Table- and ornamental 
ware 
GJ/t   47.56 38.91 43.46 45.18 
Technical ceramics GJ/t     34.72 50.39 
Source: (BREF-ceram) 
For the manufacture of bricks the share of the energy costs varies between 17% and 25% 
with maximum levels of up to 30%. For the manufacture of porcelain, energy accounts 
for 10% to 18% of the total cost. Due to the high added value of some products of 
technical ceramics, parts of this industry are not so highly energy intensive in relation to 
turnover as other sectors.  
For almost all products in the ceramics sector the additional cost of the CO2 allowances 
is at most 2% of the product price, some cheap household ceramics being an exception to 
this rule. For several products the increase in costs is 1% or less. 
The strong export position of the tiles and flags industry is a significant indicator of the 
competitiveness of the European ceramic industry, particularly as energy costs are most 
likely lower elsewhere than in Europe. 
At a first glance, energy and CO2-intensity of the brick and roof tiles industry (bricks: 2.7 
GJ/tce and 0.17 tCO2/tce) seems to be lower compared to the cement industry (cement: 
about 4 GJ/tce and 0.7 tCO2/tce). However, this view changes if one takes into account that 
the final product used in the construction sector is concrete. By taking into account a 
common mixing ration of cement to fillers (sand) of roughly 1:711, the energy and CO2-
intensity of concrete is rather similar or even lower compared to ceramic construction 
products. This is a relevant comparison as in the construction sector, ceramic products 
such as bricks or tiles can be regarded as substitutes for concrete. 
                                                 
11 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beton 
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Table 10: Energy and CO2 related data for the ceramic industry (DI262,263,264) 
Cost for CO2 -allowance   Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tce) 
Electricit
y (1) 
  
(GJ/tce) 
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tce) 
CO2 
intensity
 
(tCO2/tce) 
Energy 
cost 
 
(€/tce) 
Price of
 product 
 
(€/tce) 
Euro 
 
(€/tce)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
Brick and 
roof tiles 
SP(3): 25% 
2.3 0.35 2.7 0.17 19.2 150-350 
(2)
3.4 17.7 1 to 2.3 
Wall and 
floor tiles 
SP(3): 39% 
5.6 0.84 6.4 0.4 44.4 4000 (2) 8.0 18 0.2 
Refractory 
products 
SP(3): 12% 
5.6 0.84 6.4 0.42 46.5 400 - 
1,600(2)
8.5 18.3 0.5 to 2 
Sanitary 
ware 
SP(3): 7% 
22 3.3 25.3 1.6 174  2,300 (2) 32.5 18.7 1.4  
Vitrified 
clay pipes 
 
5.2 1.2 6.4 0.43 46.7 400 (2) 8.7 18.6 2 
Expanded 
clay 
aggregates 
 
2.3 0.15 2.5 0.15 15.7 n.a. 2.9 18.5 n.a. 
Household 
ceramics 
SP(3): 7% 
45.2 6.8 52.0 3.4 358 1365 - 
4400 (2)
67 18.7 1.5 to 4.9 
Technical 
ceramics 
SP(3): 9% 
50.4 7.6 58.0 3.75 404.0 4000 -
10000 (2)
75 18.6 0.8 to 1.9 
Source: Energy consumption of current installations of the European ceramic (BREF-ceram). 
(1) Due to a lack of data for electricity consumption for most sectors, an electricity consumption of 20 % of the 
thermal energy is assumed.  
(2) Prices for ceramic products (2006) are derived from the PRODCOM and COMEXT databases of EUROSTAT).  
(3) SP: share of production. The mentioned shares refer to shares of production value.  
(4) Household ceramics refers to table- and ornamental ware made of porcelain, earthenware and fine stoneware (e.g. 
plates, dishes, cups). 
 
3.9. Paper and Pulp Industry (DE211) 
The turnover of the paper and pulp industry in the EU-25 amounted in 2004 to about €74 
billion, about twice as much as the turnover of the aluminium industry, and value added 
to about €19 billion. The sector produced 102 million tonnes of paper and 43.5 million 
tonnes of pulp ("all pulp") in 2006. About 260,000 persons are employed in the paper 
and pulp industry in the EU-25. 
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Exports of the European paper and pulp industry amounted in 2006 to almost €19 billion 
(EU-25, extra-EU). In recent years exports have grown steadily and have doubled since 
1999. Imports over the same period were rather stable and amounted in 2006 to about 
€6.4 billion (extra-EU).  
Prices in the paper and pulp industry are very much dependent on the quality and the 
degree of processing of the product. Pulp trades in a range of €370 to €570 per tonne, 
recycled paper at about €300 per tonne, newsprint paper in rolls or sheets at about €450 
per tonne and most writing or copy paper in a range between €700 to €850 per tonne. To 
calculate the relative cost shares in Table 11 average prices of €450 per tonne of pulp, 
€700 per tonne of primary paper (uncoated fine paper and newsprint) and of €300 per 
tonne of recycled paper was assumed in the table below, which gives an overview of 
energy and CO2 related indicators for different production technologies and input 
materials. 
About 50% of the energy used in the European paper and pulp industry is based on 
biomass (2005) and thus essentially CO2 free. Almost 40% of the energy is based on 
natural gas, the rest being fuel oil and coal. The use of biomass has steadily increased 
from a share of about 43% in 1996 to 50% in 2006. This trend is supposed to be 
continued as the sector has committed to reach a bioenergy share of 56% in 2010. 
Furthermore, combined heat and power generation (CHP) is used extensively in the 
paper & pulp industry. Due to this already favourable energy mix the CO2 footprint of 
the European paper and pulp industry is relatively low.  
Table 11 gives an overview of the energy and CO2-intensities of the dominant process 
technologies in the paper and pulp sector. For the wood-based processes, intensities for 
pulp and paper - where available – are shown. Facilities which comprise both pulp and 
paper production are also referred to as integrated paper mills.  
 For the production of paper and pulp from wood, five different technologies are 
analysed: The sulphate (Kraft) process, the sulphite process, the groundwood process as 
well as the processes of thermo-mechanical pulping (TMP) and the chemi-thermo-
mechanical pulping (CTMP). Typically these paper and pulp mills can generate large 
extents of their energy needs from parts of their feed material wood (such as bark) or 
residues of the paper production. In particular, some chemical pulp mills are energy self-
sufficient and in some cases even sell electricity to the grid. 
The wood-based technologies comprise about 50% of the paper and pulp production. The 
production of recycled paper comprises also roughly 50% of the production. The large 
market share of recycled paper is mainly due to the high recycling rate in Europe of 
about 56% which has grown steadily from about 10% in 1991. 
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Table 11: Energy and CO2 related data for the paper and pulp industry (DE211). 
Cost for CO2 -allowance (2) (4)(5) Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tpap) 
Elect-
ricity (1)
 
(GJ/tpap) 
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tpap) 
CO2 
intensity 
(4)(5)  
(tCO2/tpap) 
Energy 
cost (4)(5)
(€/tpap) 
Price of 
 product  
 
(€/tpap) 
Euro 
 
(€/tpap)  
Percentag
e of energy
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
pulp(1) 14.4 2.7 17.1 1.1 /
0.7 
121 / 
84 
450 (6) 22.6 / 
13.8 
18.7 /
16.4 
5.0 /
3.1 
Sulphate 
(Kraft)  
SP(9) of Sulphate 
&Sulphite: 31% 
(10) 
 
paper(2) 
(UFP)(3)
17.5 4.4 21.9 1.5 / 
0.9 (11)(12)
162 /
117 
700 (6) 30 / 
18.7 
18.5 /
16 
4.3 /
2.7 
pulp(1) 17.0 2.7 19.7 1.3 /
0.8 
135 /
91.5 
450 (6) 25.5 / 
15.4 
18.9 /
16.8 
5.7 /
3.4 
Sulphite 
 
SP(9) of Sulphate 
&Sulphite: 31% 
(10)
paper(2) 
(UFP)(3)
21.0 4.9 25.9 1.8 /
1.1 (11)(12)
189 /
135 
700 (6) 35 / 
21.7 
18.5 /
16.1 
5.0 /
3.1 
Ground-
wood 
 
SP(9): 6% 
pulp(1) 
for NP(3)
0.2 5.6 5.8 0.7 / 
0.5 (13)
80.5 /
80.1 
450 (6) 13.6 / 
10.1 
16.9 /
12.6 
3.0 /
2.2 
pulp(1) 
for NP(3)
0.2 8.5 8.7 1.0 /
0.8  
121 /
120.5 
450 (6) 20.5 / 
15.1 
16.9 /
12.5 
4.6 /
3.4 
 
Thermo- 
Mechanical 
Pulping 
(TMP) 
SP(9) of TMP & 
CTMP:  
12% (15)
paper(2) 
for NP(3)
5.5 10.7 16.2 1.6 / 1.1 
(11) 
184 /
170 
700 (6) 32 / 
22.5 
17.4 /
13.2 
4.6 /
3.2 
Chemi-
Thermo-
Mechanical 
Pulping 
(CTMP) 
SP(9) of TMP & 
CTMP: 
12% (15)
pulp(1) 2.9 6.5 9.4 0.9 /
0.67  
109 /
101 
450 (6) 18.8 / 
13.3 
17.2 /
13.1 
4.2 /
3.0 
Recycled 
Fibre 
(RCF) 
SP(9): 51% 
Paper(2) 
for NP(3)
9.2 1.9 11.1 0.5 /
0.45 (11)(14)
83 /
55.5 
300 (8) 9.8 / 
9.1 
11.8 /
16.4 
3.2 /
3.0 
Source: Energy consumption of current installations of the European paper and pulp industry (BREF-pap) 
(1) non-integrated paper mill (only pulp production). 
(2) integrated paper mill (pulp is processed to paper). 
(3) UFP: Uncoated fine paper, NP: Newsprint. 
(4) first figure: thermal energy assumed to come from natural gas and electricity assumed to correspond to EU average 
electricity energy mix. 
(5) second figure: thermal energy and electricity assumed to be produced according to the average energy mix of the 
European paper industry in 2005 (49.4% Biomass (accounted as zero CO2), 38,9% natural gas, 5.7% fuel oil, 4.3% 
coal).  
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(6) The price of €450/tp refers to an average price of pulp (2005).  
(7) The price of €700/tp refers to the lower range of writing or copy paper (2005).  
(8) The price of €300/tp refers to the price of recycled paper (2005). 
(9) SP: share of production in EU-15 (McKinsey/Ecofys(2006)).  
(10) The share of 31% refers to the total market share of the Sulphate (Kraft) and Sulphite production 
(McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)).  
(11) Total CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne: 1.07 tCO2 per tonne of paper (mixture of newsprint mills, 
mentioned value does not take into account CO2 neutral biomass use) are given in IEA (2005)); IEA (2007) quotes a 
weighted average emission over 13 countries of 0.47 tCO2 with the highest value for the US with about 0.7 tCO2 and at 
the lower edge Sweden, Norway and Finland with about 0.2 tCO2 ; the Finnish paper manufacturer UPM-Kymmene 
Ltd. quotes a 0.35 tCO2 per tonne of paper (Lund (2007)). 
(12) Total CO2 intensities for chemical paper & pulp (sulphite and sulphate) given as 0.62 tCO2 in McKinsey/Ecofys 
(2006). 
(13) Total CO2 intensities for mechanical paper & pulp (groundwood) given in McKinsey/Ecofys (2006) are 1.03 tCO2. 
(14) Total CO2 intensities for recovered fibre paper & pulp given in McKinsey/Ecofys (2006) are 0.61 tCO2. 
(15) The share of 12% refers to the total market share of TMP and CTMP (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)).  
 
Depending on the technology the energy intensity of pulp production lies in the range of 
6 GJ/tp (groundwood process) to 20 GJ tp (sulphite process), whereas the energy intensity 
of paper production is between about 11 GJ tp (recycled fibre process) and 26 GJ tp 
(sulphite process).  
For CO2-intensity Table 11 gives two figures. The first is calculated on the assumption 
that the thermal energy is generated from natural gas and the electricity consumed 
corresponds to EU average CO2-intensity (referred to as “natural gas fuel/EU average 
electricity” mix). The second figure is based on the energy mix of the European paper 
industry in 2005.  
For wood-based pulp production CO2-intensities range from 0.7 tCO2/tp (groundwood 
process) to 1.3 tCO2/tp (sulphite process) assuming the “natural gas fuel/EU average 
electricity” mix. Assuming the energy mix of the European paper industry, CO2-
intensities are in the range of 0.67 tCO2/tp (chemi-thermo-mechanical) to 1.1 tCO2/tp 
(sulphite process). 
For integrated paper production the CO2-intensities assuming the “natural gas fuel/EU 
average electricity” mix range from 1.5 tCO2/tp (sulphate/Kraft process) to 1.8 tCO2/tp 
(sulphite process). Assuming the energy mix of the European paper industry, CO2-
intensities range from 0.9 tCO2/tp (sulphate process) to 1.1 tCO2/tp (sulphite and thermo-
mechanical process). 
The CO2 intensity for paper from recycled fibre is about 0.5 tCO2/tp due to the large share 
of electricity needed for both energy mixes.  
Regarding all analysed processes and products, the incremental cost for CO2 allowances 
ranges from about €10 to €35 per tonne12, or in percentage terms from 3% to almost 6% 
of the product price.  
3.10. Chemical Industry (DG241) 
As the most energy-intensive parts of the chemical industry, the sectors “other” organic 
chemicals, “other” inorganic chemicals, fertilisers and the chlor-alkali industry are 
surveyed in this section. They are all part of the aggregated sector “basic chemicals”. 
 
12 For comparison, IEA (2005) calculated the CO2 allowance cost as €4.5/t based on an allowance price 
of €10/tCO2.).    
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This includes the three inorganic chemicals subsectors “industrial gases” (DG2411)13, 
“dyes and pigments” (DG2412), and “other inorganic basic chemicals” (DG2413), and 
the four organic chemicals subsectors “fertilizers and nitrogen compounds” (DG2415), 
“plastics in primary forms” (DG2416), “synthetic rubber in primary forms” (DG2417), 
and “other organic basic chemicals” (DG2414).  
The turnover of the sector “basic chemicals” in the EU-25 amounted to about €265 
billion, about twice as much as the iron-and-steel sector or seven times as much as the 
aluminium-producing sector in the EU in 2004. Its value added reached about €62 
billion. The workforce of the basic chemical industry counts almost 600,000 persons in 
the EU-25. Thus, this sector is much more labour-intensive than the above-mentioned 
two sectors. Nevertheless, it remains one of the most capital-intensive sectors of the big 
manufacturing industries.  
Trade flows of the European basic chemical industry have been rather balanced for 
several years. In 2006, exports amounted to €44.8 billion and imports were valued at 
€39.4 billion (both extra-EU). 
The domestic output price index for basic chemicals slightly decreased from 1995 to 
1999, from 2000 to 2002 the price index was almost stable, but then increased by 25% 
until 2006. This was mainly caused by rising energy prices over the same period, which 
were passed through to downstream industries and end users. However, detailed statistics 
on prices for organic chemicals could not be obtained from EUROSTAT. The product 
prices used and shown in the tables below have been found in other sources and should 
therefore be treated with caution. 
The values given in the following tables refer always to a 100% concentration of the 
respective chemical. In the case that concentration is physically not able to exceed a 
certain level, the values given refer to a fictive 100% concentration. For some of the 
chemical products “integrated” CO2- and energy intensities are calculated by summing-
up the CO2- and energy intensities in the last production step and in the preceding 
production processes of the feed materials. “Integrated” CO2- and energy intensities are 
calculated for production processes for several inorganic chemicals (nitric acid, five 
types of fertilisers) and organic chemicals (ethylene oxide, mono ethylene glycol, vinyl 
chloride monomer) as well as for the nine polymer production processes analysed, as 
these are assumed to be the most carbon-intensive production processes. While the 
following sections comprise a cursory overview of the production processes and the 
value chains themselves, annex 3 to this study contains further details to make the 
calculation of carbon intensities and their allocation to different co-production processes 
more transparent. 
3.10.1. Inorganic Basic Chemicals (DG2413) 
The turnover of the sector “other inorganic basic chemicals” amounted to €18.9 billion 
and its value added to €4.8 billion in 2004. The large volume basic inorganic chemicals 
considered here are ammonia, nitric acid, phosphoric acid, hydrofluoric acid and 
sulphuric acid. 
 
13 NACE code given in brackets 
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In the “other” inorganic chemicals sector, the additional cost of allowances corresponds 
to less than 1% of the product price in the case of hydrofluoric acid, and rises to more 
than 3% to 25% for ammonia, depending on the production techniques and type of 
energy input. As in the case of the industries analysed above, such as steel or aluminium 
production, introducing the carbon constraint under the ETS will clearly favour the less 
CO2-intensive processes. 
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Table 12: Energy and CO2 related data for production of basic inorganic chemicals 
(DG2415) 
Cost for
 CO2 -allowance  
 Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tch) 
Electr- 
icity  
  
 
(GJ/tch) 
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tch) 
CO2 
intensity 
 
(tCO2eq/tch) 
Energy 
cost 
 
(€/tch) 
Price of
 product 
 
(€/tch) Euro 
 
(€/tch)  
Percentage 
of energy
cost 
(%) 
Percentage 
of product 
price (%) 
Ammonia 
(air/steam 
reforming, 
natural gas) 
29  n.a. 29 total: 1.7 
(14) 
process 
related: 
1.3 (1)
165 240 (3)
(2007) 
34 20.6 14.2 
Ammonia 
(partial 
oxidation, heavy 
hydrocarbons) 
38  n.a. 38 total: 2.8 
(14)  
process 
related: 
2.3 (1)
400 240 (3)
(2007) 
56 14.0 23.3 
Ammonia  
(partial 
oxidation, coal) 
48 n.a. 48 > 2.8, data 
not 
available  
105.6 240 (3)
(2006) 
>56 n/a n/a 
Ammonia (2) 
(with combined 
urea production; 
NH3 from 
air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) 
29 n.a. 29 total: 0.4
process 
related: 0 
165 240 (3)
(2006) 
7.8 4.7 3.2 
Ammonia (2) 
(with combined 
urea production; 
NH3 partial 
oxidation, heavy 
hydrocarbons) 
38 n.a. 38 total: 1.5
process 
related: 
1.0 
400 240 (3)
(2006) 
30.3 7.6 12.6 
Nitric acid 
(integrated, NH3 
from air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) 
6.7(4) n.a. 6.7 0.5 (5)/ 2.5 
(6) 
 
47 140(7)
(2003) 
9.7 (5) / 
50(6)
20.6 (5)
/ 106.4 (6)
6.9 (5)/
35.7 (6)
Nitric acid 
(integrated, NH3 
partial oxidation, 
heavy 
hydrocarbons) 
9.3 (4) n.a. 9.3 0.8 (5)/ 2.8 
(6)
114 140(7)
(2003) 
16.1(5) / 
56 (6)
14.1(5) / 
49.1 (6)
11.5(5)  
/ 40 (6)
Sulphuric 
acid  
(elemental 
sulphur) (8)
n.a. 0.2 0.2 0.02 2.8 60 (9)
(2005) 
0.5 17.9 0.8 
Sulphuric 
acid  
0.05 0.16 0.21 0.02 2.5 60 (9) 0.5 20 0.8 
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(non-ferrous) (2005) 
Sulphuric 
acid  
(from pyrite) 
6.5  0.04 6.9  0.4  38 60 (10)
(2005) 
7.3 19.2 12.2 
Phosphoric 
acid  
(wet process (10)) 
7.7 1.0 8.7 0.6 58 600 (12)
(2005) 
11 18.9 1.8 
Phosphoric 
acid  
(dry process (11)) 
24.8 35.2 60.0 5.6 644 600 (12)
(2005) 
112 17.4 18.7 
Hydrofluoric 
acid  
5.9 0.2 6.2 0.4 37 1120 (13)
(2001) 
7.2 19.5 0.64 
Source: Energy consumption and process emissions of current installations for the production of "other 
inorganic chemicals" in Europe (BREF-inorgchem). 
(1) CO2 emissions in air/steam reforming of natural gas: 1.3 tCO2/tNH3; partial oxidation of oil residues: 2.3 tCO2/tNH3. 
(2) 1 tonne of NH3 corresponds to 1.3 tCO2 consumed in the urea production (0.566 tNH3 and 0.733 tCO2 are needed for 1 
t of urea). 
(3) Price was $325 per tonne of anhydrous ammonia in 3/2007 (CEHAmmonia2007). Assuming an exchange rate of 
$1.35/€ results in a price of 240 €/tNH3. 
(4) As sum of the energy from the exothermal nitric acid production process (-1.6 tCO2/tHNO3) and the proportionate 
share of the NH3-production process.. 
(5) The first number refers solely to carbon dioxide emissions. 
(6) The second number refers to equivalent CO2 emissions including the N2O emissions of 2 tCO2eq/tHNO3 
(corresponding to about 6.5 kg N2O per tonne of 100% HNO3). Low cost technologies to abate N2O emissions are 
available, and would be expected to be implemented if the ETS were extended to cover these emissions – see Annex 3 
for details. 
(7) Export value from France per tonne: €136/tHNO3 (CEHNitric2004). 
(8) Exothermal as elemental sulphur is burned 
(9) Price for high purity sulphuric acid in Western Europe (CEHSulfuric2006). 
(10) Wet process: solvent extraction route of P2O5 containing rocks with the use of H2SO4. 
(11) Dry process: combustion of elemental phosphorus with subsequent hydration of the resultant P2O5. 
(12) Price in 2005 was $445 per tonne of P2O5 (CEHPhosphor2006). With the average exchange rate in 2005 of 
$1.25/€ and the fact that 1.67 t of P2O5 correspond to one tonne of H3PO4, results a price of 594 €/tH3PO4.  
(13) Price in 2001 was about $0.65 per pound (1 pound = 0.4536 kg). Assuming an exchange rate of $1.2/€ results in a 
price of 1120 €/tHF. Prices for hydrofluoric acid available at:http://www.the-innovation-
group.com/ChemProfiles/Hydrofluoric%20Acid.htm 
(14) CO2 intensities quoted by other studies per tonne of NH3 are 2.1 tCO2 as average of 66 ammonia production plants 
(all technologies) worldwide excluding China (IEA(2007)); 1.7 tCO2 steam reforming with natural gas and 3.2 tCO2 with 
partial oxidation of oil residues (both modern plants) (IPCC (2006)). 
 
3.10.2. Fertiliser Industry (DG2415) 
The turnover of the fertiliser industry (“fertiliser and nitrogen compounds”) in the EU-
25 amounted to €15.4 billion in 2005 and its value added to €3.1 billion in 2004. 
Energy and CO2 related data for five types of fertilisers are compiled in Table 13: urea, 
urea ammonium nitrate (UAN), ammonium nitrate (AN), calcium ammonium nitrate 
(CAN) and calcium nitrate (CN). Due to its high nitrogen content, the production of 
fertilisers is strongly interrelated with ammonia production. As the ammonia production 
is always in the beginning of the fertiliser value chain, “integrated” energy and CO2-
intensities are given in Table 13 for each fertiliser product based on two different 
ammonia production processes: ammonia from air/steam reforming using natural gas and 
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partial oxidation using hydrocarbons, knowing, however, that the first production process 
is used for almost 90% of all ammonia production in the EU. 
Moreover, for the fertilisers listed in Table 13 containing nitrate, two CO2-intensities are 
mentioned: The first figure refers solely to CO2 emissions, the second figure refers to 
CO2-equivalent emissions, that is, additionally accounting for N2O emissions in the nitric 
acid process. 
The energy and CO2 intensities of fertilisers depend significantly on the process route 
used (ammonia by air/steam reforming or partial oxidation, CN production routes) as 
well as on their composition (in particular multi-nutrient fertilisers). Thus, specific 
intensities have to be calculated for each particular case. Table 13 gives an overview of 
the energy and CO2 intensities for a variety of basic fertiliser products.  
The “integrated” energy intensities of the fertilisers listed range from about 5 GJ/t for 
calcium nitrate to about 46 GJ/t for calcium ammonium nitrate depending on the 
production process. 
The “integrated” CO2-intensities range from 0.44 tCO2/t for urea (air/steam reforming of 
natural gas) to 2.4 tCO2/t for ammonium nitrate (partial oxidation of hydrocarbons) 
regarding solely CO2 emissions. This corresponds to a CO2 allowance cost of about €9/t 
and about 4% of the product price in the case of urea. For the case of ammonium nitrate 
the allowance cost amounts to up to €48/t, representing about 23% of the product price. 
Regarding CO2-equivalent emissions, if N2O emissions in nitric acid production are 
included, the CO2-intensities range from 0.44 tCO2/t for urea (air/steam reforming of 
natural gas) to 2.85 tCO2/t for ammonium nitrate (partial oxidation of hydrocarbons). This 
would result in a CO2 allowance cost of about €9/t in the case of urea and about €57/t in 
the case of ammonium nitrate. As N2O emissions within nitric acid production can be 
significantly reduced (see Annex 3), the CO2-equivalent emissions (N2O and CO2) of 
nitrate-containing fertilisers should in the long run be close to the emissions resulting 
solely from CO2.  
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Table 13: Energy and CO2 related data for the production of fertiliser (DG2415) 
Cost for
 CO2 -allowance  
 Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tch
) 
Elect-
ricity 
(1) 
 
(GJ/tch
) 
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tch) 
CO2 
intensity 
 
(tCO2eq/tch) 
Energ
y cost
 
(€/tch) 
Price of
 product 
 
(€/tch) Euro 
 
(€/tch)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
Urea  
(with NH3 from 
air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) (1) (3)
19.5 0.4 19.9 0.44 117 240 (4)
(3/2007) 
8.9 7.6 3.7 
Urea  
(with NH3 from 
partial oxidation, 
heavy 
hydrocarbons) (2)(3) 
24.6 0.4 25.0 1.08 250 240 (4) 
(3/2007) 
21.6 8.6 9 
AN 
Ammonium 
nitrate (5)
(integrated, based 
on air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) (6)
24.6 0.02 24.6 1.45 / 1.9 
(8)
142 214 (9)
(10/2007) 
29 / 
37.6 
(8)
20.4 / 
26.5 (8)
13.6 / 
17.6 (8)
AN 
Ammonium 
nitrate (5)
(integrated, based 
on partial 
oxidation, heavy 
hydrocarbons) (7)
32.3 0.02 32.3 2.4 / 2.85 
(8)
340 214 (9)
(10/2007) 
48.2 / 
56.7 
(8)
14.2 / 
16.7 (8)
22.5 / 
26.5 (8)
UAN solution 
Urea 
ammonium 
nitrate (10) 
(integrated, based 
on air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) (6)
17.9 0.2 18.1 0.8 / 1.0 (8) 105 207 (11)
(7/2007) 
16.3 / 
20.1 
(8)  
15.5 / 
19.1 (8)
7.9 / 9.7 
(8)
UAN solution 
Urea 
ammonium 
nitrate (10) 
(integrated, based 
on partial 
oxidation, heavy 
hydrocarbons) (7)
23.1 0.2 23.3 1.5 / 1.7 (8) 241 207 (11)
(7/2007) 
20.1 / 
29.3 
(8)
8.3 / 12.1 
(8)
9.7 / 14.2 
(8)
CAN (12)
Calcium 
ammonium 
nitrate 
(integrated, based 
20 0.1 20.1 1.2 / 1.5 (8) 116 n/a 23.8 / 
30.6 
(8)
20.5 / 
26.4 (8)
n/a 
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on air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) (6)
CAN (12)
Calcium 
ammonium 
nitrate 
(integrated, based 
on partial 
oxidation, heavy 
hydrocarbons) (7)
45.8 0.1 45.9 2 / 2.3 (8) 275 n/a 39 / 
46 (8)
14.2 / 
16.7 (8)
n/a 
CN (13)
Calcium 
nitrate 
(integrated, based 
on air/steam 
reforming, natural 
gas) (6)
5.1 n/a 5.1 0.6 / 2.2 (8) 36 n/a 13 / 
43.5 
(8)
36.1 / 121 
(8)
n/a 
CN (13)
Calcium 
nitrate 
(integrated, based 
on partial 
oxidation, heavy 
hydrocarbons) (15)
7.1 n/a 7.1 0.9 / 2.4 (8) 88 n/a 18 / 
48 (8)
20.5 / 55 
(8)
n/a 
Source: Energy consumption and process emissions of current installations of the European fertiliser 
industry (BREF-inorgchem).  
(1) Ammonia is assumed to be produced by air/steam reforming of natural gas. 
(2) Ammonia is assumed to be produced by partial oxidation of heavy hydrocarbons. 
(3) For the production of 1 tonne of urea 0.566 t ammonia and 0.733 t of CO2 are needed. 
(4) Price per tonne of urea in Europe $350/turea (11/2007). Assuming an exchange rate of $1.45/€ results in a urea price 
of €241.4/turea. 
(5) 1 t of AN needs as feed material 0.789 t NH3 and 0.213 t nitric acid. 
(6) Ammonia produced in the production chain (as ammonia itself or for the production of nitric acid or urea) are 
assumed to be produced by air/steam reforming of natural gas. 
(7) Ammonia produced in the production chain (as ammonia itself or for the production of nitric acid or urea) are 
assumed to be produced by partial oxidation of heavy hydrocarbons. 
(8) The first number refers solely to carbon dioxide of the integrated production chain; the second number refers to 
equivalent CO2 emissions including additionally the N2O emissions accounted for as CO2eq stemming from the nitric 
acid used for the production of AN. 
(9) Ammonium nitrate price $299.11/tAN (at 10/29/2007) for AN from Russia (fob). Assuming an exchange rate of 
$1.4/€ results in an AN price of €213.7/tAN. 
(10) 1 t of UAN solution (32%N) consists of 45% ammonium nitrate, 35% urea and 20% water.  
(11) Price for UAN in US $300/tUAN (11/2007). Assuming an exchange rate of $1.45/€ results in a UAN price of 
€207/tUAN. 
(12) CAN: containing 80% AN and 20% calcium carbonate.  
(13) Direct production from CN based on the reaction of nitric acid with calcium carbonate. Per tonne of CN 0.7684 t 
HNO3 are needed and 0.268 t CO2 occur as process emissions.  
 
3.10.3. Chlor-alkali industry (DG2413) 
The chlor-alkali industry produces chlorine (Cl2) and alkali, referred to as sodium 
hydroxide (NaOH) or potassium hydroxide (KOH), by electrolysis of a salt solution 
(NaCl or KCl). Since chlorine and caustic soda are co-products produced in almost equal 
amounts, the distribution of the caustic soda manufacturing industry is essentially the 
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same as the chlorine manufacturing industry. Hydrogen is also a co-product of the chlor-
alkali electrolysis (28 kg for 1 tonne of chlorine) and is used as fuel (on-site or 
transported) or used on integrated sites for certain applications in particular because of its 
high purity (synthesis of ammonia, methanol, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen peroxide). 
Chlorine is used for the production of plastics, notably PVC and polyurethanes (for 
phosgene as intermediate), chloroaromatics (for example, chlorobenzene for phenol 
synthesis), propylene oxide (chlorohydrin process), solvents containing chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, and inorganic chlorine compounds. Caustic soda is used in pulp and paper 
production, for the manufacture of soaps and detergents or as a cleaning and etching 
agent. 
Global production capacity of chlorine in 1995 was about 44 million tonnes, the EU 
accounting for about 24% of that capacity. World chlor-alkali capacity is concentrated in 
three regions: North America, Western Europe (EU-15 & EFTA) and Japan. After a fall 
at the beginning of the 1990s, production in Western Europe now seems to have 
stabilised at around 9 million tonnes per year. Although there have been some 
fluctuations, utilisation of plant capacity has remained at between 80% and 95% in both 
the USA and Europe since the late 1980s. Presently, there is no overcapacity and new 
plant investment seems to be under way (BREF-cl_alk).  
The main technologies applied for chlor-alkali production are membrane, diaphragm and 
mercury-cell electrolysis, mainly using sodium chloride as feed or to a lesser extent using 
potassium chloride for the production of potassium hydroxide. The mercury-cell 
electrolysis (amalgam process) will be phased out in the coming years14. However, the 
mercury process still has a market share of 55%, whereas the membrane and the 
diaphragm processes have market shares of 20% and 22%, respectively. Other 
electrochemical processes in which chlorine is produced include the electrolysis of 
hydrochloric acid and the electrolysis of molten alkali-metal and alkaline-earth-metal 
chlorides, in which chlorine is a by-product, but these account for less than 3% of the 
total chlorine production capacity. 
Since 1975, the membrane-cell process has been developed to a high degree of 
sophistication. It has ecological advantages over the two older processes and has become 
the most economically advantageous process in recent years. Despite these advantages, 
the change of technology to membrane cells has been slow in Western Europe because 
most existing chlorine plants were installed in the 1970s with a plant life of 40-60 years 
and there has been no need for new production capacity (BREF-cl_alk). 
 
14 According to a voluntary agreement with the European chlorine industry, and as part of the EU 
Mercury Strategy, the mercury plants will be phased out by the end of the year 2020. Originally, the 
recommendation of the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based 
Sources in 1990 intended to phase-out mercury plants by 2010.  
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Table 14: Energy and CO2 related data for the chlor-alkaline industry (DG2413) 
Cost for
CO2 -allowance 
(1)
 Fuel (1) 
 
 
(GJ/tch
) 
Electricit
y  
  
 
(GJ/tch) (1)
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tch)
(1)
CO2 
intensity 
 
(tCO2/tch)
(1)
Energ
y cost
 
(€/tch) 
1)
Price of
 
product 
 
(€/tch) 
(1) Euro 
 
(€/tch)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
Membrane 
(2) 
(chlorine) 
SP(7) : 20% 
0.3 4.7 5.0 0.6 67.9 210 (5) 11.5 16.9 5.5 
Diaphragm 
(2)  
(chlorine) 
SP(7) : 22% 
1.0 5.0 6.0 0.65 76.2 210 (5) 13.0 17.1 6.2 
Mercury (2) 
(chlorine) 
SP(7) : 55% 
0 5.0 6.0 0.7 84.4 210 (5) 14.3 16.9 6.8 
Membrane 
(3)  
(sodium 
hydroxide) 
SP(7) : 20% 
0.3 4.1 4.4 0.5 60.2 320 (6) 10.2 16.9 3.2 
Diaphragm 
(3)  
(sodium 
hydroxide) 
SP(7) : 22% 
0.9 4.4 5.3 0.63 67.6 320 (6) 11.6 17.2 3.5 
Mercury (3) 
(sodium 
hydroxide) 
SP(7) : 55% 
0 5.3 5.3 0.6 74.8 320 (6) 12.6 16.9 3.9 
          
          
          
Source: Energy consumption of current installations of the European chlor-alkaline industry  
((BREF-cl_alk).  
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(1) Energy consumption and CO2 emissions are assigned to the products according to their masses: By the production 
of 1 tonne of chlorine 1.13 tonnes of NaOH and 0.028 tonnes of hydrogen are co-produced. 
(2) Per tonne of chlorine. 
(3) Per tonne of solid sodium hydroxide. 
(4) Per tonne of hydrogen. 
(5) Prices per tonne of product (100% concentration). 
(6) SP: share of production in 2000 in the area of the EU-15 & EFTA (BREF-cl_alk).  
 
The chlor-alkali process is one of the largest consumers of electrical energy. Table 14 
shows the energy and CO2-related data for the three production processes mentioned 
above. All processes have similar energy and CO2-intensities. The lowest intensities are 
achieved by the membrane process at 5 GJ/tch and 0.6 tCO2/tch per tonne of chlorine 
produced, 4.4 GJ/tch and 0.5 tCO2/tch per tonne of sodium hydroxide produced. For all 
technologies the price increases corresponding to the CO2 constraint would be less than 
7% for chlorine and less than 4% for sodium hydroxide. 
3.10.4. Organic Basic Chemicals (DG2414) 
The turnover of the sector “other organic basic chemicals” amounted to €106 billion and 
its value added to €26 billion in 2004. This corresponds to about 40% of the turnover and 
value added figures of the entire basic chemicals sector. In recent years sharp price 
increases of organic chemicals have been seen, with prices almost doubling from 1999 to 
2006.  
Energy intensities and CO2-intensities of eight basic organic chemicals which are 
produced in very large volumes and which are fundamental for the entire organic 
chemical industry are given in Table 15. 
The energy intensities of the basic organic chemicals obtained from refinery processes 
(steam cracking, catalytic reforming, HDA) range from 10.0 GJ (benzene from HDA) 
over 33 GJ (ethylene) to 192 GJ (butadiene) per tonne of product. Analogously, the CO2 
intensities range from 0.7 tCO2 (benzene from HDA), to 1.9 tCO2 (ethylene), to 9.8 tCO2 
(butadiene) per tonne of product. The large energy and CO2-intensities of propylene and 
butadiene are a result of the low product yields in the naphta steam cracking process15.  
The energy intensities of the “integrated”16 processes of ethylene oxide and mono 
ethylene glycol amount to 51.5 GJ/tch and 64.5 GJ/tch, respectively. The total CO2 
intensities of the integrated production process amount to 3.7 tCO2/tch for ethylene oxide 
and 4.6 tCO2/tch for mono ethylene glycol. 
Based on an allowance price of €20/tCO2, the CO2 allowance cost as a percentage of the 
product prices ranges from about 2% (benzene from HDA) to 11.5% in the case of mono 
ethylene glycol and 21.3% for butadiene.  
 
15 The energy and CO2 intensities of propylene and butadiene are calculated proportionate to their 
relative production yields from the total energy and CO2 intensity of "high value chemicals" from the 
naphta steam cracking. 
16 The "integrated" intensities account for the proportionate intensities of the ethylene prodcution. 
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Table 15: Energy and CO2 related data for the production of basic organic chemicals 
(DG2414) 
Cost for CO2 -allowance   Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tch
) 
Electricit
y (1) 
  
 
(GJ/tch) 
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tch) 
CO2 
intensity
 
(tCO2/tch) 
Energy 
cost 
 
(€/tch) 
Price of
 
product 
 
(€/tch) 
Euro 
 
(€/tch)  
Percentage 
of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentage 
of product 
price (%) 
Ethylene (1) 34 n/a 33 1.9 355 900 (3)
(5/2007) 
38 10.7 4.2 
Propylene 
(1)(2)
57 n/a 57 2.9 600 850 (3)
(5/2007) 
58 9.7 6.8 
Butadiene (1) 
(2)
192 n/a 192 9.8 2020 920 (3)
(5/2007) 
196 9.7 21.3 
Ethylene 
oxide  
(integrated) (4)  
51.3 0.2 51.5 total: 3.7
process 
related: 
0.7 
542 890 (3)
(5/2007) 
74 13.7 8.3 
Mono  
ethylene 
glycol  
(integrated) (5)
64.2 0.3 64.5 4.6 678 810 (3)
(5/2007) 
93 13.7 11.5 
Vinyl 
Chloride 
Monomer 
(VCM) 
(integrated) (6)
20.7 3.7 24.4 1.6 247 600 (3)
(5/2007) 
32 13.0 5.3 
Benzene  
from pygas 
9.5 0.9 10.4 0.8 113 870 (3)
(5/2007) 
16.2 14.3 1.9 
Benzene  
from HDA 
9.7 0.3 10.0 0.7 106 870 (3)
(5/2007) 
14.9 14.1 1.7 
Benzene  
from 
reformate  
14.4 1.4 15.8 1.2 171 970 (3)
(5/2007) 
24.5 14.3 2.5 
Para-Xylene 
from 
reformate 
21.6 2.1 23.7 1.8 256 880 (3)
(5/2007) 
36.7 14.3 4.2 
Source: Energy consumption of current installations for the production of basic organic chemicals in 
Europe (BREF-orgchem). 
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(1) Obtained by steam cracking of naphta.  
(2) Calculated from energy and CO2-intensity of high value chemicals (ethylene, propylene, butadiene, hydrogen, 
benzene) with 17.5 GJ/thvc and 0.9 tCO2/thvc assuming a product yield of 28.4% ethylene, 16,5% propylene and 4.9% 
butadiene. 
(3) Prices according ICIS pricings for Europe in May 2007. 
 (4) Includes energy and CO2 intensities of ethylene production (integrated). Selectivity from ethylene to ethylene 
oxide of 75% corresponds to process emissions of 0.7 tCO2/tEO . 
(5) Includes energy and CO2 intensities of precursors ethylene and ethylene oxide (integrated).Yield of mono ethylene 
glycol from ethylene oxide: 80% 
 (6) Includes energy and CO2 intensities of feed materials ethylene (0.47 tEt/tVCM) and chlorine (0.6 tEt/tCL2) 
(integrated). 
 
3.10.5. Polymers (DG2416) 
Today industrial polymers are an essential part of everyday life and are used in virtually 
all end products, either a part of the final good or for packaging the actual product. 
Polymers are predestined for mass production processes due to their low material cost 
(per volume), easy processing characteristics as well as their easy and flexible shaping 
abilities (by extrusion, moulding, and so on). Moreover, polymers cover a wide range of 
different material properties making them useful for a vast number of appliances. For 
many applications of polymers there exist no economically viable alternatives; other 
applications have only been feasible at all by using polymers (such as certain membrane 
applications).  
By definition a polymer is a macromolecule that is composed by identical or similar 
structural units thereby forming main and side chains. There are various types of 
polymers which are distinguished by their chemical composition. Production volumes of 
polymers vary from very large volume polymers (such as polyethylene (PE), 
polypropylene (PP)) for commodity applications (such as packaging) over engineering 
polymers (like polyamide (PA), polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA), polycarbonates (PC)) 
produced in large volumes for technically more advanced applications (fibres, optical 
products) to high performance polymers (polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE), 
polyetheretherketone (PEEK), polyimide (PI)) produced in relatively low volumes for 
special applications (examples are coatings, electronics, micro-/nanotechnology). Lower 
polymer production volumes usually go along with a higher degree of specification and 
so with higher prices and value-added. Plants for the production of large and very large 
volume polymers are usually near refineries which provide them with the raw materials. 
The total volume of polymers produced worldwide is about 170 million tonnes (2003) 
from which about 50 million tonnes are produced in the EU-15. The polymer-
manufacturing industry employs in the EU-15 more than 70 thousand people (BREF-
polymer). 
This section refers mainly to commodity polymers which are produced in (very) large 
quantities at relatively low costs for (very) large volume products (such as bottles, tubes, 
profiles). The polymers addressed in Table 16 cover about 70% of polymer production 
by volume in Europe. 
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Table 16: Energy and CO2 related data for the production of polymers (DG2416) 
Cost for CO2 -allowance   Fuel 
 
 
(GJ/tch
) 
Electricit
y  
  
 
(GJ/tch) 
Energy 
intensity
 
(GJ/tch) 
CO2 
intensity
 
(tCO2/tch) 
Energy 
cost 
 
(€/tch) 
Price of
 
product 
 
(€/tch) 
Euro 
 
(€/tch)  
Percentag
e of energy 
cost (%) 
Percentag
e of 
product 
price (%) 
Polyethylene 
LDPE 
(integrated) (1) 
SP(6): 16.5% 
(including LLDPE) 
38.1 0.4 38.5 2.2 390 1230 (2)
(5/2007) 
43.5 11.2 3.5 
Polyethylene 
HDPE 
(integrated) (1) 
SP(6): 11.1% 
37.6 1.2 38.8 2.2 400 1260 (2)
(5/2007) 
44.8 11.2 3.6 
Polypropylene 
PP 
(integrated) (1) 
SP(6): 16.1% 
60.9 1.2 62.0 3.3 642 1190 (2)
(5/2007) 
65.0 10.1 5.4 
PVC 
suspension 
(integrated) (1) 
SP(6) total 
PVC: 11.9% 
23.6 4.7 8.2 1.9 279 1010 (2)
(5/2007) 
37.5 13.4 3.7 
PVC emulsion 
(integrated) (1) 
SP(6) total 
PVC: 11.9% 
28.6 5.6 14.1 2.3 320 n.a. 45.3 14.2 n.a. 
Polystyrene 
General 
Purpose PS 
(integrated) (1)(3) 
SP(6) total PS: 
6.4% 
17.4 0.7 18.1 1.18 187 1430 (2)
(5/2007) 
23.6 12.6 1.7 
Polystyrene 
High Impact 
PPS 
(integrated) (1)(3)(4) 
SP(6) total PS: 
6.4% 
17.8 0.7 18.5 1.2 189 1470 (2)
(5/2007) 
24.0 12.7 1.6 
Polystyrene 
EPS 
18.1 0.7 18.8 1.22 191 1600 (2)
(5/2007) 
24.4 12.7 1.5 
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(integrated) (1)(3)(5) 
SP(6) total PS: 
6.4% 
PET  
(TPA process) 
(integrated) (1) 
SP(6): 7.8% 
25.1 1.2 26.3 1.9 270 1400 (2)
(5/2007) 
38.3 14.2 2.7 
Source: Energy consumption of current installations for the production of large volume polymers in 
Europe (BREF-polymer). 
(1) Refers to the total energy and CO2 intensities of the share of feed chemicals (see Table 15) to produce one tonne of 
polymer as well as the actual production process of the polymer. 
(2) Prices according ICIS pricings for Europe in May 2007. 
(3) Due to a lack of data for the styrene production process the given values refer to the energy and CO2 intensities of 
the feed chemicals of the styrene process (i.e. benzene and ethylene) as well as the production process of polystyrene 
itself. 
(4) HIPS: rubber additives such as polybutadiene not taken into account. 
(5) EPS: blowing agents (e.g. pentane, CO2) are not taken into account. 
(6) SP: share of production. The mentioned values refer to shares of total polymer production volume in the EU-15 & 
EFTA.  
 
The energy intensities of the commodity polymers listed in Table 16 range from 8.2 GJ 
(PVC suspension) to 62 GJ (polypropylene) per tonne of polymer. The integrated CO2-
intensities taking into account the total emissions of the polymerisation process as well 
as the total emissions of the feedstock materials range from 1.2 tCO2 (polystyrene) to 3.3 
tCO2 (polypropylene).  
Based on an allowance price of €20/tCO2 the incremental costs for the CO2 allowance 
range between €24 and €65 per tonne of polymer. These costs would be equivalent to 
price increases of about 1.5% (polystyrene) to 5.4% (polypropylene) based on energy 
and product prices in May 2007.  
3.10.6. Refineries 
The purpose of oil refineries is to convert crude oil into useable products. Usually the 
refinery products are classified in terms of “light” to “heavy” following the way crude oil 
is separated by distillation into fractions: light fractions (LPG, gasoline, naptha), middle 
fractions (kerosene, diesel), heavy fractions (fuel oil, lubricating oils) and residuum 
(wax, bitumen, tar). 
Oil refineries are complex plants which comprise a combination and sequence of 
different processing facilities. Typically, in a refinery the outputs of a process are fed 
into subsequent different processes, referred back to a previous process or blended with 
other outputs to form marketable products.  
Distillation is the primary17 and fundamental process in the processing of crude oil and is 
carried out in all oil refineries. Distillation processes (atmospheric distillation, vacuum 
distillation) sort heavier from lighter components of the crude oil according to their 
boiling point. What follows is a further processing of the distillation fractions in diverse 
                                                 
17 After pretreatment of the crude oil by desalting. 
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processes to saleable products by breaking, combining and re-shaping the containing 
hydrocarbons (BREF-refinery).  
Pivotal conversion facilities are diverse cracking processes in which longer hydrocarbons 
(heavy fraction) are broken down into smaller hydrocarbon molecules (light fraction, 
light hydrocarbons). The basic cracking processes employed are thermal cracking (steam 
cracker, visbreaking, coker) and catalytic cracking (fluid catalytic cracking, 
hydrocracking). Steam cracking is mainly used for the generation of organic feedstock 
for the chemical industry such as methane, ethylene, propylene, butadiene and aromatics. 
Another important refining process is catalytic cracking which converts the naphta 
fraction by re-shaping and breaking of the hydrocarbons. The main product of catalytic 
cracking is the reformate which contains mainly high-octane aliphatic and aromatic 
compounds. The reformate is used for blending of gasoline or for extraction of aromatics 
such as benzene, toluene and xylene for the chemical feedstock. Significant by-products 
of catalytic cracking are liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and hydrogen. The hydrogen 
produced is needed as feed material in several processing steps in a refinery such as 
hydrocracking and hydrotreatments (hydrodesulphurisation, hydrodenitrification, 
saturation of olefins and aromatics). Other important methods for hydrogen production in 
a refinery are steam reforming and partial oxidation of hydrocarbons. Steam reforming is 
the most commonly used process method for the hydrogen production and it is less CO2-
intensive than the partial oxidation process. 
Other important re-shaping and combining processes of hydrocarbons are alkylation 
(reaction of olefins with isobutane, to form isoparaffins with a high octane rating), 
polymerisation (converting propene and butene to high octane gasoline blending 
components), etherication (producing methyltetrabutylether (MTBE), 
ethyltetrabutylether (ETBE), gasoline additives from isobutylene), and isomerisation 
(converting paraffins and olefins to hydrocarbons with higher octane rating).  
The CO2-intensity of the Europen refinery industry varies widely in a range of 0.02 tCO2 
to 0.8 tCO2 per tonne of crude-oil refined. The specific emissions depend very much on 
the refinery complexity as more complex refineries tend to consume more energy and 
consequently emit more CO2. Most of the refineries show CO2 intensities in the range of 
0.08 tCO2 to 0.4 tCO2 per tonne of crude oil which would correspond to allowance costs of 
€1.6 to €8 per tonne of crude oil at an allowance price of €20/tCO2 (BREF-refinery). 
The energy consumption of European refineries ranges from 1.7 GJ to 5.4 GJ per tonne 
of processed crude oil. About 35-40% of the total process energy is consumed in 
distillation facilities (atmospheric and vacuum distillation) as the entire volume of the 
processed crude has to be heated to a temperature of about 350ºC. The most energy-
intensive processing steps are catalytic reforming (1.4 GJ/tcrude - 2.9 GJ/tcrude), coking (0.8 
GJ/tcrude - 1.2 GJ/tcrude), hydrocracking (0.6 GJ/tcrude - 1.2 GJ/tcrude), catalytic cracking 
(0.12 GJ/tcrude - 2.0 GJ/tcrude) as well as etherication (2 GJ - 4 GJ per tonne of MTBE) 
(BREF-refinery). 
The refinery capacity in the EU-15 and EFTA was about 700 million tonnes of crude oil 
at the end of the 1990s. This volume was processed by 104 refineries of which about 10 
were specialist refineries producing mainly lubricating oil or bitumen. Refineries are 
located mainly close to the sea or to a large river in order to facilitate the sea transport of 
raw materials and products. Due to large overcapacities only a few oil refineries have 
been built in Europe in the last 25 years (BREF-refinery). 
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3.11. Summary 
Based on the above calculations for more than 50 different products and production 
processes in energy intensive sectors, the impact of a €20/tCO2 allowance price on output 
prices should be between 0.1 and 5% for most of the products considered, assuming full 
pass through of CO2 along the upstream supply chain. Doubling the CO2 price to 
€40/tCO2 and retaining the assumption of full pass through would double these figures.  
In the metals sectors, the primary production of steel and aluminium would require 
higher price increases to recover fully the costs of a binding carbon constraint. In the 
case of primary steel (integrated steelworks) price increases would be in the range of 
6.5% to 12%, whereas in the case of primary aluminium necessary price increases are 
likely to be in the range from 7.5% to 10%. In the area of building materials, full pass 
through of CO2 prices would correspond to price increases of more than 20%-45% in the 
cement and lime industries, but prices of most types of ceramics and glass would 
typically have to rise by no more than 2%. In the basic chemicals sector, ammonia prices 
could rise by up to 14% to 25% or more, depending on the production technology and 
fuel input used, and this would have knock-on effects on most types of fertilisers. 
However, price increases needed to recover the carbon constraint imposed on basic 
organic chemicals and polymers would not need to exceed 7%. 
For most of the energy-intensive industries, cost increases are directly related to the 
carbon content of the fossil fuel they use (direct costs). Other sectors, such as the energy-
intensive production of primary aluminium, are exposed to cost increases resulting from 
the pass through of higher costs of their electricity suppliers (indirect costs). Finally, 
production processes in some sectors, such as the production of cement and lime, also 
emit CO2 independent of the energy mix they use (process emissions). 
Typically, production from recycled material requires only a fraction of the energy 
needed by production from virgin material. Thus, the price increases needed for iron and 
steel, aluminium, copper or even glass production based on recycled input would be 
much less affected by the imposition of a carbon constraint than the same products based 
on primary inputs. Imposing a carbon constraint would therefore make recycling more 
attractive. 
Moreover, the upper and lower ranges given above for identical products are largely 
determined by alternative production processes of fuel inputs. Switching to less carbon-
intensive fuels and switching to more energy-efficient production processes could 
already reduce the cost increase stemming from the carbon constraint by 30% to 50% or 
even more, for example, in the production of cement or clinker, paper and pulp 
production or most of the chemical products analysed. 
As European climate policy is phased in gradually, so could the price increases necessary 
to take into account rising (opportunity) costs from the carbon constraint. Assuming a 
phasing in of a tighter carbon constraint by 1 percentage point annually would translate 
the price increases derived above into annual price increases of 0.01 to 0.5% for most of 
the products analysed, and to 0.5 to 1.0% for the primary production of steel and 
aluminium. This would be well below price increases experienced in recent years. 
Outliers would be the cement and lime industry and the production of ammonia (an input 
for fertilizers), if they continued to be produced in a very carbon-intensive way despite 
the availability of low-carbon alternatives, where the annual price increases needed to 
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recover the (opportunity) cost of such a carbon constraint would amount to 2 to 4%. 
However, these products are largely sterilized from extra-EU competition. 
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4. MEASURING EXPOSURE TO (INTERNATIONAL) COMPETITION – AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR COST-PASS THROUGH POSSIBILITIES 
The previous analysis has clearly shown that imposing a carbon constraint on European 
energy and carbon-intensive industries, branches and production processes can have 
significant cost implications. If producers are not able to pass these higher production 
costs through to their clients, or to adjust their production processes to become 
significantly more energy and carbon efficient, they will be forced to leave the market in 
the long run. 
The possibility to pass through higher costs largely depends on the (in)ability of clients 
to change their supplier by switching to non-EU producers and/or on their substitution 
possibilities. The fewer alternative producers or products available to their clients, the 
easier it will be for producers to pass through higher costs. Such substitution possibilities 
are typically measured by price elasticities of demand, and in the international context, 
by so-called Armington elasticities that try to measure substitution possibilities between 
domestic and foreign supply. 
If one wants to quantify the consequences of unilateral carbon constraints, it is necessary 
both to analyse the exposure of these industries to international competition and to look 
more carefully at the structure of the relevant markets and competition in general, as, for 
example, revealed by price elasticities and concentration indices. 
However, reliable estimates of these price and Armington elasticities do not seem to exist 
for the markets analysed in this study (see for example annex 2 dealing with Armington 
elasticities). Thus, alternative indicators to measure exposure to (international) 
competition are needed. Therefore, an analysis of the openness of these industries to 
trade and market and price dynamics will be undertaken in the following three sections 
of this chapter before having a closer look at market concentration and other issues in 
section 4.4. 
4.1. Openness to trade 
As regards international competition and in the absence of firm data on price and 
Armington elasticities, openness to trade could serve as an indicator of the degree of 
international competitive pressure that industry branches face. The chart below (Figure 
8) shows the ratio of extra-EU exports and imports to turnover of a number of energy-
intensive sectors. For reasons of data availability, values for exports and imports refer to 
extra-EU trade for the year 2005, while the turnover figures use data from 2004.  
The “cement and concrete” branch stands out as being considerably less open to trade 
than the other energy-intensive sectors, with exports and imports together amounting to 
less than 10% of turnover. Other construction-related branches (stone, glass) also appear 
among the relatively closed branches. At the other end of the scale, both “basic precious 
and non-ferrous metals” (which includes aluminium manufacture) and the branch “basic 
chemicals, pesticides, other agro-chemicals” are relatively open to trade. 
Figure 8: Openness to extra-EU trade 2004/2005 
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Source: EUROSTAT Structural Business Statistics and Comext 
A more disaggregated presentation of the exposure to trade of different products, based 
on Eurostat’s Prodcom database for 2006, is given in annex 1. It highlights the need for 
disaggregation and for a bottom-up analysis, as openness to trade within a well-specified 
industry and branch still differs significantly between individual products within such a 
branch or industry. 
Moreover, high openness to trade does not automatically imply a bad/good international 
(cost) competitiveness position triggered by differences in relative prices between EU 
and non-EU producers. It is rather an indication of the integration of the EU economy in 
the world market and of the international division of labour. 
Thus, instead of only comparing exposure to trade and using this as a synonym for 
exposure to international competition, one often also focuses on the trade balance. A 
longer-lasting trade surplus is taken as an indication of an underlying healthy 
competitiveness position while a long-lasting trade deficit is seen as a sign of a weak 
competitiveness position. 
However, such high import or export ratios and surpluses/deficits are often triggered by 
long-term capacity constraints, specialisation on the supply side, or by domestic supply 
capacities being much higher/lower than domestic demand. Thus, the high export share 
for (for example) tubes in total turnover might be more the result of high demand for 
tubes for pipeline construction in the rest of the world, combined with the specialised 
technical know-how concentrated in the EU, than the result of relatively low energy, 
labour or capital costs in the EU. Nevertheless, longer-term trends in the trade balance 
might be a good indication of the comparative advantages of different economic regions 
of the world. 
Typically it is assumed that a high exposure to international trade together with a long-
lasting trade deficit is also an indication of high international competitive pressure, 
which makes it difficult to easily pass through unilateral cost increases. Thus, primary 
aluminium producers in the EU might have difficulties to pass through unilateral cost 
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increases to their clients. However, primary aluminium production and processing is also 
an example of a global market characterised by a global oligopoly, in which EU 
producers and processors have the advantage of a highly depreciated capital stock, so 
that the costs of capital have already largely been paid back by past production18.  
4.2. Trade and regional market-share dynamics – and the role of (real effective) 
exchange rates 
Alternatively, or as well as simply looking at the openness to trade, one could analyse 
market dynamics, that is, the shares of European producers in world markets, how they 
have developed, and how European producers were or were not able to benefit from 
dynamically growing markets. The less they could benefit from growing markets and the 
more they lost market shares, the more intense might be their exposure to international 
competition. 
Figure 9: World trade dynamics for energy intensive sectors from 2000 to 2005 
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Products of energy-intensive sectors have enjoyed extraordinarily dynamic international 
trade growth in recent years. Figure 9 shows that all sectors except pulp (and paper) 
experienced two-digit annual growth rates between 2000 and 2005, with trade in copper, 
organic chemicals or iron and steel growing by 15 to 20 percent annually. Similarly, 
cement trade (not shown in Figure 9) developed very dynamically, although starting from 
very low levels if compared with other energy and carbon-intensive industries.  
This compares to global exports of goods expanding by about 10% annually between 
2000 and 2005. The main reason for this dynamic trade and production development of 
energy-intensive industries can be found in the growing appetite of large developing 
countries like China and India, in the past characterised by a huge agricultural (and 
textile) sector but now turning into industrialised superpowers. 
                                                 
18  See section 3.3 for more detail. 
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Quite often, European producers could not fully benefit from this dynamically expanding 
international exchange of goods. However, Figure 10 shows that the performance has 
been rather heterogeneous. Some industries and branches such as glass and glassware 
production had a stable market share while others such as pulp and paper production, or 
the production and processing of paper and paperboard gained significant market share. 
Figure 10: Change in extra-EU market shares for selected energy-intensive commodities, 
2000-2006 
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Source: UN Comtrade database, HS1992 
The figure also shows that it is crucial to distinguish between the production of a 
commodity such as copper or aluminium, and its further processing. Indeed, typically, 
European industry specialises in the further processing of such energy-intensive 
commodities, as can be seen from the much higher market share in the 2-digit Comtrade 
nomenclature (that typically includes production and processing) and the 4-digit 
Comtrade nomenclature that only covers the production of the commodity. 
Competitors from other major industrialised regions such as the USA or Japan lost even 
more market share. This is especially surprising for the USA whose international 
competitiveness position did not – as opposed to that of EU companies - suffer from a 
significantly appreciating currency since 2001, or the imposition of a carbon constraint 
(as of 2005). Main winners of market share were China, Russia, India and Brazil. 
Thus, other than relative cost developments seem to have dominated world market 
growth for these products. Indeed, it seems to be the emergence of the “BRICs” (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China), both on the supply and on the demand side, that has 
significantly altered traditional global trading patterns. 
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Beyond typical elements such as production cost components, the relative 
competitiveness position of companies in international markets (as opposed to domestic 
markets) is largely influenced by exchange rate levels and exchange rate changes. As can 
be seen from table 17, over recent years, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of 
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the euro has substantially appreciated (+21.4%) against the basket of currencies of the 
main trading partners, more than recovering the losses it experienced in the 1996 to 2000 
period (-14.6%). It has appreciated even further in 2007. This fluctuation had definitely a 
bigger impact on the relative competitiveness position than the unilateral imposition of 
regulatory constraints such as a carbon constraint. However, while in the earlier years the 
euro's depreciation facilitated life for European companies, its subsequent appreciation 
has definitely made it more difficult over the last years, which coincided with the 
imposition of a unilateral carbon constraint, and the growing role of the BRICs in 
international trade.  
Table 17: Nominal and real effective exchange rates for the euro area, 1996 - 2006 
% change over the period  
1996 – 2000 2001 – 2006 
NEER (1) -14.2 21.4 
REER ULC (2) -25.8 17.5 
REER GDP (2) -22.3 16.3 
Source: Cigan/Zogala (2007) 
 (1) NEER: nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis 19 trading partners, double export weighting. 
 (2) REER: real effective exchange rate. The figures given for the REER are corrected for the relative 
changes of the GDP deflator or of unit labour cost (ULC), i.e. .changes in wage costs after correction for 
changes in labour productivity.  
The real effective exchange rate, that also explicitly takes into account relative unit 
labour cost developments in manufacturing industries in the most important competing 
economies, shows a somewhat more favourable picture, albeit not for all European 
countries. Indeed, while the nominal effective exchange rate recovered by more than 
21% in the period 2001 to 2006, after having declined by about 14% in the 1996/2000 
period, the real effective exchange rate recovered by less (17.5%) than it lost in the 
earlier period (25.8%). 
However, the impact of both the nominal and real appreciation on the export 
performance seems to have been rather modest. A 1% appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate seems to have reduced the level of extra-euro area exports by 0.2% after 
one year and by about 0.25% after two years with no further significant additional impact 
afterwards (see Cigan/Zogala, 2007). 
Assuming that a unilateral increase in production costs due to a positive carbon price 
imposed on EU enterprises has similar effects as an increase of the same size in unit 
labour costs the impact on exports should also be similar. Thus, the estimated short and 
long term elasticity of export demand to the estimated cost increase in the range of one to 
five percent over a ten-year period would trigger a decline in exports relative to the 
baseline of less than 1% over this period for most energy intensive industries. Primary 
aluminium, and iron and steel from integrated steel plants, which face a much higher cost 
increase would be an exception to this (for more details, see chapter 3). 
A recent literature review of competitiveness impacts of the EU carbon constraint 
(Frontier Economics (2006)) also identified primary aluminium manufacture, followed 
by BOF iron and steel, as the activities most likely to be adversely affected. This also 
highlights the role of the pass-through of allowance prices in electricity prices in 
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influencing the competitiveness impacts of the carbon constraint, since the aluminium 
sector is not part of the European emission trading scheme.  
Quirion & Hourcade (2003) observed that carbon-intensive sectors – with the exception 
of the non-ferrous metals sector – are less exposed to extra-EU competition than the 
industry average. They also attempted to compare the impact of the EU carbon constraint 
on competitiveness with exchange rate shocks. With allowances grandfathered and a CO2 
allowance price of €20/tonne they found that the impact of the carbon constraint would 
be no more than one-fifth that of a 10% appreciation in the exchange rate of all EU 
currencies against all other currencies. However, their analysis was conducted at quite an 
aggregated level – industry was divided into 12 sectors – and did not take account of the 
impact of the carbon constraint on electricity prices. 
4.3. Price and market developments – some evidence from the pre-carbon-
constraint period 
Figure 1111 shows in some detail how domestic production, domestic output prices and 
exports and imports developed for some energy-intensive industries in the period 
preceding the imposition of a carbon constraint. The period was characterised by rather 
sluggish growth in the EU, a significant appreciation of the euro and of the currencies 
pegged to it, and energy prices initially retreating from their peak experienced in 2000 
before embarking in early 2002 on an upward path, eventually leading to record nominal 
levels in 2006/2007. The period also includes the terror attacks of 9 September 2001 and 
the war in Iraq starting in early 2003. 
Of the 17 branches, nine suffered a – sometimes even very significant – production loss, 
the output of glass remained rather stable (-0.2% over five years), while seven branches 
enjoyed more or less dynamic output growth. However, an output loss did not necessarily 
reflect a deterioration in international competitiveness. Indeed, three of the seven 
branches in which production fell, and for which trade data were available (preparation 
of textiles, man-made fibres and basic precious and non-ferrous metals), experienced 
declining imports and rising exports during this period, not necessarily a combination 
characterising a loss in international competitiveness. In addition, 10 of the 15 branches 
for which trade data were available showed an improvement in their trade balance while 
five experienced a certain modest erosion, the balance itself remaining in surplus. Of the 
latter, the cement, lime and plaster industry suffered the most pronounced decline in its 
trade balance, its trade surplus deteriorating from about 6% of annual turnover to 2.3%. 
In addition, the correlation between price and production or trade developments is less 
straight forward than one would expect, or sometimes even “counter-intuitive”. Indeed, 
while it is true that (including glass) 10 of the 16 branches in which domestic prices 
increased also experienced a decline in domestic production, five benefited from both 
rising domestic prices and rising domestic production. In fact, plotting price changes 
against production changes shows a positive correlation, suggesting that at times of 
buoyant economic and sector-specific growth it is much easier to pass through cost 
increases and to increase prices than at times of sluggish overall demand. One might 
want to interpret trade and price data in the same vein: the fact that 11 of the 14 branches 
that managed a sustained price increase also had a rising trade surplus should be seen 
more against the background of dynamic (global) demand growth than as evidence for 
growing international competitiveness. 
Figure 11: Output and price changes as well as dynamics for selected European energy-
intensive industries, 2000 to 2004 
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Overall, it seems plausible to assume that at least in the short to medium term, that is, up 
to a period of three to five years, demand and supply dynamics are more relevant for 
price setting and production behaviour than underlying cost-competitiveness 
considerations. Moreover, the multitude of sector and branch-specific characteristics, and 
developments outside the control of branch-specific decision makers, such as exchange 
rate or energy-price volatility, or political risks, seem to be much more important for the 
relative performance of sectors in the shorter run than the fine-tuning of the production-
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cost function. In addition, the emergence and industrialisation over the last decade of 
economically very important key players on the global scene, such as the BRICs, had a 
major impact on the absolute and relative economic performance of the incumbents from 
other industrialised regions, including Europe. 
Thus, as long as the global economy and demand for products from energy- and carbon-
intensive industries continues to grow dynamically, concerns of limited pass-through 
possibilities of relatively modest but unilateral cost increases seem to be less well 
founded. However, this picture can be expected to change once this dynamic demand 
growth tapers off. Then, for example, in a long-lasting global recession, small cost 
differences and the existence or non-existence of “deep pockets” might play a decisive 
role in determining whether an industry or production location will survive. This would 
hold even in highly concentrated markets where companies are not necessarily 
competing against each other but where competition is between different production 
facilities of and the same company in different locations. 
4.4. Barriers to competition in energy-intensive industries 
Exposure to international competition as measured by openness to trade and the gain or 
loss in market share at the global level is only one facet, but an important one, for 
analysing the pass-through potential of industries. Another, equally important issue, is 
the degree of competition on a given market, indicated for example by the degree of 
concentration, barriers to entry and exit, or the degree of collusion between competitors 
on a market. Here it is typically assumed that higher degrees of concentration, of 
collusion or important entry and exit barriers might be harmful for competition and thus 
would facilitate the pass-through of (asymmetric) cost increases, while the absence of 
these features is typically assumed to intensify competition and, consequently, make the 
passing through of such cost increases more difficult. 
Energy-intensive industries are typically rather capital intensive and, thus, invite for 
concentration to better exploit economies of scale. Figure 12, depicting a small selection 
of energy-intensive industries – clearly confirms this picture. The market shares of the 
five biggest producers on these markets range from almost 30 percent to well above 75 
percent, with the markets for the basic inputs of a refined commodity (such as iron ore, or 
alumina production) being typically even more concentrated than the markets for the 
production of the refined product (different steel products or aluminium production). 
Figure 12: Concentration in selected energy intensive industries – market shares of 5 
biggest producers (2006) 
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Source: European Aluminium Association, Brook Hunt, Macquarie 
In the economic literature19, four categories of indicators are typically used to measure 
competition. They relate to (i) market structure as (for example) reflected in 
concentration indices or entry and exit barriers and (dis)economies of scale and scope, 
(ii) supplier behaviour such as collusion, cartels or predatory pricing, (iii) consumer 
behaviour as (for example) reflected in the price elasticity of demand, and (iv) consumer 
benefits. The most common forms of weak competition materialise in formal or informal 
collusion, or horizontal agreements, or in the abuse of a dominant position. Motta (2004) 
identifies structural factors related to technology and market structure, a high degree of 
price and market transparency, and factors related to pricing rules and contracts as those 
features that facilitate collusion and the forming of some kind of cartels or agreements 
amongst competitors. Similar factors prima facie working as forceful barriers to effective 
competition are also highlighted by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (2005).  
In 2007, London Economics (2007) in association with ZEW and RPA tried to identify 
industrial sectors with weak competition. Not surprisingly (given the analysis of chapter 
3), the energy-intensive industries that have been analysed above feature prominently in 
this analysis. Indicators such as concentration indices, market entry and exit rates or 
capital-intensity requirements indicate the presence of market structures that are not very 
conducive to effective competition. For some sectors, such as the cement and lime 
industry, this has been confirmed by an above-average number of cartel and anti-trust 
cases pursued by the EU or its Member States, although the absence of such cases does 
not automatically serve as a proof for the absence of such behaviour. 
In principle, the study has been undertaken at too aggregate a level to be taken as firm 
evidence of weak competition on these markets. However, the structural features 
identified for these industries do not seem to be very conducive to strong competition. 
This suggests that the barriers to competition identified could be sufficient to enable the 
pass through to downstream industries of a non-trivial part of higher production costs. 
                                                 
19 For a recent overview of the relevant literature see for example Lee (2004). 
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5. POTENTIAL BRANCH-LEVEL AND WIDER ECONOMIC IMPACTS, AND THE RISK OF 
CARBON LEAKAGE 
5.1. Profitability, carbon leakage and the value chain 
Enterprises exposed to a carbon constraint either themselves, or through their upstream 
suppliers who pass through their higher (opportunity) costs, typically face higher 
production costs. If these tried to pass through to their clients these higher costs, in a 
world of perfect competition they would immediately be crowded out of the market if 
their competitors producing perfect substitutes were not confronted with an identical cost 
increase (unless flexible exchange rates corrected for this). 
In a world of imperfect competition and rather sticky exchange rates, these enterprises 
can either try to pass these higher costs through to their clients and suffer a certain 
decline in demand with profits remaining relatively unchanged, or they may try to first 
shoulder these higher costs through a (temporary) squeeze in their mark up. In this case, 
part of their higher costs will effectively be born by taxpayers as the tax bill would be 
reduced correspondingly. In the medium term, they might also try to improve their “x-
efficiency” by reducing slack, innovating, and – of course - improving their energy and 
carbon efficiency. In any case, as a tighter carbon constraint would be phased in over a 
longer period, for example through tightening by 1 percentage point annually, it might 
also be possible to phase in the cost increase and the necessary price increase over a 
longer period. 
Given the importance of electricity in overall energy costs (particularly for a branch such 
as primary aluminium production), reducing electricity costs is obviously key to 
maintaining the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries in general, and especially 
the (primary) aluminium industry. There are essentially just two ways to do this: 
lowering electricity prices, for example through increased competition and efficiency in 
electricity production, and/or by increasing the energy efficiency of energy-intensive 
industries themselves. 
The introduction of an emissions constraint through the carbon constraint places a value 
on emission (allowances) that should be included as a production cost. If EU ETS 
emission allowances are given out for free, then the ability of electricity producers to 
pass through the opportunity cost of allowances in prices allows them to earn an 
economic rent. The same should hold true for energy-intensive industries themselves, as 
they should also aim to pass through to their clients the higher opportunity costs of the 
carbon constraint. 
An aluminium producer that responds to this situation by building or acquiring its own 
power plant and, for example, receiving free of charge a corresponding amount of 
emission allowances captures part of this rent. If the producer values this electricity in its 
internal accounting at the price it paid prior to the introduction of the carbon constraint 
(that is, excluding the cost of emissions), then its financial profits will be unchanged 
from the situation before the introduction of the emission trading scheme, when it bought 
its electricity from outside. 
However, this numerical stability in the financial value of profits masks the fact that the 
source of the profits has changed. Prior to the introduction of the carbon constraint the 
firm made a profit by selling aluminium at a price greater than its production costs. After 
the introduction of the carbon constraint and deciding to produce its own electricity, the 
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firm makes a profit by subsidising its aluminium production through not including the 
value of emission allowances in the cost of the electricity it produces. The new, vertically 
integrated firm would then in effect consist of a power generator that supplies electricity 
at below market prices to an aluminium plant that would otherwise be less profitable. 
The vertically-integrated firm could earn the same profits by selling its electricity on the 
market. 
The crucial distinction is between profitability and competitiveness: profitability in this 
example is positively affected due to the “windfall” of free allocation of allowances. 
Competitiveness, however, depends on the impact on marginal production costs of the 
price of emission allowances (see Frontier Economics (2006), McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)). 
Thus, while at first glance it might make a difference for the competitiveness position of 
industries whether they have to pay for allowances of whether they get them allocated for 
free, at second glance it becomes clear that free allocation would have a positive impact 
on profits only, while the competitiveness position would not change due to the increased 
(opportunity) costs of being obliged to surrender the allowances (McKinsey/Ecofys 
(2006)). 
Nevertheless, in the longer run and in a world of fierce competition, a permanent squeeze 
in profit margins could affect the overall competitiveness position and investment 
decisions: 
• The competitiveness position could be affected notably in crisis situations where 
production costs could no longer be recovered over a longer period: then having a 
“deeper pocket” than major competitors would force the latter to leave the market 
earlier, potentially improving the possibility for the survivor with the deeper pockets 
to increase prices afterwards. 
• Investment decisions might be affected as investment capital might always be looking 
for the highest rate of return, after correction for risks. Thus, reduced profit margins in 
a world of selling instead of giving away allowances might trigger relocation 
decisions to locations neither imposing now nor expected to impose a carbon 
constraint in the longer run, but being otherwise (closeness to markets, infrastructure, 
rule of law, provision of public goods, taxation and so on) as attractive as the present 
location. However, to really influence investment behaviour the differences in profit 
margins must not be negligible, as relocation activities themselves typically come at a 
rather high price.  
An increase in an EU industry’s production costs may reduce both domestic and extra-
EU demand for its output, depending on the EU industry’s price-setting ability and the 
elasticity of non-EU supply. If the carbon constraint results in EU production being 
replaced by non-EU production, “carbon leakage” will occur. This is more likely the less 
EU producers themselves influence world market prices, the more difficult it is for 
downstream industries (such as aircraft industries or car manufacturers) to adjust their 
production so as to reduce their use of the output of energy-intensive industries (such as 
steel or aluminium), and the easier it is for these non-integrated downstream industries to 
switch suppliers. 
In the short run, delocalisation activities would probably not take the form of closing 
production plants in Europe and opening new ones (to serve the European market) in 
non-EU locations. Rather it would take the form of not expanding production capacities 
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in case of growing markets, and of downscaling or giving less priority to (maintenance) 
investment in EU locations. 
On the other hand, the decline in demand for a certain production process, such as 
primary aluminium or iron and steel produced in integrated steelworks, might also result 
from them losing market share to competing intra-EU suppliers that do not produce 
virgin material, but recycle scrap, such as producers of secondary aluminium, or steel 
production through the electric arc furnace process. Indeed, as recycling is typically 
much less energy intensive than virgin production, imposing a carbon constraint should 
work in favour of recycling, partly mitigating the carbon leakage problem. 
Typically, energy-intensive industries figure high up the value chain, and they provide 
critical input for numerous economic activities. Thus, rising production costs at this level 
will also lead to rising production costs along the value chain, unless fierce competition 
in energy-intensive industries makes passing through these higher production costs 
impossible, even in the longer run. In this latter case, the economic implications of the 
carbon constraint would remain limited to energy-intensive industries. 
In all other cases, the additional production costs resulting from the carbon constraint 
will trickle down the supply chain. For example, rising cement prices will trigger higher 
costs for the construction sector, and higher steel and aluminium prices will trigger 
higher production costs for car manufacturers or shipbuilding. The more cost increases 
are passed through to downstream industries the better it will be for the profitability of 
upstream industries. 
Some industries may face a double cost increase, such as the fertiliser industry: first it 
might suffer from the higher costs of the production of ammonia, a crucial input for the 
production of most fertilisers. Then it may suffer from the carbon constraint imposed on 
its own process emissions. These indirect and direct cost increases and their magnitudes 
have been analysed in chapter 3. 
Once again, downstream enterprises exposed to such price increases have different 
options for responding to this challenge. They can try themselves to pass through these 
higher production costs, they might accept a (temporary) squeeze in their profit margins, 
or they may invest in adjustment efforts to reduce their reliance on the input that has 
become more expensive and/or invest in other cost-reducing activities. In any case, given 
the downstream character of their activities, the cost increase these downstream 
industries face should only be a fraction of the cost increase faced by the upstream 
industries.20 Thus, the impact on production costs and, thereby, on the international 
competitiveness position of these industries should remain rather limited. 
Nevertheless, for some downstream industries it might be worthwhile to invest in 
alternative technologies: aircraft producers might try improve the design of their aircraft 
to save on aluminium input, while car manufacturers might do the same to save on steel. 
Such abatement efforts are the more likely the more such innovation would also generate 
benefits for end users, for example by improving the fuel efficiency of aircraft and 
passenger cars. 
 
20  A 10% price increase of an input that accounts for 10% of all inputs would trigger a cost increase for 
this downstream industry of only one percentage point. 
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In any case, one should avoid the trap of double counting along the value chain, that is, if 
production cost increases in upstream industries due to a carbon constraint are passed 
through to their clients, they should be counted as a burden for the downstream industries 
only. Ideally, in the longer-term the end-user should shoulder all the burden – and adjust 
its demand by favouring less carbon-intensive products. This is, after all, the main 
purpose of imposing a positive carbon price. 
5.2. Quantified ex-ante estimations of economic effects 
Numerous studies have been produced to analyse the potential effect of imposing a 
carbon constraint on energy-intensive European industries. There is little controversy 
about the mechanisms at play in such a case. These include costs, influence on 
international competition or the risk of carbon leakage or delocalisation, as described 
above. However, significant differences between these studies can emerge when it comes 
to quantifying the importance of the different mechanisms and effects. 
Typically, one can distinguish between bottom-up and top-down approaches. The first 
analyse at a rather disaggregated level the impacts of imposing a carbon constraint on 
individual or several sectors. These bottom-up approaches are normally not based on 
economic models but are based on sector-specific evidence, the latter itself either being 
derived from empirical evidence or from expert interviews or some other form of then 
typically difficult-to-verify other sources. In contrast to this, there also exist top-down 
approaches that are typically based on general or partial equilibrium economic models. 
These top-down approaches often transpose findings having shown some value added at 
the aggregate level and in some specific regions of the world (such as the USA) to a 
specific question under investigation. 
This section 5.2 tries to summarise and analyse the findings of some of these studies, 
including two model-based bottom-up studies. 
5.2.1. Model-based ex-ante estimations 
Model-based estimations of the economic impacts of imposing a carbon constraint on the 
EU economy mostly consider ex-ante evidence only. This evidence is obtained from 
policy simulations using either top-down or bottom-up economic models. Top-down 
models (Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) or macro-econometric models) 
simulate the economy-wide effects of a selected policy measure taking into account 
interaction and spillover effects across the economy. Hence, the impact of a policy on a 
specific sector (for example, energy-intensive industry) also accounts for the effects on 
all other sectors and possible substitution effects between them. The drawback of top-
down models is their fairly aggregate structure, which does not allow very detailed 
sectoral presentation of the results. However, frequently these top-down approaches do 
not catch important features of the industries to which they are applied, such as imperfect 
competition, market-entry and exit barriers of economies of scale and/or of scope. 
Unfortunately, all these features are characteristic for the energy-intensive industries 
analysed here. 
Bottom-up models are partial equilibrium models, which only represent one specific 
economic sector (for example, cement or steel). They often incorporate detailed 
information about production technologies, cost structure and abatement options 
concerning the sector. Changes in supply and demand conditions at the world level 
determine the outcome of the policy measure. Since bottom-up models are usually able to 
deal with a wide range of technological opportunities for abatement, the costs of climate 
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policy tend to be lower than in top-down models, in which the scope of technological 
improvement is more limited21. On the other hand, bottom-up models may also overstate 
the loss of competitiveness compared with top-down approaches, since climate policy 
(such as a CO2 tax) affects only the modelled sector, which faces an increase of 
production costs relative to the other sectors, the products of which may be close 
substitutes for those of the modelled sector. 
Climate policies are commonly modelled by assuming that countries or regions face a 
binding CO2 emission reduction constraint and apply an emissions trading scheme, in 
which case the carbon price/permit price/marginal abatement cost is endogenously given 
by the model. An alternative approach is to assume that a uniform CO2 tax is imposed on 
all sectors and countries of a region, in which case the amount of emission reduction is 
an endogenous outcome of the model. This case is equivalent to an emissions trading 
scheme covering all economic sectors with 100% auctioning of allowances. 
5.2.2. GEM-E3 study22 
The GEM-E3 model (European version) covers 22 EU Member States (excluding 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Romania) and used the Eurostat database 
(base year 1995). It treats separately each EU Member State and links them through 
endogenous trade of goods and services. The rest of the world (RoW) is exogenous in the 
model. The trade flows between the EU and the RoW are modelled by assuming that 
exports from the RoW are supplied at a fixed price, while imports demanded by the RoW 
depend on the price offered by the EU exporters. 
The model incorporates 18 productive sectors, of which 8 are manufacturing, 4 energy 
products (oil, coal, natural gas and electricity) and the rest includes other economic 
activities (agriculture, transport, services). Of these sectors the following are here 
considered as energy-intensive: ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products, other 
energy-intensive and transport. “Other energy-intensive” is a composite sector and 
includes non-metallic mineral products, metal products except machinery and transport 
equipment, and paper and printing products.  
An analysis of impacts of possible post-2012 climate policy was carried out, assuming 
that EU countries reach their Kyoto target. From 2012 onwards no (additional) 
quantitative emission reduction target is imposed, but instead it was assumed that an EU-
wide CO2 tax would be imposed in all sectors. The level of tax gradually increases from 
€19/tonne CO2 to either €25 or €45/tonnne CO2 in 2030. This is equivalent to an 
emissions trading scheme with 100% auctioning of allowances and covering all 
economic sectors. Tax (or auction) revenues are recycled in the form of reductions in 
employers' social security contributions. The current EU minimum tax rates on energy 
products, or current national tax rates, if higher, are assumed to continue to apply. 
Table 18 displays the impacts of the two climate policy scenarios, depending on the level 
of the CO2 tax in 2030 at the EU-22 average level. All the results are expressed as a 
percentage difference with respect to the baseline. Note that as the study from which 
 
21  See Capros et al. (1999): Climate Technology Strategies 2. The Macro-Economic Cost and Benefit of 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the European Union. (ZEW Economic Studies 4). 
22  Nikos Kouvaritakis, Leonidas Paroussos, Tams Revesz, Erno Zalai, Denise van Regemorter: Impacts 
of energy taxation in the enlarged European Union, evaluation with GEM-E3 Europe. Study for the 
European Commission, DG TAXUD, 2005. 
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these scenarios are taken pre-dates the EU’s adoption of a target of a 20% cut in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, the results are not 
necessarily consistent with this target. Nevertheless, they give an indication of how 
different sectors are likely to be affected by increasingly ambitious medium- and longer-
term climate policies. 
The falls in output in the energy-intensive sectors are several times larger than the fall in 
GDP. In the sector worst affected – ferrous and non-ferrous metals – the loss in output 
relative to baseline is roughly equivalent to one year’s growth in output, that is, the 
output level expected in the business-as-usual scenario for the year 2030 would be 
reached only in 2031 as a result of imposing the carbon constraint. The energy-intensive 
sectors also lose export market shares more strongly than does EU industry as a whole. 
The sectors covered by the ETS are somewhat more affected than those currently outside 
it (chemicals, transport). Revenue recycling through cuts in employers’ social security 
contributions benefits some of the service sectors, which are able to increase their output 
volumes and market shares (not shown in Table 18). Alternative approaches to revenue 
recycling might help to mitigate the adverse impact on the international competitiveness 
of energy intensive industries, but would likely have a less favourable overall economic 
outcome. 
Table 18: GEM-E3 results of climate policy scenarios to 2030, EU-22.  
 case of CO2 tax 25€/t,
in %-difference  
case of CO2 tax 45€/t, 
in %-difference 
GDP -0.13 -0.24 
Employment 0.46 0.73 
Economic welfare -0.07 -0.14 
Total welfare 0.27 0.32 
Exports to ROW -0.71 -1.18 
Imports from ROW -0.32 -0.42 
CO2 emissions -19.54 -27.21 
Output volumes:  
Energy -5.72 -8.81 
Ferrous + non-ferrous -1.34 -2.14 
Chemical -0.64 -1.07 
Other EI -0.78 -1.28 
Transport -0.91 -1.55 
Export volumes:  
Energy -5.52 -8.67 
Ferrous + non-ferrous -2.46 -3.93 
Chemical -0.94 -1.57 
Other EI -1.30 -2.14 
Transport -1.84 -3.12 
Source: Kouvaritakis et al (2005). 
The results of policy simulations are always dependent on the model specification. In the 
case of the GEM-E3 model a particularly sensitive assumption concerns foreign trade23. 
As already stated, the Rest of the World is assumed to export to the EU at a fixed price 
and thus EU import prices remain unchanged even if import volumes change. On the 
other hand, export prices increase because of the higher costs of energy, which leads to 
                                                 
23  See Capros et al. (1999). 
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the fall of export volumes, but less in relative terms than the prices increase (the price 
elasticity of EU export demand is less than -1). Hence, the improvement of the terms of 
trade for the EU, leading to an increase in the money inflow from exports, partly 
compensates the negative effect of competitiveness loss due to climate policies. 
According to Capros et al. (1999) the positive terms of trade effect is essential for the 
“double dividend” (positive employment effect) in GEM-E3 simulations24. 
Technological progress is exogenous in GEM-E3, which implies that substitution 
possibilities induced by the CO2 price, from carbon-intensive to less carbon-intensive 
technologies are not incorporated. This implies that the costs of climate policies for 
energy-intensive industries, and thus also negative effects on competitiveness, may be 
overstated to some extent. 
Finally, because the Rest of the World is exogenous in GEM-E3, the impact of climate 
policies on carbon leakage is not modelled. 
5.2.2.a. COWI study for UNICE using GTAP-ECAP25 
This study used a CGE-model of the world economy (GTAP-ECAP) with the usual 
properties (perfect competition, constant returns to scale, full employment). It reports the 
impacts of EU climate policies on EU exports and imports (separately for ETS sectors), 
which are indicators for competitiveness effects. It also provides information on carbon 
leakage rates. The carbon leakage rate in Table 19 is measured as the ratio of percentage- 
increase of emissions in non-abating countries (leakage) to the percentage reduction of 
emissions in abating countries. 
Climate policy is modelled by imposing a cap on CO2 emissions necessary to reach the 
EU Kyoto target in 2010. An EU-wide emissions trading scheme is implemented in such 
a way, that the split of emission reduction efforts between trading and non-trading 
sectors is cost-effective, that is, marginal abatement cost are equalized across ETS and 
NTS-sectors. A limited amount of JI/CDM credits is allowed in the EU market. 
Two different assumptions regarding technological developments are used: long-term 
adaptation and sluggish shorter-term adaptation. In the first case the allowance price 
resulting from EU climate policy is estimated at €17/tCO2 and in the second case at 
€26.5/tCO2. 
The changes in EU GDP, foreign trade and carbon leakage rates in these two cases are 
given in Table 19 below. Compared with the GEM-E3 simulations, the COWI model 
gives somewhat higher macroeconomic costs, measured by the GDP change. This may to 
a large extent be due to the absence of revenue recycling in the COWI model, that is, the 
money that the regulated industries have to pay for acquiring emission allowances 
disappears into a “black hole”. In contrast, in GEM-E3 the recycling of this money 
counteracted the negative effect of higher energy costs on output and export volumes.  
 
24 Sensitivity analyses carried out in Capros et al. (1999).do not imply, however, that the modification of 
foreign trade assumptions would essentially change the conclusions regarding welfare and 
employment effects of the standard version of GEM-E3 model. 
25  Competitiveness and EU Climate Change Policy. Interim Report produced by COWI for UNICE, 
October 2004. 
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Exports from the ETS sectors are also more strongly negatively affected in the COWI 
model, while imports of ETS sectors increase relative to the baseline. The latter implies 
that energy-intensive industries lose some of their market share within the EU market 
and that the production activities are partly relocated outside the EU, as evidenced by the 
reported carbon leakage rates. The GTAP-ECAP model uses much higher Armington 
elasticities (the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods) than the 
GEM-E3 model26. Higher elasticities imply, in principle, more substitution possibilities 
between domestic production and imports and could explain the relatively strong 
increase of imports in the COWI model. On the other hand, increased substitution 
possibilities should also lead to lower increases in domestic prices and so in export 
prices, which should mitigate the fall of export volumes. This does not seem to be the 
case in the COWI model27.  
Table 19: The impacts of EU climate policy in the COWI study 
 Long-term technological 
adaptation 
Sluggish technological 
adaptation 
Allowance price €17/tonne CO2 €26.5/tonne of CO2
EU-25 GDP -0.36% -0.48% 
Total EU-25 exports -0.41 -0.55 
EU-25 export to ROW > -0.5% > -1.0% 
Export of ETS sectors -3.8% -5.1% 
Total EU-25 imports -0.6% -0.9% 
Imports from ROW -0.4% -0.5% 
Imports of ETS sectors 4.3% 3.1% 
Carbon leakage rate 17.8% 21% 
Carbon leakage rate: 
EI-sectors 
19.5%  
Carbon leakage rate: 
other manufacturing 
10.1%  
Source: COWI (2004) 
5.2.2.b. CPB study using WorldScan28 
The focus of the study of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(Centraal Planbureau – CPB) is the macroeconomic consequences of a 30% emission 
reduction target in 2020, under different assumptions regarding the participation of the 
countries of the world in the global emission cap and trading. Two different growth 
scenarios are considered:  
– a strong growth case (national income grows at 2.8% per annum (p.a.) in 2000-2020, 
emissions at 1.9% p.a. for EU-25)  
– moderate growth case (national income growth rate 1.9% p.a., emissions growth rate 
0.7% p.a.).  
                                                 
26  In GEM-E3 substitution elasticities between imports and domestic production are the following: 0.6 
for energy sectors, 1.5 for industrial sectors, 0.6 for service sectors, 1.2 for agriculture and transport. 
In the COWI study the Armington elasticity is 4.  
27  See, Capros & al (1999). Sensitivity analysis with respect to Armington elasticities indicates, however, 
that they have a rather marginal effect on macroeconomic aggregates in GEM-E3 model. See Koschel 
et al. (1998). 
28  Bollen, J, Manders, T., Veenedaal, P..: "How much does a 30% emission reduction cost? 
Macroeconomic effects of post-Kyoto climate policy in 2020", CPB Document 64, (2004). 
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The benchmark policy case is that of strong growth combined with global participation in 
emissions trading (the coalition of Kyoto countries is joined by all other countries in 
2010). Countries in Annex I of the UNFCCC are assumed to fulfil their Kyoto 
commitment in 2010 and receive emission rights on that basis in 2010. The other 
countries joining the coalition receive emission rights equal to their 2010 levels. The 
emission rights are adjusted in 2024 in such a way that all countries have equal rights per 
capita, the total amount of which does not exceed the global emission ceiling.  
Other scenarios differ from the benchmark either by assuming different global growth 
rates or a lower number of participants in the global emissions trading. A Kyoto scenario 
is also simulated, which assumes that all the Annex I countries (apart from USA and 
Australia) will implement the Kyoto Protocol. The results of the scenarios for EU-25 are 
described in Table 20. 
In these scenarios a much higher emission reduction level is reached than in the post-
Kyoto scenarios of the GEM-E3 study, although the allowance price is lower than the 
GEM-E3 carbon tax. In the COWI study the allowance price is at the same level as in the 
high growth benchmark scenario of the CPB study, but the emission reduction is only 
sufficient to reach the EU Kyoto target in 2010. These differences mainly illustrate the 
cost-effectiveness of global emissions trading, which offers greater opportunities for 
lower-cost emission reductions. 
Table 20: The impacts of climate policy in 2020 in EU-25 according to the CPB study 
 Benchmark Low growth, 
global 
trading 
Low growth, 
no 
participation 
of Asia and 
Africa 
High growth, 
only Annex I 
participation 
Kyoto 
scenario, 
effect in 2010 
Allowance price, €/tonne 
of CO2
17 4 58 129 11 
CO2 emissions compared 
to 1990 level, % 
-30 -27 -30 -30 -6 
CO2 emissions compared 
to the baseline, % 
-53 -36 -53 -53 -24 
National income, % 
change from baseline 
-0.6 -0.1 -1.8 -3.1 -0.3 
Production EI, trade and 
transport, %-change from 
baseline 
0 0  -4 -12 -2 
Source: Bollen et al (2004). 
Although not shown in Table 20, in the scenarios with global trading there are no adverse 
competitiveness impacts for the energy-intensive industries in Europe, as there is no 
asymmetric cost shock for EU producers. In the Kyoto scenarios the output losses are of 
similar magnitude as in the GEM-E3 Kyoto scenarios. 
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5.2.2.c. OECD study on the steel industry using SIM29 
Climate policy in this study consists of setting a carbon tax on the steel industry (and the 
power sector) at the rate of US$25/tonne of CO2. In the benchmark scenario the tax is 
implemented in the whole OECD area. The impact is simulated with a numerical partial 
equilibrium model of the world steel industry (SIM)30.  
Even compared with the GEM-E3 simulation reported above with a carbon tax of 
€45/tonne of CO2, this model estimates much greater reductions of output, particularly 
when the tax is imposed only in the EU. In EU13 (EU15 without Finland and Sweden) 
total steel production would fall by over 10%, and while CO2 emissions within the EU13 
would fall by more than twice this (reflecting significant reductions in carbon intensity), 
the fall in emissions would be less than 2% at the world level, implying a strong rate of 
carbon leakage. 
These differences could have several explanations related to modelling methodologies. 
The obvious one is the Armington elasticity of 8 assumed in the OECD study (for 
Armington elasticities in GEM-E3 see footnote 26). Such a high elasticity implies that 
there are ample opportunities to substitute steel produced in one region of the world for 
steel produced in another region and could explain large changes of output volumes. This 
might be justified if steel can be regarded as a relatively homogenous product across the 
world, where transport costs and the exploitation of economies of scope through 
vertically-integrated value chains do not matter: The sector “ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals” in GEM-E3 is much broader and consists of different kinds of products. 
However, an elasticity of 8, implying that an increase (decrease) in European producer 
prices by one percentage point would lead to a fall (increase) in demand for European 
steel by eight percentage points, does not seem to be matched by empirical evidence. 
Another explanation may be that in the OECD study the tax is imposed only on the steel 
and power sectors, and the changes of output volumes are determined only by price and 
Armington elasticities. In GEM-E3 there are also substitution opportunities between 
different products, which may mitigate output changes when the carbon tax is imposed 
broadly across all the economic sectors.  
Finally, the revenue recycling assumption (reduction in labour taxes) and the consequent 
decrease in labour costs in the GEM-E3 simulations may, to some extent, mitigate 
competitiveness losses in energy intensive industries.  
5.2.2.d. OECD study on the cement sector31 
As for the steel industry, a numerical partial equilibrium model (originally developed by 
the Commission’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS)) was used to 
simulate the impact of climate policies on the cement sector. The CO2 tax was set at a 
level of €15/tonne of CO2. Rather than using an Armington elasticity, in which one 
 
29  Environmental policy in the steel industry: using economic instruments. 
COM/ENV/EPOC/DAFFE/CFA(2002)68/REV1. (2003). 
30 The model is developed at the Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, 
Norway. 
31  The competitiveness impact of CO2 emission reduction in the cement sector. 
COM/ENV/EPOC/CTPA/CFA(2004)68/final. (2004). 
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parameter is used to capture the various “rigidities” affecting international trade, the 
model incorporates transportation costs, capacity utilization rates and profits for every 
producing country, and the average cement price for every consuming country. 
In this simulation, the fall in production is relatively modest in Europe, at less than 1% 
below baseline in 2020. This is comparable to the results of the GEM-E3 simulations (in 
which cement is included in “other energy intensive industries”). Starting at very low 
levels, exports fall by about 0.5%, and imports rise by about 4% compared to the 2020 
baseline. 
As in the steel study, the fall of CO2 emissions is nearly double the fall of output as the 
CO2 tax induces changes in production processes (reduction of the clinker content of 
cement) and a switch to low-carbon fuels. 
5.2.3. Ad-hoc bottom-up studies 
Ad-hoc bottom-up studies have tried to collect and quantify the facts, such as major 
characteristics of regulated industries and the cost increases triggered by the carbon 
constraint. Subsequently they describe the mechanisms at play and introduce and 
quantify certain key assumptions, for example, the degree of competitive pressure or the 
possibility to pass through higher production costs to clients to be able to analyse or even 
quantify the effect on production, profits or carbon leakage of introducing the carbon 
constraint. They also consider mitigating effects, or try to take into account likely 
dynamic structural adjustment that would occur in the absence of a unilateral carbon 
constraint. 
One of the more recent efforts to estimate ex-ante the effects of introducing the carbon 
constraint through the EU ETS on the competitiveness of selected industries without 
reverting to aggregate model simulations or sectoral partial equilibrium models was 
conducted by McKinsey and Ecofys (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)). This study tries to 
quantify the effects of a carbon constraint with a price of €20/tCO2 on the international 
competitiveness of the steel industry, pulp and paper production, the cement industry, 
refining activities and aluminium production. 
While it stops short of quantifying the effects of the assumed carbon constraint on output, 
employment, investment and profits of these industries, the study tries to quantify the 
cost implications of a CO2 price of €20/t CO2, and is rather explicit in quantifying the 
tightness of international competition by estimating the possibilities of these industries to 
pass through the resulting cost increase to their clients without being crowded out of the 
market. 
McKinsey and Ecofys give the following pass-through capabilities by sector: 
• Power sector: 100% pass-through capability 
• Steel: BOF can pass through 6% and EAF 66% of the cost increase 
• Aluminium: 0% pass-through capability 
• Cement from dry process: 0 to 15% pass-through capability 
• Refining: 25 to 75% pass-through capability. 
However, no indication is given that these pass-through capabilities by sector are based 
on empirical evidence. Actually, the assumptions of rather limited pass-through 
capability seem to be somewhat in contradiction with historic evidence. Indeed, most of 
these industries have significantly increased their output prices over the last years, and all 
have experienced a continued increase in outputs and rising profits, despite permanently 
rising production costs (higher raw material prices, higher labour costs) and – over recent 
years - an appreciating currency. Nor is it made clear what would happen if regulated 
industries would go beyond the pass-through thresholds defined by McKinsey/Ecofys, 
that is, the assumed price elasticities of demand are not stated. 
The cost/price increases presented by McKinsey/Ecofys also look rather high compared 
to the estimates in chapter 3 of this study: while section three arrives at increases of (for 
example) 7.3% for BOF steel or 23% for the cement industry (dry process), the 
respective figures quoted in McKinsey/Ecofys are 17.3% and 36.5%. Mathematically, 
this discrepancy can be explained by the denominator used: while both studies arrive at 
similar figures as regards the cost implications in absolute terms of a similar €20/tCO2 
carbon price the different percentage figures result from the fact that McKinsey/Ecofys 
express the increase as a percentage of production costs while in chapter 3 of this study 
the denominator is the product price. 
Figure 13: Production costs vs. sales prices (McKinsey/Ecofys; Eurostat) 
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Source: Production costs are from McKinsey/Ecofys (2006) and product prices are from Eurostat and 
were used in this study (see Tables 3, 4, 6 and 11). 
Figure 13 shows that the difference is not negligible and requires some explanation. 
Indeed, there seems to be a rather high unexplained gap between the production costs 
(including costs of capital) quoted by McKinsey/Ecofys and the product price in the 
Prodcom database of Eurostat and used in this study (see Figure 13). Unfortunately, the 
McKinsey/Ecofys study does not contain detail that would allow the reason for these 
differences to be understood, although very low energy cost figures quoted in the study 
might explain most of the difference.32 As the estimates of the amount of energy needed 
                                                 
 73
32  In the McKinsey/Ecofys study, energy costs for BOF steel are reported to amount to €38/tSt (in this 
study: €114/tSt). However, this would make the production of BOF steel only about 50% more energy 
intensive than EAF steel (while typically a ratio of 4 to 1 is reported) and half as energy intensive as 
e.g. the production of glass. Primary aluminium production is reported to require an energy bill of 
about €310/tAl (in this study: €1040/tAl) although it is supposed to consume 20 times as much energy as 
the production of secondary aluminium, for which an energy bill of €50/tAl (in this study: €74/tAl) is 
quoted. Thus, the McKinsey/Ecofys cost figures have to be used with some caution in the absence of 
further explanation. 
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do not differ very much between these two studies, McKinsey/Ecofys seem to have 
worked with much lower energy prices. In the absence of complete documentation, this 
could not be verified. 
5.3. Ex-post estimates 
Ex-post evidence of competitiveness effects could be obtained by observing what 
happened in a country or region in which a new policy was implemented. Econometric 
methods can be used to explain the impact of a policy taking into account, as far as 
possible, all other changes in the economy which may also affect the competitiveness of 
the sector under consideration. The data requirements for such a study are rather 
demanding, especially as information on the counterfactual is difficult to obtain. 
Ideally, two similar economies should be analysed where one (for example, the EU) has 
applied a carbon constraint while the other (for example, the US) has not. Then one could 
compare the development of market shares and market dynamics of the different energy-
intensive sectors in these two economies. After having tried to control for developments 
other than the carbon constraint (such as exchange-rate fluctuations) one could try to 
isolate the effects of a unilateral carbon constraint. However, emissions trading or carbon 
taxes are a recent phenomenon in the EU, and hence the data needed for an econometric 
investigation are mostly not available.  
Alternatively, one could analyse other unilateral environmental legislation that has 
triggered cost increases for selected industries. For example, some countries 
implemented green tax reforms in the 1990s, which largely rely on energy taxes. 
5.3.1. The case of environmental taxes 
The COMETR project33 studied the competitiveness impacts of environmental tax 
reforms in six EU countries (SE, FI, DK, NL, DE, UK), that carried out such reforms 
during the 1990s. The project studied the impacts both at the sectoral level (selected 
energy-intensive industries) using bottom-up analysis, and at the economy-wide level 
using a top-down, large-scale macro-econometric model (E3ME). 
The project identified the sectors of food and beverages, pulp & paper, wood & wood 
products, chemicals, non-metallic mineral products, and basic metals as being potentially 
vulnerable to the effects of higher energy prices, such as would be expected to result 
from climate change policies. The project also estimated the degree to which these 
sectors have market power, that is, are able to pass on higher production costs into prices. 
It found that, of the six manufacturing sectors listed above, basic metals (which includes 
the steel industry) have the least pricing power, and hence would be the most vulnerable 
to higher energy prices, while non-metallic minerals (which includes the cement sector) 
has most pricing power. This result seems broadly consistent with the outcome of the two 
ex-ante bottom-up studies described above. 
The project identified no change in competitiveness of these vulnerable sectors due to 
environmental tax reform in most of the cases considered. However, this is largely 
because all of the countries concerned applied various mitigating measures in favour of 
 
33  Competitiveness Effects of Environmental Tax Reforms (COMETR). Final Report to the European 
Commission, DG Research and DG Taxation and Customs Union; available at 
http://www2:dmu.dk/cometr/. 
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energy-intensive industries (tax exemptions, reduced rates, refunds . . .), so that taxes 
actually paid by these industries were in most cases very modest. Aggregate 
macroeconomic impacts were estimated to have been slightly positive, due to the effect 
of recycling of tax revenues: without revenue recycling all six countries would have 
experienced a net loss of output. 
5.3.2. The case of the EU ETS 
Since 2005, energy intensive industries in Europe have been exposed to a carbon 
constraint through the emission cap imposed by the EU ETS. Carbon allowances have 
been and are still traded at a value of around €20 for most of the time. As discussed 
above, from an economic point of view and with respect to the impact on international 
competitiveness, it makes little difference whether companies get the allowances for free 
or whether they have to pay for them. The only difference is that in the case of free 
allocation there is no immediate negative effect on the cash flow of the company, while 
in case of auctioning or selling there is a negative effect on the cash flow, unless 
companies can pass through these cost increases to their clients. 
Although there is little direct evidence available on how energy-intensive industries have 
dealt with this increase in (opportunity) costs, the case of electricity producers, having 
probably entirely passed through these opportunity costs to their downstream clients is 
well documented (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)). This has, after all, triggered a broad public 
debate on how to avoid these “windfall profits” in the ETS, and willingness to sell or 
auction allowances has significantly increased in several Member States. 
It is less clear-cut how energy-intensive industries themselves covered by the EU ETS 
have incorporated their increased (opportunity) costs in their price-setting 
behaviour,.However, some evidence is available that as of 2005 about a third to half of 
the companies in energy-intensive industries were pricing in the value of CO2 allowances 
in their daily operations, as compared to more than two third of the companies in the 
power sector (McKinsey/Ecofys (2006)). 
It is undisputed that the prices of most of the products of energy-intensive industries have 
witnessed significant increases in recent years. This is true for both intra-EU prices and 
export prices. These price increases were to a certain extent triggered by higher input 
costs for raw materials and energy. A notable exception is cement, where seemingly the 
break-up of a cartel has resulted in a decline in prices from about €70/t to about €50/t. 
European producers might have suffered much less from the rather dramatic (dollar-
denominated) price increases for these globally traded commodities than their non-
European competitors as they were partially sheltered by the substantial weakening of 
the US dollar. However, this was largely offset by the costs of their domestically-sourced 
inputs (such as labour, electricity and capital costs), as these had to be paid in euro or 
other appreciating currencies. However, the price increases typically also went hand in 
hand with rising profits. 
 
Figure 14: Price changes Jan 2005 - Jan 2007 
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Source: COMEXT. Extra-EU prices refer to import prices from extra-EU suppliers; intra-EU prices refer 
to import prices from intra-EU suppliers. 
Therefore, it should not be ruled out that these energy-intensive industries themselves - 
similar to electricity producers - have already used the opportunity of soaring demand 
and strong global economic growth to pass through to their clients the opportunity costs 
they have faced from the imposition of a carbon constraint as of 2005, when the EU ETS 
started. Thus, the (opportunity) cost of the Kyoto carbon constraint in the order of 
magnitude of €15 to €20/tCO2 may have already been factored into the prevailing price 
levels of most or all energy-intensive industries. 
With respect to carbon leakage triggered by the unilateral Kyoto commitment of the EU, 
no evidence has been put forward so far that the imposition in 2005 of a carbon 
constraint has led to relocation activities of energy-intensive industries. This might have 
several reasons: physical relocation is expensive and time-consuming and the increase in 
marginal production costs triggered by the present and envisaged carbon constraint might 
not (yet) have justified such activities. Moreover, uncertainty and risks associated with 
relocating activities, particularly to emerging economies or countries perceived as having 
a rather unstable institutional set-up, might outweigh the expected economic benefits 
from relocating. In addition, it cannot be taken for granted that the absence of a carbon 
constraint in these countries will be maintained until the relocation investment will have 
paid off. Finally, relocating capacities, the output of which is supposed to serve the 
European market, especially when it affects clusters of vertically-integrated value chains 
(such as aluminium or steel production and processing), would have to also take into 
account the additional transport costs due to the increased distance to the market of the 
new production capacities. 
In addition, carbon leakage, through clients shifting demand from EU suppliers to non-
EU suppliers such as the US or Australia that do not suffer from a carbon constraint 
seems to have remained rather limited. Indeed, trade statistics do not support the case 
that imports of products relevant in this context from other industrialised countries have 
soared over the last years and that they have significantly gained market share. 
Furthermore, demand for domestic production does not seem to have suffered from the 
price increases observed lasting recent years. If demand had shifted to non-EU suppliers, 
one would have expected EU producers to have increased production less than their 
competitors on other industrialised markets, and to have lost market share at global or at 
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EU level to these competitors, especially when one controls output trends for exchange-
rate changes and the emergence of new key players (such as the BRICs) on the demand 
and the supply side. Nevertheless, some potential carbon leakage might have been 
masked by strong global economic growth that has left hardly any sizeable spare capacity 
that could have replaced EU output. 
Finally, a kind of carbon leakage could have occurred through non-physical relocation, 
that is, European energy-intensive industries could have acquired existing companies of 
energy-intensive industries in the rest of the world. However, no evidence seems to be 
available that investment decisions have been determined or influenced by the absence 
(or presence) of a carbon constraint in target industries and countries. Neither do recent 
major acquisitions of EU companies by non-EU investors (for example, in the steel 
industry) seem to have been influenced by the presence or absence of an EU carbon 
constraint. 
However, while it therefore appears that energy-intensive industries have been able to 
pass through the (opportunity) costs of the prevailing carbon constraint without any 
noteworthy negative repercussions for output and employment, this was supported by 
uniquely favourable framework conditions: dynamic global demand with a special 
emphasis on products in which energy-intensive industries are specialised, an absence of 
significant spare capacities in the rest of the world, or cost increases for key raw 
materials that could easily be passed through to downstream industries and that also 
allowed the opportunity cost of the carbon constraint to be passed through – a cost that, 
after all, looks rather modest compared to the other cost increases. 
Such a favourable set of circumstances might not persist in the longer run. Thus, while 
energy-intensive industries might have been able to pass through to their clients the 
opportunity costs of the obligation to surrender carbon allowances so far, this might only 
be a temporary phenomenon. If the economic environment deteriorates, or if the euro 
appreciates even further, these "windfall profits" might melt away even if allowances 
were again given away instead of being sold or auctioned. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has tried to identify the energy-intensive industries whose competitiveness 
risks most being affected by the imposition of a carbon constraint in the EU. It has 
reviewed evidence from a broad range of other analyses, and has also looked at the most 
recent available official statistical data from Eurostat. All together, about 50 sub-sectors 
and more than 100 production processes belonging to 13 sectors at the NACE 3-digit 
heading have been analysed. 
There is a marked degree of convergence (+/-5%) among all of these sources with 
respect to the direct and indirect cost implications in € per unit of output of a carbon 
constraint. A carbon price of about €20/tCO2 is estimated to trigger or to have triggered34 
an increase in electricity prices of €9 to €10/MWh. Fully passing through a carbon price 
of €20/tCO2 along the value chain (including by electricity producers) would eventually 
need to trigger (or has already triggered) price increases for most energy and carbon-
intensive industries in the order of magnitude of between 0.1 to 5% for most products 
considered to maintain profits. 
A minority of these roughly 50 sub-sectors and 100 production processes, however, 
would (have) require(d) significantly higher price increases to recover their additional 
(opportunity) costs triggered by the carbon constraint. These are cement and lime 
production, primary steel (BOF) and primary aluminium production and the production 
of primary container glass as well as some basic chemicals such as ammonia, nitric acid 
or fertiliser production, where the price increases needed could reach up to 50% 
(ammonia production based on partial oxidation with coal as an input fuel). 
However, there is also some evidence that most energy-intensive industries participating 
in the ETS seem to have followed the same pricing policy as power generators and have 
successfully passed through the additional (opportunity) costs to their clients. 
A further tightening of the carbon constraint beyond 2012 as envisaged for the period 
until 2020 might lead to a doubling of the carbon price to about €40/tCO2 by 2020. 
Retaining the assumption of a full pass through of allowance costs would double the 
above figures to the extent that price levels prevailing in 2007 do not already reflect the 
existing carbon constraint. However, as such higher CO2 prices of €40/tCO2 are not 
expected to materialise before the end of the next decade regulated industries would have 
until then to phase in these price increases, or to adjust their production processes to 
become less carbon-intensive. 
The sub-sectors that risk being most challenged by the carbon constraint are primary 
aluminium production, primary steel production based on the BOF technology, and some 
basic chemicals production. The cement sector, although very energy- and carbon 
intensive, is relatively little exposed to international competition mainly due to high (and 
still rising) transport costs. The extent to which higher prices for greenhouse gas 
emissions will change this remains uncertain. As regards primary aluminium, one should 
keep in mind that, due to often abundantly available and much cheaper hydropower-
based electricity in developing countries and other non-EU countries, primary aluminium 
 
34  There is some evidence that the electricity prices prevailing in 2007 to a large extent already 
incorporate the (opportunity) costs of a carbon constraint consistent with reaching the Kyoto 
obligations. 
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production in the EU is generally expected to be phased out in any case over the next ten 
or twenty years, that is, when the existing capital stock has reached its economic end of 
life, unless significant economies of scope in a vertically-integrated and regionally-
clustered value chain of production and processing slow down this process.  
Rising production costs triggered by a carbon constraint in conjunction with intense 
intra-EU and extra-EU competition might result in some consolidation of energy-
intensive industries, as marginal loss-making suppliers might eventually be forced to 
cease production. If other EU suppliers were to replace them, the consolidation would 
not necessarily lead to significantly declining EU production and employment in this 
sector. This could actually occur as, for example, secondary steel and aluminium 
production is much less energy intensive than primary production. Thus, imposing a 
carbon constraint might work in support of more ambitious recycling activities. This 
would, however, also depend on the availability of sufficient quantities of economically 
recyclable steel and aluminium. If the market segment was captured by non-EU 
suppliers, both employment and the environmental effectiveness of the EU carbon 
constraint might suffer. 
The analysis in this paper has shown that any severe competitiveness impacts of EU 
climate policy are likely to be limited to a few specific products and production 
processes. With the exception of the OECD study on the steel sector, losses of output and 
export volumes at EU level are rather small in all the studies examined. Nevertheless, for 
as long as the EU pursues an autonomous climate policy and there is inadequate 
international agreement, the EU industry faces a constraint that potential competitors in 
third countries do not. Were this constraint to lead production to shift outside the EU, the 
environmental goals of the European climate policy would hardly be achieved, in 
addition to the loss to the EU economy. 
However, so far no evidence has become available that such carbon leakage has occurred 
or should be an issue in the short to medium run. Moreover, the degree of carbon leakage 
would depend on the energy mix used in third countries. In addition, energy-intensive 
industries are by definition very capital intensive and vertically integrated with 
processing activities. Thus, entry and exit barriers are large, and delocalisation would 
come at a rather high financial cost. Furthermore, uncertainty as regards the future 
imposition of carbon constraints in other countries might serve as an additional brake on 
physical delocalisation. 
Indeed, the potential competitive disadvantage coming from a unilateral EU carbon 
constraint should disappear in the medium- and longer-term, as more countries join the 
effort to avert dangerous climate change. In the longer-term, industries and/or producers 
that cannot reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and energy use will be economically 
disadvantaged relative to industries and producers that are less energy- and greenhouse 
gas-intensive. In the extreme, the constraint imposed by the EU’s leadership on climate 
policy could become a source of competitive advantage, if other countries agree to cut 
their greenhouse gas emissions, and if EU companies develop a “1st mover advantage” in 
low-emission technologies and production techniques (Porter hypothesis). Turning this 
potential into a real gain requires that climate policy gives appropriate incentives for the 
development and use of low-carbon technologies. Giving companies lump-sum transfers 
in the form of free allowances based on their historic or projected emission “needs” 
hardly fits the bill. 
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The initial allocation method for carbon allowances (auctioning/selling or giving away 
for free) was not analysed in this study as it does not have an impact on the cost-
competitiveness of European energy intensive industries, since both methods impose a 
similar (opportunity) cost on these industries. However, due to the potential implications 
on cash flow in case these higher costs could not be passed through to end users, 
companies with a “deeper pocket” and receiving free allowances (or facing no carbon 
constraint at all) could survive critical market situations more easily. This even holds 
when one takes account of the tax-deductibility of the purchasing costs of allowances, 
which would constitute an automatic recycling of parts of the money streams involved. 
So far, and in the light of the prevailing favourable market conditions, the pass-through 
potential seems to have been rather high. 
The role of a further recycling of revenues from the sale of emission allowances as 
simulated in the GEM-E3 model appears to be an important factor mitigating 
competitiveness losses. In this study, it was assumed that revenues from the sale of 
emission allowances were recycled to the whole economy through cuts in social security 
contributions, which benefits labour-intensive rather than energy-intensive sectors. This 
suggests that revenue-recycling targeted on the latter, while less beneficial for the whole 
economy and negative on overall employment, might be an effective means of 
attenuating potential adverse impacts of the carbon constraint on energy-intensive 
sectors, and could even stimulate the development of low-carbon production techniques 
and substitute products. 
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ANNEX 1: IDENTIFYING ENERGY-INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES EXPOSED TO INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION - A CROSS-SECTORAL COMPARISON FOR 2006 
Chapter 3 of this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the energy and carbon 
intensity of different sectors, branches and production processes, and it has tried to 
quantify the implications of imposing a carbon constraint leading to a carbon price of 
€20/tCO2. However, as the focus is on detailed analysis of individual products and 
production processes, more effort was devoted to get up-to-date, detailed price and 
energy-cost information than to cross-sectoral comparison. Thus, while the analysis is 
based on publicly available statistics and market prices, different sources have been used 
for different products and sectors. This approach should be considered as being sufficient 
to allow a reliable quantification of the problems and issues at stake for the individual 
sectors and products analysed. 
To allow a reliable cross-sectoral comparison, a harmonised statistical basis should be 
used, and cost and price information should refer to identical observation periods. 
Information coming close to these requirements is provided in the two tables of this 
annex. Table A1 tries to quantify the issues at stake based on a carbon price of €20/tCO2, 
that is, the approximate marginal cost of ETS allowances to comply with the Kyoto 
obligation in 2008-12, and table A2 provides the same information assuming an 
allowance price of €40/tCO2. This is the marginal abatement cost assumed to result from 
a unilateral mitigation effort by the EU, aiming to reduce emissions to 20% below the 
1990 level, without access to the Join Implementation (JI) and Clean Development 
(CDM) mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. In case the latter were allowed on a 
significant scale, the marginal abatement cost in 2020 should be much closer to €20 to 
€25/tCO2. 
The product prices are derived from Eurostat's Prodcom database, by dividing the 
declared production value by the declared production volume, for EU27. The trade data 
also come from the Prodcom database, built on the Foreign Trade Statistics. Import and 
export data are those of EU27 with non-member countries. The first four digits of the 
product codes correspond to the NACE nomenclature. 
Average energy prices, 2006 
Natural Gas 
Russian border Coal ARA Gas Oil ICE Elect EEC 1M Coke 
6.00 €/GJ 1.73 €/GJ 10.99 €/GJ 14.34 €/GJ 4.55 €/GJ 
233.90 €/t 50.76 €/t 461.69 €/t 51.64 €/MWh 122.82 €/t 
Source: Reuters EcoWin, Euracoal's Market Report 1-2007 (for coke)35
 
The tables follow the structure of chapter 3. That is, they start with the iron and steel 
sector and end with different chemical products and production processes. 
Products and production processes shaded in grey are those activities that would require 
a profit-neutral price increase of more than 5 percentage points while at the same time 
being exposed to an openness to non-EU trade in excess of 20% of its turnover. As can 
                                                 
35 EURACOAL Market Report 1/2007, available at: http://euracoal.be/vorlagen/Market1-07.pdf
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be seen from table A1, showing about 100 production processes of energy-intensive 
industries, this would only be the case for some steel products produced in integrated 
steelworks, primary aluminium production, clinker production and a small number of 
products from the chemical industry. As can be seen from table A2, at a higher allowance 
price, some ceramics, products of the paper and pulp industry and some more products of 
the chemical industry would have to be added to this list. 
Table A1: €20/CO2
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Table A1: €20/CO2, continued 
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Table A1: €20/CO2, continued 
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Table A2: €40/tCO2
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Table A2: €40/tCO2, continued. 
 
 87
Table A2: €40/tCO2, continued. 
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ANNEX 2: THE ROLE OF ARMINGTON ELASTICITIES IN MODEL SIMULATIONS 
Estimates of the economic impact of cost increases due to the carbon constraint crucially 
depend on the extent to which the increase in costs is passed through the economy. This, 
in turn, is largely influenced by the reaction of clients to such price increases, that is, the 
elasticity of demand to price changes. As regards the possible effects of the carbon 
constraint on the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, the 
elasticities of interest are the so-called “Armington” elasticities, which measure the 
sensitivity of demand for a region’s or sector’s output to changes in relative prices. The 
higher the value of the Armington elasticities, the more sensitive is the output of a sector 
to changes in relative prices. 
Armington elasticity 
Armington (1969) introduced the assumption that final products which are traded internationally are 
differentiated based on the location of production. The Armington elasticity specifies the degree of 
substitution in demand between similar products produced in different countries. The higher the value of 
the Armington elasticity, the closer is the degree of substitution.  
The Armington assumption of nationally differentiated products has been widely adopted in global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to define demand for domestically produced and imported 
goods. The Armington assumption states that a consumer differentiates between a domestic and a foreign 
product of one industry. In the eyes of this consumer the domestic and foreign product are close substitutes 
and form a product group which is separable in the sector's utility function (Ruhl (2005)). The utility 
function in sector j derives from the nationally differentiated goods is presented by a constant elasticity of 
substitution utility function (CES) with the elasticity of substitution ρ : 
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where is the price of the good produced in the foreign country and  is the price of the good 
produced domestically. The elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign good is 
fjp , djp ,
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referred to as the Armington elasticity. Taking the logarithm yields: 
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Based on this equation empirical estimates of Armington elasticities can be made.  
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The following section reviews estimates of Armington elasticities found in the literature 
and used in trade models. 
The first two columns of Table 21 below report Armington elasticities from the general 
equilibrium model GEM-E3, and GTAP. The GEM-E3 Armington elasticities are for 
extra-EU-14 trade. Thus, for EU27, lower values would be appropriate36. 
The values in the third column are taken from to a comprehensive study by Reinert & 
Roland-Holst (1992) in which Armington elasticities for 163 US mining and 
manufacturing sectors were estimated based on a series of quarterly import data for the 
years 1980 - 1988. The elasticities in this study range from 0.02 to 3.49 with an average 
value of 0.91. Given the relatively similar size of the EU and US economies, these 
estimates may indicate the likely order of magnitude of Armington elasticities to be 
expected for the EU as well. For the various energy-intensive sectors, most of the 
reported values appear to be close to the average value, with iron and steel foundries a 
notable exception. Unfortunately, no value is reported for aluminium. 
The Armington elasticities in the fourth column stem from two different sources: Cortes 
& Jean (1996) and Demailly & Quirion (2007). The values from Cortes & Jean (1996) 
come from a trade flow model between European countries and emerging countries. The 
values from the second paper are averages from diverse comprehensive studies on 
Armington elasticities compiled by Demailly & Quirion (2007). The values from these 
sources are in general much higher than those reported in the other columns of the table. 
Unfortunately, alternative versions of Armington specifications are commonly used in 
the literature on international trade. For instance, Armington elasticities obtained from 
multilateral trade data can significantly differ from those obtained from bilateral trade 
data (Saito (2004)). Thus, a lack of a coherent methodology makes the comparison of 
Armington elasticities questionable 
In model simulations, these elasticities typically drive the overall results, thus, they 
should be accurately estimated. However, so far this has not yet been the case. It is 
reasonable to argue that extra-EU Armington elasticities should be smaller than intra-EU 
Armington elasticities, and that these latter should be smaller than company-specific 
price elasticities, thus, the upper bound would be set by the latter company-specific price 
elasticities. Moreover, the Armington elasticities should be greater for homogeneous 
goods than for differentiated products, that elasticities should be higher the more 
disaggregated the sectoral breakdown, and that long-run elasticities should be higher than 
short-run elasticities. In reverse, they should be smaller for goods incurring high 
transportation costs or perishable goods than for the opposite case. However, beyond 
these broad theoretical considerations, there appears to be little consensus in the 
economic literature about the actual values of elasticities.  
 
36 It should be pointed out that the Armington elasticities reported in table 5 are not the same as the 
substitution elasticities between imports and domestic production used in the GEM-E3 study, which is 
discussed above in ch. 5.2. (see footnote 26). As explained in Capros & al. (1999),  the latter 
elasticites are calculated on the basis of econometrically-estimated US elasticities and country-specific 
weights, on the one hand, and country-specific import price elasticities and import shares, on the other 
hand (see table 10-11 in Capros & al. (1999)). The sensitivity analysis carried out in Capros & al. 
(1999) indicates that halving or doubling the value of these elasticities has a very marginal effect on 
the macroeconomic aggregates of the model. 
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Table 21: Overview of Armington elasticities from different sources 
 GEM-E3 (1) GTAP (2) Reinert et al. (3)
 
 
 other studies (4)
Textiles 2.4 (5) 2.2 0.57 (felt, lace, other textile goods) 
2.53 (hosiery) 
0.45 (apparel made from purchased 
materials) 
8   
 
  
Leather 2.4 (5) 2.2 1.1 8  
Footwear 2.4 (5)   8  
Paper 2.4 (5) 1.8 0.97 (paper mills) 4  
Print/Publishing 2.4 (5) 1.8 1.0 (newspapers, books) 
0.8 (printing) 
4  
 
Chemicals 2.2 1.9 0.48 (industrial inorganic and organic 
chemicals) 
0.31 (agricultural chemicals) 
1.5  
 
Rubber 2.2  0.87  
Plastic 2.2  1.71 (plastic materials and resins) 
0.66 (organic fibres) 
 
Pottery/China 2.4 (5)  1.45 (china) 
1.04 (brick & clay tile) 
0.88 (ceramic wall & floor tile) 
 
Glass 2.4 (5)  0.3  
Non-metallic 2.4 (5) 2.8 0.82 (stone and non-metallic mineral 
products) 
 
Iron/Steel 2.2 2.8 0.8 (primary steel) 
3.1 (iron and steel foundries) 
3  
6 
Non-ferrous 2.2 2.8 0.91 (primary copper) 13  
Coke 2.4 (5) 2.8   
Cement 
(as part of non-
metallic) 
2.4 (5)  1.09 2  
Aluminium 
(as part of non-
ferrous) 
2.2   2 
Petroleum 0.6  0.31  
Sources and footnotes: (1) Koschel & Schmidt (1998), (2) GTAP (2002), (3) Reinert & Roland-Holst (1992), 
(4) other studies: Cortes & Jean (1996) & Demailly & Quirion (2007). 
(5) referred to as "other energy intensive industries" in the specifications of Armington elasticity values in 
the standard version of the GEM-E3 model. 
Indeed, Capros et al. (1999) report that no estimates for EU countries of sectoral 
Armington elasticities could be found in the literature. Accordingly, they had to “guess-
estimate” values, mainly based on US estimates, when calibrating the GEM-E3 model. 
The reason for this lack of empirical estimates might lie in the absence of appropriate 
statistics, as comparable price and volume statistics would be needed for both trade flows 
and domestic markets. However, these statistics are typically not comparable: the product 
classification in COMEXT is normally not comparable with the one in PRODCOM, 
neither are the corresponding price indices.  
Moreover, the empirical basis of the Armington elasticities of the GEM-E3 and GTAP 
model is not clear. As indicated above, the values used seem to be more accurately 
described as “reasonable estimates” rather than empirical findings. The elasticities are 
given for rather broad aggregated sectors, and are identical for a number of sectors. It is 
therefore questionable if the given Armington elasticities are appropriate and 
representative for the more differentiated product sectors of the energy intensive 
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industries that are the focus of this study. In the absence of firm estimates of elasticities, 
no attempt is made in this study to make new estimates of the impacts on output of cost 
increases due to the ETS.  
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ANNEX 3: SOME FACTS ON CARBON INTENSIVE PRODUCTION PROCESSES IN THE 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY  
"Other" Inorganic Basic Chemicals 
Ammonia (NH3) is needed for a huge variety of chemicals. However, about 80% of the 
ammonia is used as a nitrogen source in fertilisers. Apart from that, ammonia is used as a 
refrigerant, to remove nitrous oxides from flue gases, to produce diverse polymers and 
many other important chemicals. Large volume basic inorganic chemicals made from 
ammonia are nitric acid, urea and sodium cyanide. In 2003, the world production 
capacity of ammonia was 109 million tonnes of nitrogen. About 46% of the world 
capacity was produced in Asia, 11% in North America and 9% in the area of the EU-15 
& EFTA (the European share in 1988 was about 13% of world capacity). 
Ammonia is synthesised from nitrogen and hydrogen (Haber-Bosch process). The 
hydrogen used for this reaction is either generated by steam/air reforming or partial 
oxidation (see Table 12). Significant amounts of carbon dioxide are generated as a co-
product within the steam/air-reforming from natural gas (1.3 tCO2/tNH3) and partial 
oxidation using heavy hydrocarbons (2.3 tCO2/tNH3). The partial oxidation route based on 
coal releases even more process emissions. However, this carbon dioxide is virtually 
entirely removed from the gas stream so that only hydrogen and nitrogen enter the 
ammonia synthesis process. The removed carbon dioxide may be used in an on-site urea 
plant, bottled in a liquid carbonic acid plant (for example, used as dry ice or in the 
beverage industry), or vented to the atmosphere. The case when the entire carbon dioxide 
of the ammonia production is emitted to the air is addressed in the first three lines in 
Table 12. The total CO2-intensity of ammonia production in the case of steam/air-
reforming from natural gas amounts to 1.7 tCO2/tNH3 and in the case of partial oxidation of 
heavy hydrocarbons to 2.8 tCO2/tNH3. 
Ammonia is the inorganic basic chemical with by far the highest energy-intensity, 
ranging from about 29 GJ/tNH3 to 48 GJ/tNH3 depending on the production process. 
Worldwide, almost 80% of ammonia production is based on steam reforming of natural 
gas. In the EU this share is even higher. About 13% of world ammonia production is 
processed by partial oxidation of coke or coal. The rest of worldwide production is based 
on steam reforming of oil products (naphta, LPG, refinery gas) or partial oxidation of 
heavy hydrocarbon fractions (oil residues). 
Compared to steam reforming of natural gas, relative investment costs are significantly 
higher for the process of partial oxidation of oil residues (factor 1.5) and coal (factor 2 to 
3) (BREF-inorgchem). 
In a combined ammonia and urea production plant, ammonia and carbon dioxide react to 
give urea ((NH2)2CO), where 1 tonne of ammonia corresponds to 1.3 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide. Thus, using the urea production as a sink, the carbon footprint of the ammonia 
production can be reduced to 0.4 tCO2/tNH3 and 1.5 tCO2/tNH3 in the steam/air reforming 
and partial oxidation process, respectively (lines 4 and 5 in Table 12). 
Nitric acid (HNO3) production is about 75% used to manufacture ammonium nitrate 
(AN), of which more than 70% is used as fertiliser. Other important uses are the 
manufacture of explosives, the nitration of aromatics (such as nitrobenzene, 
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dinitrotoluene), for the production of adipic acid as well as the use as powerful oxidising 
agent (BREF-inorgchem). 
World production of nitric acid was 46.2 million tonnes (100% HNO3) in 2002. About 
30% of world production is synthesised in the area of the EU-15 & EFTA. About 21% of 
world production is in the Commonwealth of Independent States and 15% in the US; 
China accounts for less than 5% of world production. 
Nitric acid is synthesised by oxidising ammonia (Ostwald process). In this production 
process a net heat gain of 1.6 GJ/tHNO3 is obtained. However, to calculate the total energy 
and CO2-intensity of nitric acid, the energy consumption and emissions of ammonia have 
to be accounted for. As about 0.286 t of ammonia are used to produce one tonne of nitric 
acid (100% concentration), the integrated energy intensity of this nitric acid route 
amounts to 6.7 GJ/tHNO3 and 9.3 GJ/tHNO3 in the case of steam/air reforming and partial 
oxidation, respectively. Analogously, one tonne of nitric acid accounts in an integrated 
view (including the ammonia production) for 0.5 tCO2/tHNO3 and 0.8 tCO2/tHNO3 in the case 
of steam/air reforming and partial oxidation respectively (first figures in the column of 
CO2-intensity in Table 12).  
During the production process of nitric acid no CO2 is released, but emissions of nitrous 
oxide (N2O) have to be taken into account. The actual volumes of the released nitrous 
oxide are relatively small, but due to a global warming potential of about 310 the emitted 
nitrous oxide corresponds to significant CO2-equivalent emissions. The average 
European plant emits about 6.5 kg N2O per tonne of 100% nitric acid which corresponds 
to about 2tCO2eq/tHNO3. Thus, CO2-equivalent-intensities of 2.5 tCO2eq/tHNO3 and of 2.8 
tCO2eq/tHNO3 (second figures in the column of CO2-intensity in Table 12) result, depending 
on the ammonia production process.  
However, by installing efficient abatement technologies the nitrous oxide emissions can 
be reduced to a large extent. Using end-of-pipe technology nitrous oxide emissions in 
existing plants can be reduced to levels of at least 1.85 kg N2O per tonne of nitric acid 
(BAT-value37) corresponding to about 0.6 tCO2eq/tHNO3. Moreover, for many existing 
plants and new installations using combined NOx and N2O abatement technology, the 
N2O emissions can be even further reduced to levels of 0.12 kg to 0.6 kg N2O per tonne 
of nitric acid corresponding to less than 0.2 tCO2eq/tHNO3. The additional cost for these 
abatement technologies are estimated to be about €1 per tonne of CO2-equivalent 
prevented (BREF-inorgchem). Thus, as soon as N2O emissions are included in the ETS, 
the overall CO2-equivalent emissions (CO2 and N2O) of the integrated nitric acid 
production (including the ammonia production) will be close to 1.0 tCO2eq/tHNO3.   
Most sulphuric acid (H2SO4) (about 55% of worldwide production) is used to 
manufacture phosphoric acid (fertiliser, detergent). Sulphuric acid is widely used as a 
process chemical mainly due its low cost (for example, as an acidulating agent, 
dehydrating agent, catalyst in refineries). Other applications are in the iron & steel 
industry to remove oxidation, in batteries, and in the pulp & paper industry for 
coagulation purposes.  
                                                 
37 In the BREF text a split view of the industry and one member state is documented claiming that the BAT 
range should include 2.5 kg N2O per tonne of nitric acid for existing plants. 
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The world production of sulphuric acid in 2005 was 190 million tonnes. The production 
share of the EU-15 & EFTA is about 8.5%. The US and China each produce about 20% 
of world output. 
Sulphuric acid is produced from sulphur dioxide (SO2) gas which is derived from various 
sources such as combustion of elemental sulphur (44% of H2SO4 production), as a co-
product of metallurgical process in the production of non-ferrous metals (39% of H2SO4 
production) or roasting of pyrites (5% of H2SO4 production). The rest of the H2SO4 
production is gained from regeneration and recovery of used acid. The pyrite process is 
the most energy and CO2-intensive, with an energy-intensity of 6.5 GJ/tH2SO4 and a CO2-
intensity of 0.4 tCO2/tH2SO4. 
Most phosphoric acid (H3PO4) is used to manufacture phosphate salts. The dominant 
applications are the production of fertilisers (about 80%) and as an animal food 
supplement. Other important applications in which phosphates are used are metal surface 
treatments, food ingredients and detergents. The world production of phosphoric acid 
was 34.4 million tonnes in 2005. The production share of the US was 32.5% and of 
China almost 20%, whereas in the area of the EU-15 & EFTA only 3% of global 
phosphoric acid was produced.  
In the EU about 95% of phosphoric acid is produced with the so-called wet process. The 
alternative dry process for phosphoric acid production is significantly more energy-
intensive. For the wet process the energy-intensity amounts to 8.7 GJ/tH3PO4 and the CO2-
intensity to about 0.6 tCO2/tH3PO4. 
Hydrofluoric acid (HF) is used to a large extent for fluorinating polymers. Other 
applications are in the refining industry (alkylation), glass and quartz industry (etching), 
aluminium production (AlF3) and metal finishing. The production in the EU amounts to 
about 300 thousand tonnes. 
Hydrofluoric acid is produced by the conversion of dried fluorspar (CaF2) using 
concentrated sulphuric acid. The energy-intensity and CO2-intensity for the production of 
hydrofluoric acid are about 6.2 GJ/tHF and 0.4 tCO2/tHF, respectively. 
Fertiliser industry 
Urea is mainly used for fertiliser applications (60% of European urea consumption) 
either in direct use or compounded or blended with other fertiliser chemicals. Other uses 
for urea are as a supplement in animal feed (non-protein nitrogen), for NOx reducing 
from exhaust gases as well as for the manufacture of diverse polymers (amino resins) and 
melamine. 
In 2006, the world urea production was 61.7 million tonnes of nitrogen. China and India 
hold a production share of 36.5 and 17%, respectively. In contrast the share of the US 
and the area of the EU-15 & EFTA were only 3.6%, respectively. 
Urea is commercially synthesised by the reaction of ammonia and carbon dioxide at high 
pressure (Bosch-Meiser process). For the production of one tonne of urea the input of 
0.57 tonnes of ammonia and 0.73 tonnes of carbon dioxide are needed. The average 
energy intensity of the urea production process itself is about 3 to 4 GJ/turea. However, for 
an overall assessment the energy consumption and emissions of the ammonia production 
according to its usage have to be taken into account. Thus, the data given in line one and 
two of Table 13 account for the urea production process itself plus the share of the 
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energy and CO2-intensities of the ammonia process (i.e. 0.57 tNH3/turea) and the carbon 
dioxide consumed in the urea production (0.73 tCO2/turea). The “integrated” CO2-intensity 
of urea production including the proportionate intensities of the ammonia production 
amounts to 0.44 tCO2/turea and 1.08 tCO2/turea for air/steam reforming using natural gas and 
for partial oxidation of hydrocarbons, respectively.  
Concerning CO2 emissions it is important to bear in mind that most of the urea used in 
the agricultural sector as fertiliser hydrolyses back to ammonium and CO2 in the 
presence of water and urease enzymes (IPCC (2006)). 
Urea-ammonium nitrate (UAN) is a liquid fertiliser solution containing typically 28% to 
32% nitrogen. The consumption of UAN solution in the EU at end of the 1990s was 
about 4 million tonnes of which about 40% were imported (BREF-inorgchem). The 
production process of UAN solution comprises the mixing of concentrated urea and 
ammonium nitrate solution.  
Ammonium nitrate (AN) is the most common nitrogenous fertiliser component and is also 
used as a component of explosives (15-20% of world AN consumption). 
World production of ammonium nitrate was 15.3 million tonnes of nitrogen in 2005. The 
EU-27 and the Commonwealth of Independent States have both a share of about 30% of 
the world production, followed by the US and China with a share of about 14% and 8%, 
respectively. In the last two decades world ammonium nitrate production has declined by 
more than 10% mainly due to low market prices.  
International trade in ammonium nitrate is significant and accounts for 30% of the world 
production. Export is dominated by the EU and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States holding both about 40% of the world exports.  
AN is produced by neutralising nitric acid with gaseous ammonia within a highly 
exothermic reaction.  
Calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) is obtained by mixing a solution of AN solution with 
calcium carbonate components as filler (limestone, dolomite)38. Other products, similarly 
obtained are magnesium ammonium nitrate (MAN) and ammonium sulphate nitrate 
(ASN).  
The production of CAN accounts for about one quarter of the AN production. CAN is a 
widely used fertiliser product in the EU, giving rise to much fewer safety concerns than 
AN.  
Calcium nitrate (CN) can be formed by the reaction of nitric acid and limestone, thereby 
releasing carbon dioxide (Uhde (2006)).  
Multi-nutrient or compound fertilisers (NPK, NP, PK, NK) contain more than one of the 
nutrients nitrogen (N), phosphorous (P) and potassium (K). Among those, NPK fertilisers 
are the most important products. NPK fertilisers are produced by the “mixed acid route” 
or the “nitrophosphate route”.  
                                                 
38  Potentially CO2 emissions may arise depending on the pH-value of the AN solution (usually 
neutralised). 
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The feed materials used in the “mixed acid route” are ammonia, sulphuric acid, nitric 
acid, phosphoric acid as well as various other raw materials, manly salts (potassium and 
phosphorous compounds) and granulation aids.  
The “nitrophosphate route” uses nitric acid and phosphate rock as feed materials. Within 
this process calcium nitrate tetra hydrate (CNTH) is produced as a co-product which. 
One option is to convert the co-produced CNTH into ammonium nitrate (AN) and 
calcium carbonate for CAN production by adding ammonia and carbon dioxide. The 
second option is to convert the co-produced CNTH into calcium nitrate (CN), whereby 
no process emissions of CO2 occur in contrast to the CN production route using nitric 
acid and limestone (BREF-inorgchem). 
“Other” Organic Basic Chemicals 
Ethylene is used primarily as an intermediate in the manufacture of other chemicals used 
in the synthesis of polymers. More than 50% of ethylene is used in the production of 
polyethylene, but it is also particularly important in the production of polystyrene (via 
ethylbenzene and styrene), glycol (via ethylene oxide), vinyl acetate and PVC (BREF-
orgchem). 
The world production capacity for ethylene amounted to 112.6 million tonnes in 2004. 
About 30% of the capacity was installed in the US and about 25% in the EU. The 
capacity in Japan and China amounted to about 5% and 7%, respectively. In recent years, 
the EU has become a net importer of ethylene. In 2004 the EU imported about 0.4 
million tonnes of ethylene. 
The primary production process for ethylene is steam cracking of hydrocarbons. In this 
process, suitable hydrocarbons are heated to very high temperatures, in the presence of 
steam, to split (“crack”) the molecules into the desired lower olefins. Typical products of 
the steam cracking process are ethylene, ethane, propylene, butadiene, various aromatics 
and methane. Depending on the feedstock (naphta, gas oil, LPG) different product yields 
are obtained. Naphta (from crude oil refining) is in the EU by far the most important raw 
material for steam cracking, and accounts for about 70% of the ethylene production. In 
the area of the EU-15 & EFTA, the steam cracking process accounts for more than 95% 
of ethylene and butadiene production, and 75% of the propylene production.  
More than 50% of propylene is used to produce polypropylene. Other important products 
include acrylic esters, acetone, acrylonitrile fibres and glycol (via propylene oxide) 
(BREF-orgchem). 
About 47% of butadiene is used to produce styrene/butadiene rubbers and latexes. A 
further 27% is used for producing polybutadiene rubber. Smaller amounts of butadiene 
are used to produce Nylon® via the precursor adiponitrile (BREF-orgchem). 
Ethylene oxide is a key chemical intermediate in the manufacture of many important 
products. Most ethylene oxide product is converted into glycols, detergent ethoxylates, 
ethanol amines, glycol ethers and polyols (BREF-orgchem). 
The prevailing process for ethylene oxide production is the direct oxidation of ethylene. 
As a by-product, carbon dioxide occurs depending on the selectivity of the oxidation 
process. Typical selectivities are between 65% and 80%, which corresponds to CO2 
process emissions of 1.1 tCO2 to 0.5 tCO2 per tonne of ethylene oxide produced.  
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Ethylene glycols are produced by reacting ethylene oxide with water. About 40% of 
European ethylene oxide production is converted into glycols, although globally the 
figure is about 70%. The main product is mono ethylene glycol (MEG), but diethylene 
glycol and triethylene glycol are also produced. Mono ethylene glycol is mainly used for 
the manufacture of polyester fibres and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) as well as 
antifreeze in cooling systems (BREF-orgchem).  
Although ethylene oxide and ethylene glycols can be produced separately, nearly all 
European installations produce a mix of the products on integrated plants.  
Vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) is almost entirely used for the production of polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC, see section 3.10.5). The global production capacity of VCM was 32.6 
million tonnes in 2005. From 2000 to 2005 the production by volume increased annually 
with about 3.6%. In 2005 the VCM production capacity in the area of the EU-15 & 
EFTA was about 6.6 million tonnes. In North America the production capacity accounted 
to 8.9 million tonnes whereas the capacity in Japan and China amounted to 3.0 and 3.4 
million tonnes, respectively. 
VCM is obtained via the intermediate ethylene dichloride EDC. The EDC is synthesised 
by direct chlorination of ethylene with chlorine or by oxychlorination of ethylene with 
hydrochloric acid (HCl) and oxygen. Thermal cracking of dry, pure EDC then produces 
VCM and HCl. The HCl generated can then be reused in the oxychlorination section. 
The high volumes of HCl needed for oxychlorination can in practice only be produced by 
the reaction of chlorine and hydrogen (by chlor-alkali electrolysis). Thus, the only feed 
material requirements for both VCM production processes (oxychlorination or direct 
chlorination) are essentially ethylene and chlorine. About 0.47 tonnes of ethylene and 0.6 
tonnes of chlorine are needed to produce one tonne of VCM (BREF-orgchem).  
Benzene is mainly used as an intermediate to produce other organic chemicals and 
polymers. About 50% of the benzene production is used to produce styrene, which in 
turn is converted into polystyrene, rubbers and alkyl benzene sulphonate (ABS). A 
further 21% of the benzene production is used to produce cumene (and then phenol and 
acetone) and another 13% is used to produce cyclohexane (most importantly for adipic 
acid and Nylon®). Smaller amounts of benzene are also used to make some lubricants, 
dyes, detergents, drugs, explosives and pesticides. 
The world production of benzene amounted to 37.5 million tonnes in 2005, of which 8.5 
million tonnes were produced in the EU-15 & EFTA. Production in North America 
amounted to 7.9 million tonnes. Japan and China produced 4.9 and 3.3 million tonnes, 
respectively. The global production growth rate in recent years was about 4%.  
Benzene is mainly produced from crude oil processing in refineries. The most important 
processes for the industrial benzene production are catalytic reforming, steam cracking 
and toluene hydrodealkylation39 (HDA). Smaller amounts of benzene are produced as a 
by-product of coke production.  
Steam cracking of heavier hydrocarbons produces ethylene and propylene fractions (see 
above) as well the by-product pyrolysis gasoline (pygas) which contains typically about 
40% benzene and 20% toluene.  
                                                 
39  Hydrodealkylation converts toluene by reaction with hydrogen into benzene. 
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Catalytic reforming restructures the hydrocarbon molecules of the heavy naphta 
feedstock, so that the yielded reformate product contains significant amounts of 
aromatics. Typically the reformate contains 12%-23% benzene, 23%-48% para-xylene 
and up to 30% toluene.  
In Europe, about 55% of benzene is produced from pygas extraction, about 20% obtained 
from reformate and a few percent come from coal tar. In the US, 50% of benzene comes 
from reformate and only about 15% is extracted from pygas (BREF-orgchem).  
Reformate is the main source of xylenes. Almost 90% of the para-xylene produced in 
Europe and the US is extracted from the reformate. Xylenes production normally focuses 
on para-xylene, but most producers also extract ortho-xylene and meta-xylene. The para-
xylene production capacity in Europe amounted at the end of the 1990s to about 1.4 
million tonnes (BREF-orgchem). Almost all of the para-xylene is transformed to 
terephthalic acid, which is mainly used for the production of polyethylene terephthalate 
(polyester). 
A basic organic chemical with particularly significant greenhouse gas emissions in its 
production process is adipic acid. Adipic acid is mainly used for the production of 
polyamide 66 (e.g. Nylon®). Moreover, adipic acid is used for the production of some 
polyurethanes as well as some plasticizers and lubricant components. The production of 
adipic acid in Europe end of the 1990s was about 0.9 million tonnes. 
The synthesis of adipic acid includes the two-stage oxidation of cyclohexane (from 
benzene) to cyclohexanone and subsequent nitration (using nitric acid). An alternative 
route uses phenol as feedstock.  
The nitration process releases substantial quantities of nitrous oxide (N2O) which amount 
to about 0.3 tonnes of N2O per tonne of adipic acid (IPCC (2006)), (BREF-orgchem). As 
nitrous oxide has a greenhouse gas potential factor of 310, the N2O emissions amount to 
about 93 tonnes of CO2-equivalent per tonne of adipic acid produced.  
N2O emissions in adipic acid production are already abated by about 90% using end-of-
pipe technologies. Further abatement which comes at comparably low cost should take 
place if N2O emissions of adipic acid production are included in the ETS.  
Polymers 
The polymer with the highest production volume is polyethylene. Global production of 
polyethylene was 63.5 million tonnes in 2003, of which 13.4 million tonnes were 
produced in the EU-15 & EFTA. From 1987 to 2001 output has grown by 66% in EU-15 
& EFTA, and in the rest of the world production almost doubled (BREF-polymer).  
The most common types of polyethylene are low-density polyethylene (LDPE) and high-
density polyethylene (HDPE). LDPE is a polymer which is soft, tough and very flexible, 
whereas HDPE is harder and more rigid and can withstand higher temperatures. Both 
polyethylene types are quite resistant to solvents. Another widely used polyolefine is 
polypropylene which is produced by polymerisation of propylene. Many of its material 
characteristics are intermediate between that of LDPE and HDPE.  
Polyethylene and polypropylene are used for a wide variety of applications such as 
containers (food, beverage, fuel, chemicals), pipes, foils (plastic bags), housings of 
diverse appliances, coating of paperboard or aluminium (food industry) as well as a 
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coating for corrosion protection (steel pipes) or insulation purposes and many other uses. 
Polypropylene is also used to produce textiles and as shock absorber material (helmets). 
In Europe, HDPE accounts for about 40% of the polyethylene produced and LDPE40 
accounts for the remaining 60%.  
Polyethylene accounted for 28% of the total volume of polymers produced in the EU-15 
& EFTA in 2003. Polypropylene has a share of about 16% of total European polymer 
production.  
Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is another very large volume polymer. Total PVC world 
production in 1999 was 28.7 million tonnes. About 6.1 million tonnes were produced in 
the EU-15 & EFTA, 7.9 million tonnes in North America and about 2.5 million tonnes in 
Japan and China, respectively. PVC accounted in 2003 for 12% of the total volume of 
polymers produced in the EU-15 & EFTA.  
PVC is produced by the polymerisation of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM, see Table 15). 
More than 50% of PVC is used in the construction sector. Furthermore, PVC has many 
applications in the automotive, packaging and medical sector. Certain additives make 
PVC softer and more flexible. Various environmental concerns are related to these 
additives as well as to VCM emissions during the production of PVC and in the case of 
fires. Despite these well-known negative effects, PVC is still widely used. 
The two main production processes for PVC are the suspension process (S-PVC) and the 
emulsion process (E-PVC). The emulsion process accounts for about 13% of European 
production capacity. Nearly all the rest of European capacity uses the suspension 
process. The suspension process is used for large volume production of a limited number 
of PVC grades, whereas the emulsion process is used for specific applications (such as 
dispersions, latexes). 
World production of polystyrene was 16.7 million tonnes in 2000, of which 4.2 million 
tonnes were produced in Europe. From 1980 to 2000 world polystyrene production more 
than tripled, while European production has only increased by about 130% in the same 
time. Polystyrene accounts for about 8% of total EU-15 & EFTA polymer production 
(BREF-polymer). 
Polystyrene is a vinyl polymer and is produced by polymerization, from the monomer 
styrene. Structurally, styrene is a phenyl group attached to ethylene. Styrene is produced 
from benzene and ethylene via the intermediate ethylbenzene. 
Polystyrene is used for a wide range of applications because its material properties can 
be varied broadly by using additives in the production process. Polystyrene is fabricated 
in three different types: general-purpose polystyrene (GPPS), expandable or foam 
polystyrene (EPS) and (high) impact polystyrene (IPS/ HIPS). GPPS, the standard 
polystyrene, is a rigid, brittle, transparent material which is easy to process, in particular 
by moulding. High impact polystyrene (HIPS) is obtained by adding rubbers (such as 
polybutadiene) to the relatively brittle polystyrene thereby improving its impact 
capability without breaking. Expandable polystyrene (EPS) is produced by suspension 
polymerisation of styrene with the addition of blowing agents. In their final form, EPS 
foams contain about 95% air by volume and are used for heat insulation purposes. 
                                                 
40  including LLDPE (linear low density polyethylene) 
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Table 16 shows the integrated energy and CO2-intensities of GPPS, HIPS and EPS 
polystyrene by taking into account the energy and CO2-intensities of the feed products 
benzene and ethylene for the production of styrene as well as of the polymerisation 
process itself. 
Polyesters are a class of polymers which contain the ester functional group in their chain. 
There exist many different forms of polyesters. However, the term “polyester” is most 
commonly used to refer to polyethylene terephthalate (PET). The main applications of 
PET are its use as synthetic fibre, in containers, mainly for beverages and food, as well as 
foils. 
Polyester polymers account for the largest share of man-made fibres with a production 
volume of more than 16 million tonnes per year worldwide. Based on similar polymer 
technologies, another seven million tonnes are produced for packaging (bottles) and film 
end uses. The average growth in production for fibre end use over the past 10 years was 
6.5 %, which mostly took place in areas outside of Europe, the US and Japan. In Europe, 
the growth rate was about 1% in recent years, with a total production of 3.2 million 
tonnes in 2002 (BREF-polymer). PET accounts for 7.8% of the total volume of polymers 
produced in the EU-15 & EFTA (2003).  
A common process for the production of PET is the polycondensation of terephthalic 
acid (TPA) and ethylene glycol (see Table 15). TPA is produced by oxidation of p-
xylene with oxygen from air; the production of dimethyl terephthalic acid (DMT) is also 
based on the oxidation of p-xylene but with an additional reaction with methanol. The 
European production of TPA was about 1.3 million tonnes and of DMT about 0.8 million 
tonnes in 1996 (BREF-orgchem). The use of DMT has continuously been displaced by 
TPA as the preferred industrial route to PET production. Thus, Table 16 only refers to 
the “integrated” intensities of PET based on TPA. In general this process is overall less 
energy-intensive than the concurrent process. The estimation of the energy and CO2-
intensities of the feed products is based on the data given in Table 15 for ethylene glycol 
and p-xylene. The energy and carbon intensities of TPA are taken to be equivalent to the 
ones of p-xylene due to a lack of process details for the conversion from p-xylene to 
TPA. 
Other Polymers 
Besides the basic large volume commodity polymers described above there exists a 
variety of other polymers produced in relatively high volumes for engineering purposes. 
This section looks at five engineering polymers which have market volumes of more than 
1% and use in their production process high volume organic chemicals identified in 
section 3.10.4 or emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases in their production 
process.  
Polyurethanes (PUR), which account for 5.5% of total European polymer production 
volume, are typically used as foams for insulation and packaging applications, as well as 
for mattresses, car seats and footwear. PUR are formed from isocyanates and polyols. 
Commercially important isocyanates are toluene diisocyanate (TDI) and diphenyl 
methane diisocyanate (MDI). Both isocyanates are synthesised from toluene in the case 
of TDI or from benzene in the case of MDI with subsequent nitration (use of nitric acid) 
and phosgenation (from chlorine and formaldehyde). Some of the polyols used in the 
production of PUR are based on ethylene oxide (see Table 15) and propylene oxide. In a 
side reaction of the PUR process, carbon dioxide may be released for foaming the 
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polyurethane foam. However, usually additional blowing agents are used to shape the 
structure of the final product. Typical blowing agents used are methylene chloride, 
carbon dioxide and diverse hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). The greenhouse 
warming potential (GWP) factors of HCFCs are in the range of several hundreds up to 
about 5000. These emissions usually take place off-site (that is, not within the ETS 
installations). 
Aminoplasts with 5.4% of the total European polymer production volume are typically 
used as laminates, surface layers on boards, and as foams. Nowadays, melamine resin is 
the dominating polymer product. Its main feed products are melamine and formaldehyde. 
Melamine is produced from urea. During the process significant amounts of carbon 
dioxide are produced as 6 moles of urea form one mole of melamine, thereby releasing 3 
moles of ammonia and carbon dioxide. Usually, a large amount of the gases are 
recovered to be used for urea production. However, a significant amount of the CO2 
produced in the melamine process is emitted to the atmosphere. At the end of the 1990s 
the production of melamine was about 0.3 million tonnes in Europe (BREF-orgchem). 
Polyamides (PA6, for example, Perlon®, PA66, for example, Nylon®) with 2.7% of the 
European polymer production volume are used as yarns for textiles, ropes and cords as 
well as for mechanical appliances such as dowels, gearwheels, bearings, and so on, and 
electrical insulation appliances. PA6 is produced from caprolactam and PA66 is 
produced from hexamethylenediamine (synthesis based on 1,3 butadiene) and adipic acid 
(see above). Caprolactam and adipic acid are synthesised from the oxidation of 
cyclohexane which is produced from benzene by reacting with hydrogen. The significant 
greenhouse gas emissions during the production of adipic acid due to N2O of about 90 
tCO2eq per tonne of adipic acid were discussed above. Small amounts of N2O are also 
emitted in the production of caprolactam. Theses N2O process emissions amount to about 
9 kg per tonne of caprolactam which corresponds to about 2.7 tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
per tonne of caprolactam. Moreover, terephthalic acid (TPA) is used as feedstock for 
some polyamides. 
Polycarbonates (PC) with 1% of the European polymer production volume are typically 
used for the manufacture of many optical mass products such as lenses, CDs, DVDs, etc. 
Most relevant polycarbonates are produced from bisphenol A (synthesis from benzene) 
and phosgene (from chlorine and formaldehyde). 
Acrylonitrile butadiene styrene (ABS) and Styrene-acrylonitrile resin (SAN) with 1.6% 
of the total European polymer production volume are used for casings, housings and as 
packaging material. Basic organic chemicals used for these polymers are acrylonitrile, 
styrene and butadiene.  
Other important engineering polymers produced in lower quantities are: various 
unsaturated polyesters (1%), phenolic polymers (1%), epoxy polymers (0.8%), 
polymethyl methacrylates (PMMA, 0.7%) and other acrylic polymers (0.6%)41. In 
particular, high performance polymers for special applications are produced at relatively 
low volumes. Typical high performance polymers are polyimides (PI), 
polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE (for example, Teflon®)), polysulfones (PSU, PEES), 
polyetherketones (PEEK) or particular polyamides (such as Kevlar®). 
                                                 
41 Figures in brackets are the shares of output volume 
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